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“Just	  a	  Damned	  Nuisance”:	  New	  Zealand’s	  Changing	  Relationship	  with	  
Israel	  from	  1947	  until	  May	  2010	  
INTRODUCTION	  
	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  frequently	  described	  by	  its	  leaders	  as	  bipartisan.	  The	   current	   Prime	   Minister	   John	   Key,	   for	   example,	   claimed	   in	   2008	   whilst	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  that	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy:	  
…does	  not	  belong	  to	  any	  individual	  political	  party.	  It	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  any	  Prime	  Minister	  or	  any	  government.	  Foreign	  policy	  belongs	   to	   the	  public	  of	  New	   Zealand	   and	   should,	   as	   far	   as	   possible,	   be	   driven	   by	   a	   considered	  evaluation	  of	  their	  evolving	  international	  interest	  and	  not	  by	  perceptions	  of	  narrow	  domestic	  political	  advantage.1	  	  In	  some	  ways	  this	  statement	  is	  a	  true	  reflection	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy.	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   relationship	   with	   Israel,	   consecutive	   New	   Zealand	  governments	   from	   the	   left	   and	   right	   have	   retained	   a	   formal	   official	   policy	   of	  ‘even-­‐handedness’	   throughout	   the	   Israel’s	   existence.	   In	   later	   years	   the	  words	  ‘balanced	  and	  constructive	  approach’	  were	  added	  to	  help	  steer	  New	  Zealand’s	  responses	   towards	   the	   Israel-­‐Palestine	   dispute.	   However	   this	   rhetorical	  stability	  in	  official	  policy	  obscures	  an	  interesting	  and	  dramatic	  story	  of	  shifting	  attitudes,	   tones	   and	   nuances,	   which	   have	   redefined	   and	   refocused	   the	  relationship	   since	   it	   began	   in	   1947	  when	  New	  Zealand	   fought	   tenaciously	   for	  Israel’s	  establishment	  under	  the	  United	  Nations	  Partition	  Plan.	  	  For	  supporters	  of	  Israel,	  the	  election	  of	  John	  Key	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  November	  2008	  heralded	  an	  opportunity	  to	  amend	  a	  relationship	  that	  many	  felt	  had	  fallen	  into	   considerable	   disarray	   under	   the	   previous	   Labour	  Government.	   For	  many	  commentators,	  Helen	  Clark’s	  administration	  had	  been	  hostile	  or	  unsympathetic	  to	  Israel,	  a	   feeling	  that	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  2004	  Mossad	  Passport	  Scandal	  and	   subsequent	   freezing	   of	   diplomatic	   contact	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	  According	   to	   these	   supporters,	   including	   the	   then	   Honorary	   Consul	   of	   Israel,	  








David	  Zwartz,	  New	  Zealand’s	  professed	  policy	  of	   “even-­‐handedness”	  had	  been	  used	   by	   the	   Clark	   Government	   to	   “turn	   away	   from	   former	   friendly	   relations	  with	  Israel.”2	  	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  veracity	  of	  this	  claim	  by	  tracing	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  of	  successive	  New	  Zealand	  Governments	  towards	  Israel,	  from	  its	  formation	  as	  a	  state	   until	   the	   presentation	   of	   credentials	   in	   Wellington	   by	   a	   new	   Israeli	  Ambassador	   in	  May	   2010.	   It	   argues	   that	   sympathy	   towards	   Israel	   has	   indeed	  declined	   since	   1945	   due	   to	   a	   number	   of	  material	   and	   ideological	   factors,	   not	  least,	  a	  concern	  over	  Israel’s	  actions	  in	  the	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territories.	  The	   focus	   of	   this	   research	   is	   a	   timely	   one.	   Israel	   reopened	   its	   Embassy	   in	  Wellington	   in	  May	  2010	  after	  an	  eight-­‐year	  hiatus.	  Less	   than	  one	  month	  after	  the	   presentation	   of	   credentials	   to	   the	   Governor	   General	   of	   New	   Zealand,	   the	  new	  Israeli	  Ambassador	  Shemi	  Tzur	  was	  called	  into	  the	  Beehive	  to	  explain	  the	  policies	   of	   the	   Israeli	   Government	   regarding	   the	   storming	   of	   an	   aid	   flotilla	  heading	   to	   Gaza	   to	   break	   the	   blockade.	   A	   New	   Zealand	   citizen,	   Nicola	  Enchmarch,	   was	   one	   of	   the	   activists	   on	   the	   flotilla	   who	   was	   subsequently	  arrested	   and	  deported	   from	   Israel.	   Foreign	  Minister	  Murray	  McCully	   released	  not	   one,	   but	   two	   statements	   about	   this	   issue	   on	   the	   same	   day.	   The	   first	  condemned	   the	   storming	   of	   the	   flotilla	   and	   the	   second	   explained	   the	   New	  Zealand	  response.	  According	  to	  this	  second	  press	  release	  McCully	  conveyed	  the	  Government’s	   “concern”	   over	   the	   incident	   to	   the	   Ambassador	   as	   well	   as	  communicating	   the	   feeling	   that	   the	   blockade	   of	   Gaza	  was	   “unsustainable	   and	  there	  should	  be	  an	   intensification	  of	   the	  effort	  to	   find	  a	  solution.”3	  The	  careful	  attention	  the	  new	  National	  government	  gave	  to	  the	  issue	  reflects	  the	  very	  high	  level	   of	   public	   interest	   in	   ties	   with	   Israel.	   	   In	   some	   ways	   this	   interest	   is	  surprising,	  given	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Israel	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  one	  in	  strategic,	  economic,	  cultural	  or	  even	  historical	  terms.	  	  	  What	  explains	  this	  intense	  interest	  on	  the	  part	  of	  New	  Zealanders?	  Why	  has	  the	  New	   Zealand-­‐Israel	   relationship	   seen	   such	   dramatic	   ups	   and	   downs	   over	   the	  








course	   of	   the	   last	   fifty	   years?	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   major	  economic	   material	   links	   combined	   with	   periodic	   bursts	   of	   intense	   public	  interest	   in	   Israel	  has	  created	  a	   relationship	  whose	   tone	   is	   shaped	  by	   the	  calm	  but	  critical	  hand	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  (MFAT).	   	  MFAT’s	  interest-­‐based	  approach	  however,	  has	  been	  punctured	  every	  now	  and	  then	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  well-­‐placed	  individual	  acting	  as	  a	  result	  of	  passion	  or	  instinct,	  or	  responding	   to	   international	   trends.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	  dynamic	  between	   critical	  institutional	  stability	  and	  individual	  manoeuvring	  has	  reshaped	  the	  relationship	  in	  a	  remarkable	  way	  over	  the	  years.	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  tell	  that	  story.	  	  
Examination	  of	  the	  literature	  
 Unlike	   Australia	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   history	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   foreign	  affairs	  has	  not	  been	  subject	  to	  great	  academic	  debate.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  a	  reflection	  of	   New	   Zealand	   society,	   as	   elections	   are	   rarely	   decided	   upon	   foreign	   policy	  concerns	  and	  there	  is	  little	  interest	  in	  international	  issues	  amongst	  a	  significant	  section	  of	  the	  population.	  Of	  the	  literature	  that	  does	  exist,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  fair	  amount	   of	   research	   conducted	   into	   the	   foreign	   policy	   outlooks	   of	   the	   Labour	  Party	   but	  much	   less	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   the	  National	   Party.	   There	   has	  been	   a	   notable	   focus	   on	  New	  Zealand’s	   so-­‐called	   search	   for	   ‘independence’	   in	  foreign	  policy,	  a	  formulation	  which	  tends	  to	  obscure	  the	  reactive	  and	  pragmatic	  qualities	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   foreign	   affairs.	   Some	   academics	   have	   advanced	  theories	  comparing	  National	  to	  Labour	  Governments	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  traditional	  international	   relations	   paradigms	   of	   realism	   and	   liberal	   internationalism,	   but	  this	  seems	  to	  simplify	  a	  complex	  series	  of	  events	  and	  policy	  choices	  and	  ignores	  phenomena	   which	   do	   not	   fit	   the	   paradigms.4	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   almost	   a	  








complete	  absence	  of	  material	  on	  the	  New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	  relationship	  and,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  does	  exist	  much	  of	  it	  is	  transparently	  partisan.	  	  Former	  diplomats	  have	  written	  much	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  diplomatic	  history	  and	  there	   is	   a	   relative	   lack	   of	   historiography	   and	   more	   of	   an	   emphasis	   on	  descriptive	   accounts	   based	   on	   personal	   experience.	  Not	   surprisingly,	  many	   of	  these	  accounts	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  world	  events,	  and	   in	   doing	   so	   they	   sometimes	   neglect	   the	   impact	   of	   world	   events	   on	   New	  Zealand.	   While	   valuable	   and	   interesting,	   they	   largely	   recount	   of	   historical	  events	   rather	   than	   addressing	   broader	   patterns	   in	   the	   country’s	   international	  relations.	   The	  most	   important	   exception	   to	   this	   trend	   is	  Malcolm	  McKinnon’s	  
Independence	   and	   Foreign	   Policy.5	   McKinnon	   argues	   that	   New	   Zealand’s	   early	  foreign	  relations	  were	  mediated	  through	  the	  Commonwealth	  and	  consequently	  independence	   in	   New	   Zealand’s	   foreign	   relations	   tended	   to	   fall	   into	   two	  categories:	  vigorous	  assertion	  of	  local	  interests	  and	  independence	  expressed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  loyal	  dissent.	  Assertion	   of	   interest	   is	   explained	   by	   McKinnon	   essentially	   as	   a	   form	   of	  “speaking	  up”	  especially	  regarding	  the	  economic	  and	  strategic	  concerns	  of	   the	  country	  despite	  the	   interests	  of	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries,	  or	   later	  other	  UN	  member	   states.6	   In	   the	   case	  of	   the	   relationship	  with	   Israel,	   interest	  would	  compel	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  to	  move	  to	  develop	  economic	  links	  with	  Arab	  states	  and	  minimise	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Israel	  relationship.	  	  More	   commonly	   utilised	   in	   the	   early	   period	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   relations	   with	  Israel	   was	   the	   second	   form	   of	   independence:	   the	   idea	   of	   loyal	   dissent.	  McKinnon’s	   concept	   comes	   from	   the	   British	   parliamentary	   system	   where	   an	  opposition	   was	   conceived	   not	   as	   seditious	   but	   loyal.	   This	   notion	   of	  independence	  was	  a	  “progressive	  critique	  of	  an	  existing	  pattern,	  which	  did	  not,	  








however,	  challenge	  its	  underlying	  structure.”7	  Loyal	  dissent	  was	  envisaged	  as	  a	  means	   to	   direct	   Britain	   or	   other	   states	   within	   the	   Commonwealth	   to	   more	  enlightened	   purposes.8	   There	   are	   several	   examples	   of	   this	   form	   of	  independence	   in	   the	   early	   relationship	   with	   Israel,	   probably	   most	   noticeably	  when	   Prime	   Minister	   Peter	   Fraser’s	   deep	   personal	   concerns	   for	   the	   Jewish	  people	  led	  him	  to	  support	  Partition,	  despite	  British	  objections.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  New	  Zealand	  has	  always	  officially	  expressed	  a	  stated	  aim	  of	  acting	  in	  an	  even-­‐handed	  way	  towards	  Israel,	  the	  Arab	  states	  and	  Iran.	  It	  has	  always	  supported	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution.	  It	  has	  always	  recognised	  Tel	  Aviv	  as	  the	  capital	   of	   Israel	   rather	   than	   Israel’s	   self-­‐declared	   capital	   of	   Jerusalem.	   New	  Zealand	   has	   been	   a	   core	   funder	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   programme	   for	  Palestinian	  refugees	  (UNRWA)	  and	  remains	  committed	  to	  providing	  aid	  for	  this	  cause.	   It	   does	   not	   recognise	   territory	   acquired	   in	   war,	   including	   the	   land	  acquired	  after	  the	  1967	  Six-­‐Day	  War,	  and	  consequently	  does	  not	  recognise	  the	  Israeli	   settlements	   in	   the	   Occupied	   Palestinian	   Territories.	   MFAT	   proudly	  proclaims	  that	  its	  “carefully	  balanced	  position	  is	  consistent	  with	  New	  Zealand’s	  international	  reputation	  for	  fair-­‐mindedness.	  It	  reflects	  the	  value	  we,	  as	  a	  small	  country,	   place	   on	   the	   international	   rule	   of	   law.”9	   However,	   the	   veneer	   of	  stability	  in	  official	  policy	  conceals	  a	  changing	  and	  dynamic	  relationship	  that	  has	  undergone	  significant	   shifts	   in	   tone,	  nuance,	  and	  political	   support	  within	  New	  Zealand.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   identifies	   two	   themes	   as	   key	   factors	   explaining	   the	   changing	   tone	  and	   nuances	   in	   the	   relationship.	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	   dynamic	   between	   the	  institutional	   preferences	   of	  New	  Zealand	   foreign	  ministry	   and	   the	   role	   of	   key	  individuals	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	   the	   relationship.	   It	   argues	   that	   certain	   Prime	  Ministers	   and	   Foreign	   Ministers	   have	   had	   opportunities	   to	   influence	   the	  bilateral	   relationship	   more	   so	   than	   may	   have	   been	   the	   case	   with	   other	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  Ibid.,	  p.	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  Ibid.	  9	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countries,	   in	   part	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   material	   repercussions	   in	   changing	  policy.	  	  The	  second	  theme	  is	  the	  impact	  that	  wider	  global	  trends	  and	  events	  have	  played	  in	  shaping	  the	  New	  Zealand	  –	  Israel	  relationship.	  I	  argue	  there	  are	  two	  parts	  to	  this	   international	   influence:	   the	   first	   is	   linked	   to	  changing	  material	   incentives,	  particularly	   the	  growing	   importance	  of	  Arab	  oil	   from	  the	  1970s	  onwards.	  The	  second	  is	  an	  ideational	  influence,	  specifically	  the	  way	  the	  Palestinian	  issue	  came	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  social	   justice	  concern	   for	  parties	  of	   the	   left	   internationally	   from	  the	  1970s	  on.	   Israel	  went	   from	  being	  a	   leftwing	  cause,	   to	  a	   situation	  where	   it	  became	   a	   state	   more	   likely	   to	   receive	   political	   support	   from	   centre-­‐right	  elements	   in	  New	  Zealand,	   in	  accordance	  with	  wider	  global	   trends.	  This	   theme	  acknowledges	   and	   attempts	   to	   contribute	   to	   recent	   reinterpretations	   of	   New	  Zealand	   history	   that	   question	   the	   uniqueness	   or	   distinctiveness	   of	   the	   New	  Zealand	   experience	   arguing	   instead	   that	   “events	   in	   New	   Zealand	   have	   their	  origins	  beyond	  New	  Zealand’s	  shores.”10	  Despite	   the	   remarkable	   amount	   of	   ink	   spilled	   about	   Israel	   and	  Palestine	   both	  within	   New	   Zealand	   and	   internationally,	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   between	  Israel	   and	   New	   Zealand	   has	   escaped	   significant	   scholarly	   attention.	   Within	  broader	  studies	  of	  New	  Zealand	  history	  and	   in	  several	  political	  biographies	  of	  notable	  New	  Zealanders	  there	  are	  fleeting	  mentions	  of	  Israel	  but	  no	  major	  study	  of	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   exists.	   One	   of	   the	   few	   works	   produced	   by	   an	  academic	   is	   a	   paper	   by	   Stephen	   Rainbow	   entitled,	   “The	   Changing	   Attitude	   of	  New	  Zealand	  Towards	   Israel	   from	  1948-­‐1993.”	  A	   founder	  of	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Green	   Party,	   Rainbow	   was	   moved	   to	   write	   this	   piece	   after	   he	   became	  disillusioned	  with	  what	  he	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  fickle	  nature	  of	  leftwing	  politics	  and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   steady	   movement	   away	   from	   Israel	   towards	   the	  embracing	   of	   Palestine.11	  Whilst	   Rainbow	   offers	   an	   invaluable	   analysis	   of	   the	  relationship	  and	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  historiography,	  he	  focuses	  too	  much	  on	  the	  changing	   attitudes	   of	   Labour	   Governments	   and	   consequently	   downplays	   the	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material	   motivations	   for	   policy	   change	   that	   occurred	   under	   the	   Muldoon	  Government.	  Also,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  left	  from	  Israel,	  Rainbow	  seems	   to	   imply	   that	   even-­‐handedness	   is	   only	   achieved	   by	   enthusiastically	  supporting	  Israel.	  	  Another	   exception	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   material	   on	   the	   relationship	   is	   an	   article	  written	  for	  The	  Round	  Table	  journal	  by	  Jacob	  Abadi	  entitled	  “New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	  Relations:	   The	   Political	   and	   Economic	   Imperatives”.12	   Abadi	   is	   a	   prolific	  commentator	  on	   Israel	  who	  has	  published	  several	  articles	  on	   Israel’s	  bilateral	  relations,	   including	   analyses	   of	   its	   relationship	   with	   Turkey,	   Sweden,	   and	  Britain.	   However,	   in	   his	   article	   on	   New	   Zealand,	   Abadi	   relies	   extensively	   on	  somewhat	   dubious	   source	   material	   including	   multiple	   references	   from	   the	  conservative	   Israeli	   newspaper	  The	   Jerusalem	   Post	   and	  makes	   several	   factual	  errors	   including	   the	  misspelling	   of	   former	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	   Peter	  Fraser’s	  name.	  His	  work	  does	  offer,	  however,	  a	  useful	  source	  for	  understanding	  Israeli	  attitudes	   towards	   the	  relationship	  based	  on	  his	   interviews	  with	   former	  Israeli	  Ambassadors	   to	  New	  Zealand	  and	  a	  small	  quantity	  of	  archival	  research	  within	  Israel.	  	  A	  final	  source	  of	  secondary	  material	  for	  this	  thesis	  came	  from	  various	  works	  by	  pro-­‐Palestinian	   advocate	   Ron	  McIntyre	   from	   Canterbury	   University.	   McIntyre	  gathered	  together	  a	  cluster	  of	  academics	  and	  activists	  who	  worked	  with	  him	  on	  the	   New	   Zealand	   Aotearoa	   Palestinian	   Review	   that	   lobbied	   politicians	  throughout	   the	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s.	   His	   work	   offers	   a	   useful	   explanatory	  basis	  for	  New	  Zealand’s	  relations	  with	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries	  in	  general,	  but	  his	   observations	   on	   Israel	   tend	   to	   advocate	   only	   the	   Palestinian	   perspective	  with	  such	  minimal	  consideration	  of	  the	  Israeli	  perspective	  that	  his	  conclusions	  can	   sometimes	   be	   dismissed	   as	   partisan.	   Other	   scholars	   working	   on	   the	  Palestinian	   New	   Zealand	   relationship	   include	   Nigel	   Parsons	   from	   Massey	  University,	   although	   he	   tends	   to	   focus	   his	   research	   more	   on	   the	   Israel-­‐
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Palestinian	   dispute	   rather	   than	   attitudes	   directed	   towards	   Israel	   or	   Palestine	  from	  within	  New	  Zealand.	  The	   dearth	   of	   secondary	   material	   has	   meant	   this	   thesis	   has	   had	   to	   draw	   at	  length	   on	   primary	   resources.	  Much	   of	   the	   pre-­‐Lange	  material	   has	   come	   from	  archival	   investigations	  at	  Archives	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  main	  archival	  collections	  utilised	  were	  the	  records	  from	  New	  Zealand’s	  Permanent	  Residence	  in	  the	  UN,	  archives	  from	  other	  New	  Zealand	  missions	  abroad,	  Cabinet	  Paper	  archives,	  and	  finally	   records	   from	   the	   Department	   of	   External	   Affairs/Ministry	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	   in	  Wellington.13	  Post-­‐Lange	   information	  has	   come	  predominantly	   from	  material	  requested	  under	  the	  Official	   Information	  Act	  and	  interviews	  with	  key	  individuals.	   Approximately	   thirty-­‐five	   people	   were	   interviewed	   in	   a	   semi-­‐structured	  fashion	  within	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia.	  The	  interviewees	  ranged	  from	  former	  Prime	  Ministers,	   current	  and	   former	  Foreign	  Ministers,	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  (MPs)	  from	  most	  New	  Zealand	  political	  parties,	  former	  diplomats,	  the	  Israeli	  and	  Palestinian	  ambassadors	  to	  New	  Zealand,	  academics,	  journalists,	  Jewish	   community	   representatives,	   business	   representatives,	   activists	   and	  interest	   groups.	   Other	   material	   came	   from	   Labour	   Party	   remits,	   UN	   voting	  statements,	  and	  news	  sources.	  	  It	  is	  readily	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  narrow	  one.	  Several	  important	   and	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   have	   not	   been	  pursued	  in	  this	  research.	  The	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  government-­‐to-­‐government	  relationship	   and	   emphasises	   diplomatic	   rather	   than	   people-­‐to-­‐people	  connections,	   with	   slight	   concessions	   to	   the	   role	   of	   public	   opinion	   in	   shaping	  New	   Zealand’s	   foreign	   relations.	   The	   concluding	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis	   will	  consequently	  discuss	  some	  of	  these	  neglected	  elements	  as	  possible	  avenues	  for	  further	  research.	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Prime	  Minister	  Peter	  Fraser	  at	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Conference	  1945	  14	  	  This	   chapter	   traces	   the	   development	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand-­‐Israeli	   relationship	  from	  shortly	  before	  New	  Zealand’s	  formal	  recognition	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  until	  the	   end	   of	  Walter	  Nash’s	   single	   term	   Labour	   Government	   in	   1960.	   This	   early	  period	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  strong	  degree	  of	  romantic	  attachment	  to	  the	  young	  Israeli	   state,	  a	  continued	  attachment	   to	   the	  British	  Empire,	  concern	   from	  New	  Zealand	   diplomats	   over	   post-­‐war	   security	   and	   a	   corresponding	   shift	   towards	  Southeast	  Asia	  as	  the	  strategic	  operating	  theatre.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  period	  when	  New	  Zealand’s	  fledging	  diplomatic	  corps	  was	  finding	  its	  feet	  amid	  the	  disorder	  of	   the	   post-­‐war	   world.	   This	   group	   was	   anxious	   to	   assert	   the	   right	   of	   New	  Zealand,	  despite	  its	  small	  size	  and	  isolation,	  to	  have	  a	  more	  independent	  voice	  in	  global	  affairs.	  But	  as	  McKinnon	  notes	   this	  sense	  of	   independence	   in	   foreign	  policy	  was	  a	  limited	  one.	  Fundamentally	  it	  remained	  within	  the	  Commonwealth	  model	  of	  consent-­‐based	  diplomacy.	  	  	  In	   many	   ways	   the	   period	   from	   1948-­‐1960	   represents	   a	   time	   of	   unsurpassed	  warmth	   in	   the	   New	   Zealand-­‐Israel	   relationship.	   There	   was	   widespread	  admiration	   and	   sympathy	   for	   the	   fledging	   Jewish	   state.	   This	   support	   was	  especially	  strong	  from	  Labour	  Party	  members,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  personal	  ties	  to	   individual	   Israelis	   through	   connections	   like	   the	   International	   Labour	  Organisation.15	   	   Labourites	   saw	   Israel	   as	   a	   “small,	   pioneering	   and	   egalitarian	  society”	   much	   like	   New	   Zealand,	   and	   viewed	   the	   political	   aspirations	   of	   the	  Zionist	   movement	   with	   sympathy.16	   Moreover,	   anti-­‐Semitism	   was	   a	  comparatively	   insignificant	   issue	   in	  New	  Zealand	  due	  mainly	   to	   the	  small	   size	  and	  assimilative	  qualities	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community,	  as	  well	  as	  real	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  horror	  once	  the	  terrors	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  became	  known.17	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In	  1941	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion,	   Israel’s	   future	  Prime	  Minister,	  visited	  New	  Zealand	  en	  route	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  He	  received	  a	  very	  favourable	  welcome,	  including	  the	   unexpected	   attendance	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Peter	   Fraser	   at	   one	   of	   his	  speeches.18	   The	   inaugural	   issue	   of	   the	  New	   Zealand	   Jewish	   Chronicle	   reported	  that	  Fraser	  gave	  a	  speech	  at	  this	  event	  which	  was	  praised	  as	  “an	  understanding	  and	  thoughtful	  address.”19	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  spoke	  highly	  about	  his	   trip	  through	  the	  antipodes	  remarking	  that	  “there	  are	  not	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  where	  one	  would	   encounter	   such	   warmth	   and	   informality.”20	   Stephen	   Rainbow	   argues,	  although	   without	   much	   evidence,	   that	   this	   favourable	   reception	   made	   Ben-­‐Gurion	   seek	   a	   more	   radical	   programme	   than	   he	   originally	   intended:	   the	  Biltmore	  Programme	  which	  “featured	  as	  its	  core	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state	  in	  Palestine”.21	  	  	  Fraser	  had	  many	  close	  Jewish	  friends	  in	  Wellington	  and	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  goals	   of	   the	   Zionist	  movement.22	   This	   attitude	  was	   recognised	   and	   valued	   by	  some	  in	  the	  international	  Jewish	  Diaspora.	  For	  example	  in	  May	  1947	  Fraser	  was	  sent	  a	  letter	  by	  Mr	  Louis	  Phillips	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Council	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	   the	   Jewish	   congregations	   of	   Auckland,	   Wellington,	   and	   Christchurch.	   He	  listed	   various	   New	   Zealand	   personalities	   considered	   to	   be	   compassionate	  supporters	  of	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  Of	  Fraser,	  Philips	  said	  “you	  have	  been	  outstanding	  and	  your	  name	  is	  honoured	  among	  Jews	  everywhere	  because	  you	   have	   shown	   such	   sympathy	   and	   understanding.”23	   This	   admiration	   was	  reciprocated:	   in	   1945	   Fraser	   wrote	   to	   the	   Zionist	   fundraising	   organisation	  Keren	  Hayesod	  to	  congratulate	  it	  for	  its	  “magnificent	  service	  to	  Palestine	  where	  again	  as	   in	  biblical	  days	  desert	  places	  have	  been	  made	   into	  pleasant	   land	  and	  where	   the	   children	   of	   Israel	   enjoy	   health	   and	   happiness.”24	   He	   also	   wrote	   to	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Nahum	  Goldmann,	  Head	  of	   the	   Jewish	  Agency	   for	  Palestine	   to	  assure	  him	  that	  New	  Zealand	   felt	   that	   “the	  problem	  of	   the	   Jews	   in	  Europe	   cannot	  be	  divorced	  from	   the	   problem	   in	   Palestine”	   guaranteeing	   that	   “the	   New	   Zealand	  Government	  will	  do	  what	   it	   can	   to	  assist	   in	   reaching	  a	  decision	  which	  will	  do	  justice	   to	   the	   Jewish	   people	   and	   bring	   peace	   and	   progress	   to	   Palestine.”25	  Officials	   sometimes	   felt	   Fraser	   need	   to	   be	   constrained.	   In	   1948	   during	   the	  heated	  debate	  over	   Israel’s	  recognition,	  Alister	  McIntosh,	  one	  of	  Fraser’s	  most	  senior	  officials,	  attempted	  to	  stem	  what	  he	  called	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  “Zionist	  exuberance”	   and	   Fraser	   was	   reluctantly	   forced	   by	   Cabinet	   to	   delay	   New	  Zealand’s	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  Israel	  at	  the	  request	  of	  Britain.26	  	  Within	   New	   Zealand’s	   defence	   community	   warm	   relations	   had	   developed	  between	   the	   yishuv	   (small	   Jewish	   communities)	   and	   New	   Zealand	   soldiers	  serving	   in	   the	   two	   world	   wars	   in	   Palestine	   and	   the	   broader	   Middle	   East.27	  Official	  New	  Zealand	  historian	  and	  Brigade	  Major	  C.	  Guy	  Powles	  described	  the	  
yishuv	  encountered	  in	  the	  Sinai	  and	  Palestine	  with	  warmth	  and	  admiration.	  He	  described	   several	   “happy	   meetings	   with	   English	   speaking	   Jewish	   Colonists”,	  including	   Jews	   who	   had	   immigrated	   from	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand,	   and	  commented	   at	   length	   on	   the	   modernity,	   beauty	   and	   lushness	   of	   the	   Jewish	  settlements.28	  These	  views	  stood	   in	  stark	  contrast	   to	  what	  was	   for	  many	  New	  Zealand	   troops	   an	   explicitly	   anti-­‐Arab	   attitude.	   As	   Powles	   put	   it:	   “the	   Arab	  Mahomedan	  [sic]	   is	  without	  humour,	  sympathy	  or	  the	  elements	  of	  cleanliness;	  and	  his	  only	  smile	   is	  one	  of	  deceit.”29	  The	  Arab	  states’	  refusal	  to	  recognise	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel	  in	  1948	  did	  little	  to	  change	  this	  widely	  held	  view.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Arab	   attitude	  was	   so	   uncompromising	   that	   according	   to	   historian	   and	   former	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diplomat	   Malcolm	   Templeton	   “New	   Zealand	   tended	   to	   overlook	   the	   fact	   that	  they	  had	  a	  case”.30	  	  Generally	  within	   the	  Labour	  Party	  at	   this	   time	   there	  was	  a	  sense	  of	   sympathy	  and	  romance	  towards	  the	  nascent	  socialist	  state	  of	  Israel.	  In	  many	  of	  the	  official	  speeches	   and	   early	   documents	   on	   Israel,	   biblical	   imagery	   was	   evoked	   to	  describe	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population,	  with	  references	  made	  to	  blooming	  deserts	   and	   water	   brought	   forth	   from	   the	   rocks.31	   Many	   New	   Zealand	  Labourites	   saw	   similarities	   between	   the	   two	   states	   including	   their	   small	   size,	  democratic	   tradition,	   reliance	  on	  agriculture,	  and	   the	  desire	   to	  create	  a	  better	  society.	  There	  was	  also	  an	  attraction	  felt	  by	  Labour	  leaders	  for	  a	  country	  “born	  of	   the	   same	   European	   socialist	   heritage	   as	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Labour	   Party.”32	  Abba	  Eban,	  Israel’s	  first	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN),	  reinforced	  this	  perception,	  explaining	   in	  his	  memoirs	  that	  New	  Zealanders	  were	  “endemically	  pro-­‐Israel,	  as	  though	  an	  understanding	  of	  our	  enterprise	  came	  to	  them	  from	  the	  very	  air	  of	   their	  pioneering	  experience.”33	  Furthermore,	   the	  post	  war	  guilt	   felt	  for	   Jewish	  victims	  of	   the	  Holocaust	  was	   compounded	  by	  knowledge	   that	  New	  Zealand’s	   immigration	   policies	   during	   the	   war	   had	   been	   unnecessarily	  restrictive.	   Officials	   had	   limited	   the	   number	   of	   Jewish	   refugees	   from	   Europe	  because	   as	   one	   report	   put	   it,	   “there	   is	   a	   major	   difficulty	   of	   absorbing	   these	  people	  in	  our	  cultural	  life	  without	  raising	  a	  feeling	  of	  antipathy	  to	  them.”34	  	  Fraser	   was	   fascinated	   by	   international	   affairs	   and	   kept	   up	   his	   knowledge	   of	  global	   issues	  by	  relentlessly	  following	  international	  newspapers.	  After	  Michael	  Savage’s	  death	  in	  1940	  he	  became	  both	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Minister	  of	  External	  Affairs.	   Fraser	   emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   an	   independent	   foreign	   policy,	  however	   paradoxically	   this	   could	   sometimes	   involve	   closer	   cooperation	   with	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other	   states,	  particularly	  within	   the	  Commonwealth.35	  McKinnon	  explains	   this	  paradox	  as	  a	  notion	  of	  acceptable	  independence	  where	  New	  Zealand	  preferred	  to	   operate	   in	   a	   realm	   of	   consensus	   within	   the	   Commonwealth	   and	   other	  multilateral	  bodies	  rather	  than	  a	  world	  where	  power	  politics	  or	  coercion	  were	  the	   norm.36	   This	   desire	   to	   avoid	   power	   politics	   was	   coupled	   with	   a	   strong	  degree	  of	  internationalism	  and	  a	  global	  awareness	  from	  the	  political	  left,	  which	  had	   been	   brought	   into	   sharp	   relief	   by	   the	   two	   World	   Wars	   and	   their	  aftermath.37	  	  Fraser	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   New	   Zealanders	   who	   has	   been	   recognised	   as	   an	  international	   statesman,	   a	   reputation	   that	   is	   probably	   overstated	   but	   largely	  attributable	  to	  his	  role	  at	  the	  1945	  San	  Francisco	  conference,	  which	  established	  the	   UN.	   At	   the	   conference	   he	   was	   applauded	   for	   taking	   a	   principled	   line	   in	  discussions	   as	   he	   sought	   to	   defend	   the	   rights	   of	   small	   states	   by	   opposing	   the	  imposition	   of	   Great	   Power	   veto.38	   	   It	   was	   also	   here	   that	   Fraser	   made	   an	  impassioned	  speech	  in	  support	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state	  in	  Palestine	  invoking	  romantic	  imagery	   typical	   of	   socialist	   supporters	   of	   Israel.	   He	   declared	   that	   “everyone	  living	   in	   Palestine	  would	   naturally	   benefit	   from	  what	   the	   Jewish	   people	   have	  made	   out	   of	   a	   land	   which	   was	   once	   a	   desert,	   until	   the	   desert	   bloomed	   as	   a	  rose.”39	   Fraser’s	   support	   for	   Israel	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   his	   general	  foreign	   policy	   ideology:	   a	   strong	   belief	   in	   a	   rules	   based	   international	   order	  system	  which	  promoted	  the	  UN	  as	  “the	  best	  means	  of	  securing	  universal	  peace	  and	   justice	  and	  placing	   the	   fullest	   insistence	  on	   its	  organs	   for	   the	  solutions	  of	  international	  problems.”40	  In	   1947,	   New	   Zealand	   joined	   with	   Australia,	   Guatemala,	   the	   Soviet	   Bloc	   and	  Uruguay	  to	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  under	  UN	  Resolution	  181,	  which	  proposed	  Partition.	  Britain	  abstained.	  Shortly	  before	  the	  vote	  Fraser	  sent	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an	   urgent	   and	   top	   secret	   request	   to	   British	   Prime	   Minister	   Clement	   Attlee	  seeking	   clarification	   on	   the	   position	   Britain	   was	   to	   take	   in	   the	   vote.	   Fraser	  explained	   that,	   “though	   I	   naturally	   cannot	   promise	   support	   in	   advance,	   I	   am	  anxious	  that	  our	  delegation	  should	  not	  through	  ignorance	  of	  your	  objectives	  in	  Palestine	  take	  a	  line	  which	  would	  embarrass	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  delegation.”41	  However	   it	   was	   not	   any	   lack	   of	   consultation	   that	   convinced	   New	   Zealand	   to	  refrain	   from	   following	   the	   British	   line	   on	   Partition,	   but	   rather	   the	   result	   of	  individual	  passions	  within	  New	  Zealand’s	  young	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs.	  Abba	   Eban	   later	   reported	   how	   New	   Zealand	   diplomats	   “fought	   tenaciously	  against	  any	  step	  which	  might	  prejudice	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state.”42	  	  Of	  particular	  importance	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  New	  Zealand’s	  representative	  at	  the	  UN,	   Sir	   Carl	   Berendsen.	   Berendsen	   was	   a	   conservative	   who	   emphatically	  believed	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  collective	  security	  and	  adamantly	  opposed	  use	  of	  the	  veto	  in	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  Asserting	  New	  Zealand’s	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  global	  organisation	  despite	  its	  small	  size,	  he	  said	  “[i]f	  blood,	  tears,	  anguish	  and	  sacrifice,	  are	  the	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  our	  proportionate	  voice	  in	  the	  world	  today,	  then	  we	  in	  New	  Zealand	  have	  paid	  that	  price.”43	  Of	  the	  veto	  he	  described	  how	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia’s	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  its	  inclusion	  were	  met	  by	  the	   Great	   Powers	   “with	   that	   kind	   of	   friendly	   and	   patronising	   tolerance	   that	  adults	   show	   to	   a	   fractious	   child.”44	   He	   viewed	   the	   Palestinian	   issue	   as	   an	  important	  first	  test	  in	  collective	  security	  for	  the	  budding	  UN	  and	  was	  dismayed	  to	  see	  it	  fail	  under	  repeated	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  flouting	  of	  the	  UN	  mandate.	  In	   1966	   an	   External	   Affairs	   background	   paper	   prepared	   in	   advance	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	   term	   on	   the	   Security	   Council	   described	   New	   Zealand’s	   position	   on	  Partition.	   It	   noted	   that	   the	   feeling	   at	   that	   time	   was	   that	   the	   Israel-­‐Palestine	  conflict	  was	  “one	  between	  two	  nationalisms,	  and	  Partition	  was	  the	  only	  means	  of	  granting	  each	  an	  expression.	  Impartial	  as	  this	  conclusion	  may	  have	  appeared;	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it	   in	  fact	  involved	  a	  basic	  acceptance	  of	  Jewish	  claims.”45	  Berendsen	  supported	  this	   statement	   in	  his	  memoirs	  explaining	  how	  “[t]he	  Arabs	  had	  a	   case	   that	  no	  power,	   great	   or	   small,	   had	   a	   right	   to	   give	   away	   land	   that	   had	   been	   Arab	   for	  centuries.	  The	   Jews	  had	  a	   case,	   essentially	  weaker,	   in	   the	  Balfour	  Declaration,	  with	   its	   concept	   of	   a	   National	   Home.”46	   He	   explained	   how	   “in	   this	   unhappy	  situation,	   Partition	   provided	   the	   best	   solution	   available	   at	   the	   time.”47	   By	  supporting	  Partition,	   and	   consequently	   allowing	   for	   the	   formation	  of	   a	   Jewish	  state	   despite	   the	   relative	   weakness	   of	   the	   case,	   New	   Zealand	   was	   effectively	  favouring	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  Partition	  divided	   the	   territory	   in	  a	   jig-­‐saw	   like	   fashion	   into	   seven	  parts,	   three	  each	  for	  Israel	  and	  Palestine	  with	  Jerusalem	  reserved	  as	  an	  international	  zone	  and	  with	   inter-­‐state	   connection	   through	   economic	   union.	   	   Berendsen’s	  major	  concern	  with	  Partition	  was	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  UN	  to	  enforce	  it.	  Despite	  this,	  when	  Partition	   seemed	   to	   be	   in	   danger	   of	   becoming	   an	   American	   led	   Trusteeship	  proposal	   a	   few	   months	   later,	   he	   furiously	   charged	   that	   “if	   partition	   with	  economic	  union	  was	  right	  in	  November	  it	  is	  right	  today.”48	  	  The	   plan	   was	   immediately	   rejected	   by	   five	   neighbouring	   Arab	   nations	   who	  invaded	   Israel	   in	  May	  1948.	   Israel’s	   counter	   attack	  not	  only	   re-­‐conquered	   the	  lost	   territory	   but	   also	   secured	   large	   tracts	   of	   land	   designated	   for	   the	   Arab	  state.49	   After	   the	   war,	   Berendsen	  maintained	   that	   “having	   departed	   from	   the	  path	   of	   principle,	   the	   Assembly	   now	   found	   itself	   floundering	   in	   the	   mire	   of	  expediency”	   referring	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   UN	   to	   ensure	   compliance	  with	   the	  plan.50	  Looking	  back	  on	  this	  tumultuous	  period,	  Berendsen	  noted	  that	  “[n]ever	  did	   a	   people	   get	   a	   more	   rapid	   and	   humiliating	   defeat	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   an	  apparently	   weaker	   foe”	   but	   added	   that	   “the	   Arabs	   had	   thrown	   away	   their	  








sympathy”	   by	   choosing	  war.51	   The	  most	   fundamental	   outcome	   of	   the	   conflict	  was	  that	  it	  made	  the	  implementation	  of	  Partition	  impractical.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fighting	  Israel	  declared	  independence.	  This	  claim	  was	  almost	  immediately	   accepted	   by	   the	   United	   States	   to	   the	   great	   surprise	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	  diplomats.	  Berendsen	  described	  it	  as	  a	  “totally	  unexpected	  move”	  that	  “cut	  the	  Gordian	  knot”	  on	  the	  standoff	  over	  recognition	  as	  well	  as	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Partition	  plan.52	  	  Israel	  sought	  recognition	  from	  New	  Zealand	  on	  the	  18th	  November	  1948.	  Britain	  attempted	  to	  prevent	  New	  Zealand	  doing	  so,	  believing	  that	   recognition	   of	   the	   Jewish	   state	  would	   tarnish	   Britain’s	   reputation	  within	  the	  region,	  and	  as	  Alistair	  McIntosh	  admitted,	  “they	  [Britain]	  have	  played	  their	  hand	  very	  cleverly	  and	  succeeded	  so	  far.”53	  Fraser	  was	  keen	  to	  recognise	  Israel	  immediately	  but	  was	  overruled	  by	  Cabinet,	  and	  forced	  not	  to	  move	  until	  Britain	  did.	   	   McIntosh,	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Foss	   Shanahan	   explained	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	  highly	  unusual	  action	  by	  Cabinet:	  	  
The	   Prime	   Minister	   has	   been	   somewhat	   put	   out	   but	   has	   played	   along	   very	  loyally	  with	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   His	   attitude	   has	   been	   helped	   by	   that	   of	   his	  colleges	  in	  Cabinet,	  who	  are	  80	  percent	  of	  them	  opposed	  to	  recognition.	  Fraser	  and	  Nash	  are	   the	  only	   two	  who	  want	   to	  go	  ahead.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	   is	  very	  annoyed	  about	   this	  and	  threatened	  to	  regard	  an	  adverse	  vote	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  no	  confidence	  in	  himself.54	  Other	  groups	  within	  New	  Zealand	  also	  diverged	  from	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minster.	   Jacob	   Abadi	   claims	   the	   National	   Party	   was	   much	   less	   sympathetic	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state	  because	  of	  National’s	  closer	  identification	  with	  Britain.55	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  conservative	  press	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Jewish	   community’s	   desire	   for	   a	   state	   because	   of	   ongoing	   acts	   of	   Jewish	  terrorism	  against	  British	  officials	   in	  Palestine.	  A	  particularly	  grievous	   incident	  which	   received	   a	   lot	   of	   commentary	   in	   New	   Zealand	   newspapers,	   was	   the	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hanging	   of	   two	   British	   sergeants	   in	   1947	   by	   the	   infamous	   Stern	   Gang.56	  However	   despite	   this	   attitude,	   these	   same	   conservative	   groups	   were	   often	  ambivalent	  or	  disdainful	  towards	  the	  Arab	  nations.	  As	  the	  conservative	  Evening	  
Post	  noted,	  “no	  great	  amount	  of	  sympathy	  need	  be	  wasted	  on	  the	  Egyptians.”57	  	  For	  New	  Zealand,	   recognition	  was	   complicated	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   Israel	   claimed	  Jerusalem	  as	  its	  capital	  during	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war.	  This	  move	  was	  illegal	  under	  UN	   Resolution	   181	   which	   had	   designated	   Jerusalem	   an	   international	   zone	  because	  of	  its	  unique	  position	  as	  a	  Holy	  Place	  for	  Jews,	  Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  Several	   states,	   notably	   Australia,	   were	   not	   troubled	   by	   the	   failure	   to	  internationalise	  Jerusalem	  and	  Berendsen	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  their	  attitude.	  In	  a	  private	  letter	  to	  Foss	  Shanahan	  he	  fumed	  that	  “[t]he	  complete	  irresponsibility,	  not	   only	   of	   the	   Australians,	   but	   of	   the	   30	   odd	   members	   that	   supported	   this	  ridiculous	  proposal	  leaves	  me	  sick	  with	  apprehension	  and	  I	  am	  agonised	  by	  the	  stupidity	  of	  the	  Jews	  in	  publicly	  announcing	  Jerusalem	  as	  their	  capital.”58	  Other	  New	  Zealanders	   agreed.	   Cabinet	  Minister	  Robert	   Semple	   opposed	   recognition	  fearing	   that	   it	   would	   involve	   New	   Zealand	   in	   “another	   bloody	   war”,	   but	  McIntosh	  privately	   stated	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Shanahan	   that	  his	   attitude	  was	   in	   fact	  based	  on	  anti-­‐Semitism	  rather	  than	  anti-­‐war	  motivations.59	  The	  decision	  not	  to	  recognise	   Jerusalem	   as	   the	   capital	   of	   Israel	   became	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  that	  remains	  in	  place	  today,	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  like	  many	  other	  states,	  chooses	  to	  recognise	  Tel	  Aviv	  as	  the	  capital	  of	  Israel	  instead.60	  	  New	   Zealand	   accorded	   de	   facto	   recognition	   to	   Israel	   simultaneously	  with	   the	  United	   Kingdom	   on	   29	   January	   1949	   with	   an	   implied	   reservation	   about	  Jerusalem,	  refugee	  resettlement,	  borders	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  Holy	  places.61	  In	  May	   1949	   shortly	   after	   New	   Zealand’s	   de	   facto	   recognition	   of	   Israel,	   the	   UN	  General	   Assembly	   voted	   to	   grant	   Israel	   UN	   membership.	   New	   Zealand	  








supported	  the	  resolution	  along	  with	  thirty-­‐seven	  other	  countries.	  Twelve	  states	  voted	   against	   Israel’s	   membership	   including	   Burma,	   India,	   Pakistan	   and	   the	  Arab	   states	   and	   there	   were	   nine	   abstentions	   including	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	  Belgium,	   Denmark	   and	   Sweden.62	   In	   casting	   New	   Zealand’s	   vote	   Berendsen	  explained	  that	  his	  Government	  would	  expect	  Israel	  to	  duly	  respect	  the	  decisions	  of	   the	   UN	   and	   “particularly	   those	   contained	   in	   the	   UN	   Resolutions	   of	   last	  December	   with	   reference	   to	   refugees	   and	   an	   international	   regime	   in	  Jerusalem.”63	   This	   concern	   with	   refugees	   became	   a	   defining	   feature	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	  stance	  towards	  Israel	  from	  this	  period	  on	  and	  would	  later	  become	  an	  irritant	   between	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Israel,	   but	   its	   resolution	   has	   remained	   an	  integral	  component	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  perspective	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  conflict.	  64	  The	   Israeli	  Government’s	  disregard	   for	   the	  caveats	  expressed	  by	  New	  Zealand	  upon	  recognition	  would	  be	  an	  ongoing	  source	  of	  contention	  for	  New	  Zealand’s	  officials	   serving	   at	   the	   UN	   throughout	   the	   Holland	   to	   Nash	   period.	   Niggling	  criticisms	   of	   Israel’s	   behaviour	   were	   repeatedly	   sent	   back	   to	   Wellington	   in	  confidential	  memos.	  Berendsen,	   for	  example,	  was	  explicitly	  opposed	  to	  de	   jure	  recognition,	  explaining	   in	  a	   letter	   to	   the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	   that	   it	  would	   be	   wise	   for	   New	   Zealand	   to	   delay	   such	   recognition	   in	   order	   to	   apply	  pressure	   “(1)	   on	   both	   Israel	   and	   Jordan	   to	   come	   to	   some	   reasonable	  arrangement	   in	   respect	   of	   Jerusalem;	   (2)	   on	   Israel	   concerning	   Arab	   refugees;	  (3)	  on	  all	  parties	  concerned	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  accept	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  of	  local	   difficulties”.65	   These	   attitudes	   eventually	   became	   apparent	   to	   Israeli	  officials,	   especially	  within	   the	  UN.	  One	  noted	   that	  New	  Zealand	  was	   obsessed	  








with	   the	   issue	   of	   refugees	   and	   accused	   the	   Dominion	   of	   “becoming	   difficult,	  petulant	  and	  unhelpful.”66	  New	  Zealand’s	  de	   jure	   recognition	  of	   Israel	  was	  delayed	  due	   to	   the	   Jerusalem	  issue	   even	   though	   Britain	   accorded	   such	   recognition	   in	   1950.	   A	   letter	   from	  diplomat	   Malcolm	   Templeton	   to	   the	   High	   Commission	   in	   Australia	   explained	  that,	  “at	  the	  present	  time,	  when	  Israel	  and	  Jordan	  are	  both	  openly	  flouting	  the	  Assembly	   decision	   on	   Jerusalem,	   recognition	   is	   quite	   inappropriate.”67	  However,	  after	  a	  call	  by	  Mr	  Linton,	  the	  Israeli	  Minister	  in	  Australia,	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  “New	  Zealand	  is	  one	  of	  a	  small	  and	  diminishing	  number	  which	  have	  not	   taken	   this	   step.”68	   The	   decision	   was	   then	   taken	   by	   the	   new	   Holland	  Government’s	  Minister	   of	   External	   Affairs	   Frederick	   Doidge	   to	   accord	  de	   jure	  recognition	  to	  Israel	  immediately	  to	  avoid	  the	  difficulties	  of	  being	  “caught	  up	  in	  some	  crisis	  […]	  and	  when	  we	  are	  not	  being	  subjected	  to	  any	  obvious	  pressure	  in	  regards	  to	  Palestine.”69	  	  New	  Zealand	  accorded	  de	   jure	   recognition	  on	  the	  28	   July	  1950	  and	  received	  a	  letter	  of	  thanks	  from	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	  Moshe	  Sharett	  soon	  after.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  recalled	  “the	  sense	  of	  high	  moral	  purpose	  and	  the	  forthrightness	  with	  which	  New	  Zealand	  participated	  in	  deliberations	  attending	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	   State	   of	   Israel	   and	   the	   unfailing	   friendship	   between	   the	   two	   countries”.70	  There	  was	  a	  proviso	  from	  New	  Zealand	  however	  that	  such	  recognition	  did	  not	  extend	   to	   “the	   boundaries	   between	   Israel	   and	   Egypt,	   Jordan,	   Syria	   and	   the	  Lebanon.”71	   Furthermore	  de	   jure	   recognition	  was	   awarded	   “without	  prejudice	  to	   decisions	   which	   have	   been	   or	   may	   be	   taken	   by	   the	   U.N.	   in	   regard	   to	  Jerusalem”	  allowing	  New	  Zealand	  to	  uphold	  its	  preferred	  ideologies	  of	  collective	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security	  and	  commitment	  to	  international	  law	  whilst	  not	  sliding	  into	  a	  minority	  of	  world	  opinion.	  	  This	   early	   period	   of	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   is	   marked	   by	   an	   important	  dynamic	   between	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   his	   External	   Affairs	   officials.	   The	  increasingly	   antagonistic	   attitude	  of	   the	  officials	   towards	   Israel	   can	   largely	  be	  explained	   by	   their	   preoccupation	   with	   international	   cooperation	   through	   a	  collective	   security	   organisation,	   which	   was	   viewed	   as	   the	   best	   means	   of	  protecting	   New	   Zealand	   against	   external	   aggression.	   Fraser	   meanwhile	  remained	   a	   staunch	   supporter	   of	   Israel,	   despite	   British	   unease.	   McIntosh	  describes	   how	   Fraser	   was	   “inclined	   to	   be	   very	   critical	   of	   [British	   Foreign	  Minister]	  Bevin	  for	  listening	  to	  Foreign	  Office	  officials”	  and	  was	  “of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  British	  have	  blundered	  badly,	  and	  are	  still	  blundering	  [in	  Palestine]”.72	  Fraser’s	  support	  of	  recognition,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  British	  opposition,	  is	  illustrative	  of	  Malcolm	  McKinnon’s	   notion	   of	   independence	   as	   “a	   progressive	   critique	   of	   an	  existing	  pattern,	  which	  did	  not,	  however,	  challenge	  its	  underlying	  structure.”73	  Fraser’s	  influence	  highlights	  another	  important	  theme	  in	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  towards	   Israel:	   the	  pivotal	  role	  of	   individuals.	  Though	  a	  number	  of	  Labourites	  may	  have	   felt	   some	   sympathy	   towards	   the	   Jewish	   state	   it	   is	   very	   clear	   that	   it	  was	  one	  of	  Fraser’s	  passions.	  He	  had	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	   the	  suffering	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  and	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation	  to	  help	  them.	  He	  exercised	  the	  same	  character	  traits	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  displaced	  Palestinians,	  helping	  to	  ensure	   the	  refugee	  problem	  would	  become	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	   in	   Israel	   and	   Palestine.	   As	   his	   biographers	   explain,	   “Fraser	   intervened	  several	   times	   in	   [United	   Nations]	   debates	   and	   spoke	   strongly	   in	   favour	   of	  international	  assistance	  to	  settle	  the	  800,000	  refugees	  displaced	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel.”74	  Because	  there	  were	  few	  trade	  and	  economic	  interests	  at	  stake,	  and	  after	   the	   Suez	   Canal	   Crisis	   little	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   strategic	   interest	   in	   the	  Middle	  East,	   attitudes	   towards	   Israel	   and	   the	   Arab	   states	   were	   shaped	   in	   important	  ways	  by	   the	  passions	  and	  prejudices	  of	  key	   individuals.	  Fraser’s	  romantic	  and	  








idealistic	   attitude	   towards	   Israel	   can	  be	   explained	  by	   the	   context	   in	  which	  he	  viewed	  the	  new	  state:	  as	  a	  socialist	  community	  of	   industrious	  people	  working	  cooperatively	  to	  build	  a	  new	  nation	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  Holocaust.	  	  	  
Holland	  	  
Suez	  and	  the	  Old	  Lion	  with	  the	  “mighty	  roar	  and	  a	  sharp	  claw”	  
 “There	  is	  a	  note	  of	  exasperation	  in	  New	  Zealand	  utterances,	  as	  if	  Israel	  were	  just	  a	  damned	  nuisance,	  involving	  New	  Zealand	  in	  complex	  debating	  with	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  expenditure	  within	  a	  sphere	  remote	  from	  Dominion	  interests	  and	  apprehensions75	  
Cable	  from	  Mr	  Linton,	  Israeli	  Minister	  accredited	  to	  New	  Zealand,	  to	  Israeli	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  1955	  	  Sidney	  (Sid)	  Holland,	  the	  National	  Prime	  Minister	  who	  took	  office	  after	  Fraser’s	  defeat	   in	   the	  November	  1950	   election	   and	   remained	   there	   for	   the	  next	   seven	  years,	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  took	  a	  parsimonious	  approach	  when	  it	   came	   to	  diplomacy.	  Bruce	  Brown	  argues	   that	  Holland	  was	   “something	  of	  an	  ignoramus	   in	   international	   affairs”	   and	   recalled	   that	   there	   was	   a	   very	  uncomfortable	   relationship	   between	   the	   highly	   respected	   and	   long	   serving	  diplomat	   Alister	   McIntosh	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister.76	   Malcolm	   McKinnon	  suggests	   this	   ambivalence	   towards	   foreign	   affairs	   was	   not	   unusual	   among	  National	   Party	   politicians,	   arguing	   that	   attempts	   to	   forge	   an	   independent	  foreign	  policy	  were	  viewed	  as	  wasteful,	  radical	  and	  disloyal	  to	  Britain.77	  Holland	  elected	   to	   take	   the	   Finance	   portfolio	   rather	   than	   External	   Affairs,	   as	   had	  previously	   been	   the	   case	   for	   Prime	   Ministers,	   and	   he	   rarely	   intervened	   in	  international	   matters.	   When	   he	   did,	   he	   frequently	   made	   gaffes,	   much	   to	   the	  embarrassment	  of	  External	  Affairs	  officers.78	  On	  one	  occasion	  he	   revealed	   the	  








existence	  of	  ANZAM	  in	  parliament,	  a	  secret	  contingency	  planning	  organisation	  involving	   Australia,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Malaya,	   whose	   mere	   name	   was	   top	  secret.79	  In	  another	  incident	  he	  offered	  all	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  meat	  to	  Britain	  for	  free.80	  	  This	  ignorance	  and	  disinterest	  from	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  meant	  the	  formulation	  of	   foreign	   policy	   was	   left	   largely	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   his	   officials,	   especially	   his	  successive	   Ministers	   of	   External	   Affairs:	   Frederick	   Doidge,	   Clifton	   Webb	   and	  Tom	  McDonald.	   In	   this	  period	  “New	  Zealand	   tended	   to	  come	  down	  on	   Israel’s	  side”	  because	  it	  “accepted	  the	  right	  of	  a	  small	  nation	  established	  by	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  UN	  to	   live	   in	  peace	  with	   its	  neighbours”,	  although	  this	  support	  was	  not	  as	  uncritical	   as	   the	   quote	   above	   suggests.	   81	   New	   Zealand	   was	   quick	   to	   defend	  Israel	  against	  Arab-­‐Soviet	  threats	  in	  the	  UN	  throughout	  this	  period.	  MacDonald	  stated	  in	  1956	  for	  example	  that	  “[w]hatever	  her	  transgressions,	  Israel	  is	  a	  State,	  a	   Member	   of	   this	   Assembly,	   virtually	   the	   creation	   of	   this	   Assembly,	   whose	  extinction	  this	  Assembly	  cannot	  and,	  I	  believe,	  will	  not	  tolerate.”82	  The	  National	  Government	   also	   recognised	   that	   Israel	   was	   a	   powerful	   regional	   ally	   helping	  restrict	  Soviet	  influence	  in	  Egypt,	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.83	  A	  National	  Party	  publication	  from	   1955	   explained	   that	   the	   “Government	   has	   continued	   to	   give	   special	  attention	  to	  developments	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  which	  are	  vital	  to	  the	  free	  world.”84	  Israel	  became	  increasingly	  important	  as	  Cold	  War	  boundaries	  were	  established,	  and	  the	  Jewish	  state	  flipped	  from	  being	  a	  partner	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  become	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  An	   early	   matter	   in	   Holland’s	   Prime	   Ministership	   was	   the	   1951	   Huleh	   Valley	  issue.	  This	  was	  a	  lake	  and	  swamp	  area	  within	  the	  demilitarized	  zone	  that	  Israel	  had	  drained	  for	  agricultural	  purposes,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  meant	  infringing	  on	  Arab	  owned	  land	  and	  over	  the	  objections	  of	  the	  UN	  mediator,	  General	  Riley.	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One	  New	   Zealand	   diplomat	   took	   particular	   offence	   at	   Israel’s	   actions,	  writing	  that	  “Israel	  needs	  to	  be	  pulled	  up	  with	  a	  sharp	  jerk	  …	  their	  flouting	  and	  defiance	  of	   that	   authority	   [the	   UN]	   are	   flagrant.”85	   While	   New	   Zealand	   diplomats	  refrained	   from	   the	   anti-­‐Semitic	   language	   used	   by	   some	   of	   their	   Australian	  counterparts,	   one	   of	   whom	   declared	   that	   “[i]t	   is	   historically	   characteristic	   of	  Jewry,	   that,	   if	  need	  be,	   they	  will	   crucify	  any	   individual	   [Riley]	   to	  achieve	   their	  own	   ends…”	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  New	  Zealand’s	   officials	  were	   privately	   scathing	   of	  Israel’s	  failure	  to	  respect	  UN	  authority.86	  It	  is	  unclear	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  attitudes	   were	   shared	   more	   widely	   in	   Holland’s	   Government,	   but	   they	   were	  likely	  to	  be	  expressed	  in	  a	  more	  muted	  fashion	  if	  they	  did.	  In	   1952	   the	   ANZUS	   Treaty	   between	   Australia,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   the	   United	  States	   came	   into	   force.	   Holland	   had	   been	   told	   in	   1950	   that	   Britain	   could	   no	  longer	   come	   to	   the	   defence	   of	  New	   Zealand	   if	   another	  war	  was	   to	   break	   out.	  Consequently,	  part	  of	  the	  initial	  justification	  behind	  the	  signing	  of	  ANZUS	  was	  to	  allow	   New	   Zealand’s	   troops	   to	   be	   freed	   up	   to	   fight	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   with	  Britain	   in	   the	   event	   of	   another	   global	   war,	   rather	   than	   being	   confined	   to	   the	  Pacific.	  As	  McKinnon	  notes,	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  this	  was	  not	  an	  abstract	  scenario	  as	  British	  friction	  with	  Egypt	  and	  Iran	  “took	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  war.”87	  However,	  signing	  ANZUS	  did	  eventually	  shift	  the	  focus	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  defence	  activities	  away	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  close	  security	  relationship	  with	   the	  United	   States	   soon	  became	  of	   paramount	   importance	   to	  Wellington.	  This	  was	  strengthened	  in	  the	  next	  few	  years	  as	  Holland	  was	  obliged	  to	  send	  troops	  in	  1952	  to	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  in	  1954	  New	  Zealand	  signed	  the	  Manila	  Pact,	  which	  further	  entrenched	  the	  strategic	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  Middle	  East.	  New	  Zealand’s	  commitment	  to	  collective	  security	  led	  it	  to	  take	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  from	  1954-­‐55.	  Leslie	  Munro,	  New	  Zealand’s	  representative	  on	  the	   Council	   was	   “keen	   to	  make	   a	   splash”	   and	   consequently	   espoused	   a	  more	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pro-­‐Israeli	   line	   than	   the	   government’s	   advisers	   had	  wanted.	   88	  He	  was	  deeply	  critical	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   which	   he	   saw	   as	   obstructing	   progress	   on	   the	  Palestinian	  question	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  through	  their	  use	  of	  the	  veto,	  and	  he	  defended	  Israeli	  retaliation,	  saying	  “we	  have	  been	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  continuous	  strain	   and	   provocation	   to	   which	   Israel	   has	   been	   subjected.”89	   Munro	   was	  popular	   in	   the	   United	   States	   and	   his	   UN	   speeches	   were	   sometimes	   reported	  verbatim	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times.	  	  Munro	  was	  later	  presented	  with	  a	  “facsimile	  of	  an	   autograph	   ...	   in	   the	   handwriting	   of	   Ferdinarde	   de	   Lesseps	   setting	   out	   his	  device	  ‘Aperire	  Terram	  Gentibus’”	  by	  the	  Israeli	  statesman,	  Abba	  Eban,	  to	  thank	  him	  for	  his	  efforts	  while	  on	  the	  Council.90	  	  It	  was	  during	  Holland’s	  time	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  that	  one	  of	  the	  more	  significant	  incidents	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  post-­‐war	  involvement	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  occurred:	  the	  1956	  Suez	  Canal	  Crisis.	  The	  Crisis	  was	  sparked	  by	  Egypt’s	  non-­‐observance	  of	  an	  earlier	  UN	  resolution	  to	  allow	  Israel	  unimpeded	  access	  through	  the	  Suez	  Canal.91	   Many	   members	   of	   Holland’s	   Government,	   including	   Holland	   himself,	  were	   returned	   soldiers	   who	   carried	   with	   them	   anti-­‐Arab	   biases.	   These	   were	  reflected	   in	   their	   interpretation	   of	   the	   unfolding	   emergency.	   For	   example,	  Clifton	   Webb,	   by	   this	   time	   High	   Commissioner	   in	   London,	   described	   the	  Egyptian	  President	  Colonel	  Nasser	   a	   “power-­‐drunk	  bounder”	   although	  he	  had	  not	  met	  him	  personally.92	  The	  Crisis	  occurred	  after	  Nasser	  nationalised	  the	  Suez	  Canal	   to	   the	   displeasure	   of	   Britain	   and	   France.	   Without	   New	   Zealand’s	  knowledge,	   London	   and	   Paris	   secretly	   colluded	   with	   Israel	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  overthrow	  Nasser	  and	  restore	  the	  canal	  to	  international	  control.	  Their	  plan	  was	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to	  support	  an	   Israeli	  attack	  on	  Egypt	  and	  use	   it	  as	  a	  pretence	   to	  send	   in	   their	  own	  troops	  to	  ‘secure	  the	  peace’	  and	  gain	  control	  over	  the	  canal.93	  	  However	  the	  United	  States,	  under	  Eisenhower,	  was	  firmly	  opposed	  to	  the	  illegal	  moves	   and	   condemned	   the	   three	   countries	   in	   the	  UN.	   Besides	  Britain,	   France	  and	   Israel,	   the	   only	   countries	   to	   vote	   against	   cease-­‐fire	   resolutions	   in	   the	  General	   Assembly	   were	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia,	   something	   that	   was	   a	  source	   of	   deep	   embarrassment	   to	   foreign	   affairs	   officials.94	   Further	  complicating	  matters	  was	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  New	  Zealand	  ship	   in	   the	  area,	   the	  
Royalist,	  which	  had	  been	  conducting	  exercises	  with	   the	  British	  Mediterranean	  Fleet.	  This	  ship	  was	  only	  released	  back	  to	  New	  Zealand	  at	  the	  last	  moment	  after	  the	   crisis	   broke,	   narrowly	   avoiding	   implicating	   New	   Zealand	   as	   a	   belligerent	  party.95	  	  The	   Leader	   of	   the	   Opposition,	   Walter	   Nash,	   retained	   Labour’s	   traditional	  romantic	  view	  of	  Israel	  in	  his	  speeches	  to	  Parliament	  throughout	  the	  crisis	  and	  argued	  for	  its	  defence.	  He	  described	  how	  the	  Israelis	  had	  	  
…brought	   water	   out	   of	   the	   rock	   and	   oil	   out	   of	   the	   ground.	   They	   have	   made	  vegetables	  grow	  where	  none	  grew	  before.	  They	  have	  taken	  water	  to	  places	  that	  were	  previously	  barren	  and	  arid.	  They	  have	  done	  all	   this	   cooperatively	  and	   it	  has	  been	  a	  magnificent	  job.96	  This	  support	  was	   tempered	  with	   the	  recognition	   that	   Israel’s	   conduct	  had	  not	  been	   entirely	   satisfactory,	   particularly	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   ongoing	   issue	   of	  resolving	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees,	  but	  Nash	  was	  still	  adamant	  that	  Israel	   should	   not	   be	   left	   alone	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Egyptian	   nationalism.	  He	   argued	  that	   “to	   abandon	   them	   to	   the	   Arabs	   ...	   would	   be	   the	   greatest	   betrayal	   in	  








history”97	  and	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  his	  loyalty	  to	  Britain	  was	  still	  intact:	  “we’ll	  not	  criticise	  the	  old	  country.”98	  	  The	   effect	   of	   Suez	   on	   the	   diplomatic	   service	   was	   profound.	   According	   to	  Berendsen,	  the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  was	  “very	  sick	  about	  the	  line	  we	  have	   taken.	   Needless	   to	   say,	   our	   name	   stands	   fairly	   low	   in	   the	   U.N.”99	  While	  some	   emphasis	   was	   placed	   upon	   securing	   the	   Middle	   East,	   in	   reality,	   as	  recognised	  by	  External	  Affairs	  in	  their	  confidential	  files	  ten	  years	  later,	  “it	  was	  the	  British	  entreaties	  for	  support	  which	  were	  decisive	  in	  inducing	  New	  Zealand,	  for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   its	   history	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   UN,	   to	   support	   an	   action,	  which,	  according	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  customary	  standards,	  was	  flagrantly	  defiant	  of	  the	  [UN]	  charter.”100	  Furthermore,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  voting	  on	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  UN	  force,	  New	  Zealand	  had	  to	  reluctantly	  abstain	  due	  to	  its	  prior	  vote	  against	  the	  ceasefire.	  When	  it	  offered	  troops	  for	  the	  force,	  these	   were	   rejected	   by	   the	   Secretary-­‐General,	   a	   decision	   “determined	   by	   the	  position	   New	   Zealand	   had	   adopted	   on	   the	   Suez	   question”,	   which	  was	   a	   deep	  blow	  for	  the	  so-­‐called	  champion	  of	  collective	  security.	  101	  	  	  Despite	   the	  uproar	  within	  External	  Affairs,	  on	  balance	   it	  seems	  the	  Suez	  crisis	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Israel	  in	  any	  substantial	  way	  and	  actually	  may	  even	  have	  improved	  it	  slightly.	  Indeed,	  in	  an	  interview	   with	   Malcolm	   Templeton,	   author	   of	   Ties	   of	   Blood	   and	   Empire,	   he	  stated	  that	  “the	  Suez	  Crisis	  was	  a	  bit	  of	  an	  irrelevance	  to	  this	  I	  think	  because	  it	  was	  supporting	  Britain	  rather	  than	  Israel,	  but	  it	  so	  happened	  that	  Israel	  was	  on	  the	   same	   side	   as	  us.”102	  The	   relationship	   that	   did	   suffer	   in	   the	   crisis	  was	   that	  with	  Washington.	  The	  Holland	  Government	  viewed	  the	  United	  States	  as	  almost	  








treacherous,	   seeing	   “the	   American	   role	   in	   the	   Suez	   crisis	   as	   a	   betrayal	   of	   its	  closest	  and	  most	  faithful	  ally.”103	  	  Reporting	   from	   the	   UN	   shortly	   after	   the	   crisis,	   Frank	   Corner	   said	   that	   Israel,	  whilst	   perceiving	   itself	   in	   a	   position	   of	   strength,	   had	   received	   “a	   terrible	  shock”104	   over	   American	   policy	   after	   Suez.	   Until	   then	   it	   had	   “believed	   that	  however	  recklessly	  they	  behaved	  the	  US	  would,	  in	  the	  last	  resort,	  support	  them	  and	   pull	   them	  out	   of	   any	  mess	   they	   created.”105	   	   In	   his	   view,	   the	   response	   to	  Suez	  had	  forced	  Israel	  not	  to	  push	  its	  policy	  to	  extremes	  again	  for	  a	  significant	  period	   of	   time,	   evidently	   something	   Corner	   found	   satisfactory.	   Labour	  politicians	   minimised	   their	   imperial	   rhetoric	   and	   attempted	   to	   distance	  themselves	   from	   the	   debacle,	   while	   conservative	   New	   Zealand	   was	   generally	  disillusioned	  about	   the	  UN	  which	   it	   held	   to	  have	   ‘failed’	  Britain.	  One	   concrete	  outcome	   of	   the	   Suez	   Crisis	   for	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   with	   Israel	   was	   that	  New	   Zealand,	   which	   as	   noted	   earlier	   had	   been	   re-­‐evaluating	   its	   strategic	  interests	   before	   Suez,	   emphatically	   refocused	   its	   attention	   to	   Southeast	   Asia	  rather	  than	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  an	  area	  of	  strategic	  concern.106	  	  One	   small	   area	   where	   the	   Middle	   East	   remained	   important	   for	   New	   Zealand	  involved	   the	  modest	   contingent	   of	   New	   Zealand	   troops	   serving	   in	   the	   United	  Nations	  Truce	  Supervision	  Organisation	  (UNTSO).	  Initially	  created	  to	  supervise	  the	   truce	   following	   the	   1948	  War,	   the	  mission	   spread	   over	   five	   states	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   calm	   hostilities.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   resident	  representative	  in	  Israel-­‐Palestine,	  these	  troops	  were	  sometimes	  a	  useful	  source	  of	  information	  for	  the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  who	  collected	  their	  letters	  and	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  returning	  servicemen.	  One	  of	  these	  troops	  was	  Captain	  C.	  Fanselow	  who	  visited	  the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  in	  February	  1957	  to	  report	  on	  his	  impressions	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  On	  his	  views	  of	  Israel,	  Fanselow	   was	   “very	   impressed	   with	   the	   tremendous	   spirit	   in	   the	   country”	  








explaining	  how	  it	  had	  “a	  high	  degree	  of	  public	  discipline	  and	  a	  great	  willingness	  for	  self-­‐sacrifice	  amongst	  the	  people.	  They	  have	  a	  first-­‐class	  army.”107	  	  	  
Walter	  Nash	  	  
Short-­lived	  International	  Idealism	  	  	  When	  Walter	  Nash,	  close	  to	  eighty	  years	  old,	  became	  the	  new	  Prime	  Minister	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1957,	  he	   took	   the	  External	  Affairs	  portfolio	  as	  Fraser	  had	  done.	  He	  was	   well	   known,	   and	   indeed	   sometimes	   ridiculed,	   for	   his	   extensive	   overseas	  travel	   as	   part	   of	   this	   portfolio.	   As	   his	   biographer	   Keith	   Sinclair	   explains	   “it	  rapidly	   became	   clear	   to	   Nash’s	   colleagues	   that	   his	   great	   passion	   was	   now	  international	   affairs.”108	   He	   aspired	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   a	   statesman	   of	   the	  calibre	  of	  Peter	  Fraser	  and	  was	   indeed	  partially	   successful	   in	   this.	  The	  British	  High	   Commissioner	   George	   Mallaby,	   for	   example,	   noted	   how	   he	   “spoke	   with	  authority	  and	  other	  world	  statesmen	  were	  ready	  to	  listen;	  his	  views	  were	  well	  informed	   and	   liberal	   and,	   although	   occasionally	   he	   seemed	   to	   be	   lost	   in	  visionary	   speculations,	   he	   arrived	   in	   the	   end	   at	   a	   practical,	   hard-­‐headed	   and	  courageous	  attitude.”109	  He	  had	  a	   comprehensive	  knowledge	  of	   foreign	  affairs	  issues	   that	  harked	  back	   to	  his	  period	  as	  New	  Zealand	  Minister	   in	  Washington	  during	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   and	   extensive	   travels	   on	   behalf	   of	   New	  Zealand.110	  During	   the	   short-­‐lived	   Nash	   years	   New	   Zealand	   began	   to	   concentrate	   its	  resources	  on	   improving	   its	   image	   in	   the	  Pacific	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  strengthening	   its	   regional	   security	   relationships	   through	   ANZUS	   and	   SEATO.	  Nash’s	   interpretation	  of	   the	  appropriate	  positioning	  of	   foreign	  policy	  was	  one	  determined	  by	  moral	  considerations:	  his	  greatest	  concerns	  in	  this	  period	  were	  disarmament,	   the	   Colombo	   Plan,	   South	   African	   Apartheid,	   global	   poverty,	  








recognition	   of	   Communist	   China,	   and	   Southeast	   Asia.	   After	   colonialism	   had	  sounded	   its	   death	   knell	   in	   the	   UN,	   New	   Zealand	   began	   to	   divest	   itself	   “of	   its	  colonial	   relationships	   and	   image	   in	   the	   South	   Pacific”	   and	   pursue	   closer	   ties	  with	   its	   regional	   allies.111	   However,	   whilst	   Walter	   Nash	   was	   known	   to	   be	  sympathetic	  towards	  Israel	  and	  admired	  its	  endeavours	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  his	  speeches	   in	   Parliament	   while	   in	   Opposition,	   this	   period	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	   Israel	   and	   New	   Zealand	   otherwise	   offers	   very	   little	   material	   for	  analysis.	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy	  concerns	  and	  resources	  during	  this	  time	  were	  elsewhere.	  	  Even	  the	  officials	  with	  External	  Affairs	  serving	  in	  the	  UN	  were	  concerned	  about	  other	  matters	  during	  this	  period	  and	  it	  represented	  an	  unusually	  quiet	  period	  in	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   relations.	   The	   only	   issue	   pertinent	   to	   Israel	   was	   the	   ongoing	  problem	   of	   Palestinian	   refugees	   displaced	   by	   Israel’s	   independence.	   New	  Zealand’s	   interest	   in	   this	   issue	   is	   longstanding.	   It	  was	  a	  core	   funder	  of	   the	  UN	  Relief	   and	   Works	   Agency	   for	   Palestinian	   Refugees	   (UNRWA)	   and	   makes	   an	  annual	  contribution	   to	   the	  organisation	  which	   it	  has	  continued	  to	  pay	   to	  date.	  The	  resettlement	  of	  refugees	  was	  one	  of	  the	  implied	  reservations	  on	  recognition	  in	  1950	  and	   remained	  a	  point	   of	   contention	  between	   Israel	   and	  New	  Zealand	  especially	   after	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   PLO	   in	   the	   1970s.	   Israel	   initially	   expected	  neighbouring	   states	   to	   subsume	   the	   Palestinian	   territories	   and	   refugees,	  something	   that	   ran	   counter	   to	   New	   Zealand’s	   preference	   for	   a	   two	   state	  solution.	   Officials	   were	   not	   impressed	   with	   Israel’s	   limited	   compensation	   to	  refugees	   as	   they	  were	   “related	   to	   securing	   a	   comprehensive	  peace	   settlement	  which	  would	  require	  the	  refugees	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  Arab	  world.”112	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  would	  later	  criticise	  Israel	  for	  failing	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  “idea	  of	  incorporating	  Palestinian	  territories	  into	  Jordan	  is	  dead,	  as	  is	  (despite	  Israeli	  








insistence)	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  peace	  conference	  in	  which	  their	  interests	  could	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  Arab	  states.”113	  
	  
Consensual	  Diplomacy	  and	  Individual	  Passions	  
 This	   chapter	   highlights	   three	   themes	   that	   are	   significant	   not	   only	   to	   the	  New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	   relationship,	   but	   which	   also	   reflect	   broader	   trends	   in	   New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  relations.	  The	  first	  such	  theme	  is	  the	  influence	  of	   individuals	  on	  foreign	  policy.	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  significant	  trading	  interest	  with	  Israel	  and	  after	  1956	  decreased	  strategic	  concerns,	  the	  early	  character	  of	  this	  relationship	  was	  readily	  shaped	  by	  individuals	  acting	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  personal	  passions,	  instincts	  or	  prejudices.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  a	  relatively	  insignificant	  relationship	  like	  that	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Israel	  than	  would	  be	   the	   case	   where	   institutional	   attention	   and	   multiple	   interests	   work	   to	  encourage	   more	   debate,	   direction	   and	   attention	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	  relationship.	  	  Attitudes	   shaped	   by	   instinctual	   notions	   can	  work	   both	  ways	   to	   influence	   the	  nature	   of	   bilateral	   ties:	   they	   can	   either	   be	   strengthened	   considerably	   or	   they	  could	  be	  open	  to	  dismissive	  nonchalance	  or	  even	  hostility.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Israel,	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  collective	  efforts	  of	   individuals	   like	  Fraser,	  Berendsen,	   Nash	   and	   Munro	   combined	   to	   result	   in	   a	   positive	   and	   friendly	  relationship.	   The	   Labour	   Party	   under	   Fraser	   and	   Nash	   viewed	   Israel	   with	  sympathy,	   fascination	  and	  romance.	  There	  were	  a	   lot	  of	  perceived	  similarities	  between	   the	   two	   states	   including	   their	   commitment	   to	   socialism,	   small	   size,	  significant	  agriculture	  sector,	  and	  there	  also	  were	  significant	  interpersonal	  links	  from	  within	   the	   International	  Labour	  Organisation	  and	  Socialist	   International.	  The	  disinterest	  of	   leaders	  also	  opened	  space	  for	  others	  with	  strong	  feelings	  to	  fill.	  Holland	  was	  profoundly	  uninterested	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  his	  bungling	  of	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  reflects	  this	  disconnect.	  As	  Stephen	  Levine	  explains	  “he	  wasn’t	  a	  








deep	  thinker	  [and	  was]	  not	  very	  subtle	  in	  his	  thought	  processes.”114	  Accordingly	  Munro	   had	   much	   more	   of	   an	   influence	   on	   foreign	   affairs	   in	   the	   UN	   and	  consequently	   the	   Palestinian	   problem	   throughout	   the	   mid-­‐1950s.	   Munro	  wanted	   to	  make	  an	   impact	   in	   the	  UN	  and	  consequently	  espoused	  a	  more	  pro-­‐Israeli	  position	  than	  his	  government	  may	  have	  wished.	  	  Certainly	  New	  Zealand’s	  role	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  Israel	  through	  the	  UN	  went	  far	   beyond	   its	   immediate	  material,	   economic	   or	   strategic	   interests.	   The	   early	  attention	   to	   Israel	   from	  New	   Zealand	   officials	   at	   the	   UN,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   early	  Labour	  leaders,	  explains	  why	  the	  country	  took	  such	  a	  sustained	  interest	  in	  the	  refugee	   question	   to	   the	   puzzlement	   of	   Israeli	   officials.	   Having	   been	   involved	  since	  the	  beginning,	  this	  small	  group	  of	  individuals	  committed	  to	  the	  successful	  resolution	   of	   the	   issue	   and	   felt	   entitled	   to	   comment	   on	   something	   they	   had	  helped	  create.	  	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   judge	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   New	   Zealand’s	   young	   diplomatic	  service	  was	   in	   fact	  as	  antagonistic	   towards	  Israel	  as	   the	  archival	  material,	   like	  Berendsen’s	   comments,	   suggests.	   A	   great	   deal	   of	   the	   material	   viewed	   was	  written	  confidentially	  and	  meant	  for	  the	  eyes	  of	  people	  within	  the	  Ministry	  only.	  Certainly,	   the	  New	  Zealand	   representatives	   at	   the	  UN	  would	   have	   been	  much	  more	  engaged	  with	  this	   issue	  than	  most	  New	  Zealanders	  as	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  Israel-­‐Arab	  or	  Israel-­‐Palestine	  dispute	  were	  constantly	  raised	  in	  the	  UN	  year	  after	   year.	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	   this	   increased	   engagement	   with	   the	   issues	  created	   a	   sharper	   sense	   of	   antagonism	   towards	   Israel,	   especially	   given	   the	  concerted	   campaigns	   from	   the	  Afro-­‐Arab	   bloc	   to	   isolate	   Israel	  within	   the	  UN.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  distaste	   for	  a	  state	  that	  was	  perceived	  to	   flout	  international	  law.	  For	  New	  Zealand	  diplomats	  who	  conceived	  of	  themselves	  as	  operating	  for	  the	  most	  part	  within	  a	  consent-­‐based	  realm	  where	  power	  politics	  was	   to	   be	  minimised	   and	   international	   law	   elevated,	   this	  was	   something	   that	  significantly	  limited	  the	  potential	  warmth	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  
 










Inching	  Towards	  ‘Even-­handedness’	  
	  This	   chapter	   covers	   the	   period	   from	   the	   election	   of	   National	   Prime	   Minister	  Keith	  Holyoake	  to	  Labour	  Prime	  Minister	  Bill	  Rowling,	  a	   fifteen	  year	  period	  of	  considerable	   change	   in	   New	   Zealand’s	   foreign	   relations.	   The	   efforts	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	  diplomatic	  service	  in	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  international	  fora	  had	  ensured	  that	   New	   Zealand	   had	   an	   identity	   of	   its	   own,	   albeit	   one	   that	   was	   most	  comfortably	  expressed	  within	  the	  Commonwealth.	  The	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  was	  a	  time	   of	  massive	   global	   upheaval	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   plethora	   of	   new	   African	  states	   and	   general	   decolonisation	   throughout	   the	   world	   which	   impacted	   on	  voting	   trends	   in	   the	  UN.	  Despite	  niggling	   feelings	  of	  dissatisfaction	  within	   the	  Department	   of	   External	   Affairs,	   among	   New	   Zealand	   politicians	   there	   was	   a	  strong	  degree	  of	  support	  for	  Israel.	  This	  support	  remained	  strong	  from	  Labour.	  Even	   at	   the	   end	   of	   this	   period	   Bill	   Rowling	   felt	   it	   necessary	   to	   defend	   New	  Zealand’s	   new	   diplomatic	   ties	   with	   Arab	   states	   by	   emphasising	   their	   lack	   of	  impact	   on	   the	   Israeli	   relationship.	   As	   he	   noted,	   several	   of	   his	   colleagues	   “had	  visited	   Israel	   and	   they	   had	   great	   sympathy	   and	   understanding	   of	   the	   efforts	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Israeli	  people.”115	  	  Perhaps	   somewhat	   surprisingly,	  Holyoake	  was	   also	   sympathetic	   to	   Israel	   in	   a	  distinct	  departure	  from	  popular	  conservative	  attitudes	  in	  earlier	  years.	  This	  can	  partly	   be	   explained	   by	   a	   renewed	   recognition	   from	   his	   Government	   of	   the	  strategic	  imperatives	  in	  supporting	  Israel	  as	  a	  bastion	  against	  Soviet	  incursions	  into	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Kirk	  too	  was	  strongly	  supportive	  of	   Israel	  whose	  kibbutz	  movements	  he	  found	  deeply	   impressive.	  As	  Prime	  Minister	  he	  even	  aspired	  to	  create	  a	  similar	  experiment	  in	  New	  Zealand	  called	  the	  ohu	  scheme.	  Kirk	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  first	  Israeli	  Embassy	  in	  New	  Zealand	  which	  was	  eventually	  opened	  under	  his	  successor.	  However,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  period	  New	  Zealand’s	  previously	  unquestioning	  support	  had	  been	  challenged,	  both	  materially	  through	  








the	  Arab	  Oil	  Boycott	   and	   ideologically	  due	   to	  both	   the	  beginning	  of	   increased	  public	   sympathy	  and	  awareness	  of	   the	  Palestinian	   cause	  and	   the	  election	  of	   a	  rightwing	  government	   in	   Israel.	  Consequently,	   this	   is	   the	  period	  where	   “even-­‐handedness”	  was	  first	  developed	  as	  a	  careful	  policy	  marker.	  	  	  	  
Holyoake	  and	  the	  Six	  Day	  War:	  	  
“A	  little	  less	  David	  and	  a	  bit	  too	  much	  Goliath”?116	  	  As	   had	   been	   the	   case	   until	   Holland	   took	   power,	   National	   Party	   leader	   Keith	  Holyoake	   chose	   the	   External	   Affairs	   portfolio	   when	   he	   was	   elected	   Prime	  Minister	   in	  1960.	  He	  kept	   the	  portfolio	   for	   the	   following	  twelve	  years,	  making	  him	   New	   Zealand’s	   longest	   serving	   Foreign	   Minister.	   However,	   as	   McKinnon	  argues,	  Holyoake	  like	  Holland	  “had	  no	  particular	  interest	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  in	   this	   respect	   he	   was	   a	   characteristic	   conservative	   New	   Zealand	   Prime	  Minister”.117	   Barry	   Gustafson	   suggests	   that	   Holyoake	   was	   “an	   instinctive	   and	  reactive	  politician	  rather	  than	  an	  intellectual	  and	  innovative	  one”	  who	  avoided	  controversy	  and	  attempted	  to	  “act	  in	  conformity	  with	  what	  he	  perceived	  as	  the	  views	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   New	   Zealanders.”118	   His	   Government	  accepted	  that	  New	  Zealand	  had	  an	  “international	  personality”	  but	  as	  would	  be	  the	  case	  with	  future	  National	  Governments	  it	  was	  “more	  likely	  to	  link	  diplomacy	  to	   commerce	   rather	   than	   ideology”	   particularly	   in	   regard	   to	   protecting	   New	  Zealand	   from	   Britain’s	   attempts	   to	   join	   the	   European	   Economic	   Community	  (EEC)	  which	  eventually	  occurred	  in	  1973.119	  However,	  according	  to	  his	  officials,	  Holyoake	  did	  recognise,	  possibly	  after	  the	  success	  of	  Nash,	  that	  “with	  changing	  








times	  a	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  by	  making	  an	   impact	  on	   the	  world	  stage	  enhanced	  his	  stature	  at	  home.”120	  	  Unlike	   Fraser	   or	   Nash,	   Holyoake	   had	   no	   special	   interest	   in	   Israel	   initially,	  although	   once	   he	   became	   accustomed	   to	   his	   portfolio	   he	   was	   to	   periodically	  intervene	  in	  issues	  to	  make	  sure	  his	  sympathies	  were	  understood.	  Frank	  Corner	  was	   eventually	   appointed	   as	   New	   Zealand’s	   first	   full-­‐time	   Permanent	  Representative	   in	   the	   UN	  where	   issues	   concerning	   Israel	  were	  most	   likely	   to	  arise.121	   Corner	   was	   perceived	   by	   the	   British	   to	   be	   “a	   somewhat	   prickly	  character”	  under	  whom	  “the	  New	  Zealand	  delegation	  [have	  a]	  passion	  to	  show	  how	   independent-­‐minded	   they	   are.”122	   Corner’s	   appointment	  was	  opposed	  by	  the	  British	   as	   they	   felt	   he	   had	   a	   “partiality	   towards	   the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  members”	  over	   the	   ‘old’	  members	  of	   the	  UN.123	  Throughout	   this	  period	  both	   the	  UN	  and	  the	   Commonwealth	   were	   undergoing	   significant	   changes	   with	   sweeping	  decolonisation	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  accession	  of	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  new	  African	  and	  Asian	  members	  to	  these	  organisations.	  Holyoake,	  following	  the	  precedent	  set	  by	  Nash,	  was	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  decolonisation	  but	  focused	  his	  attention	  mainly	  on	   the	   South	   Pacific.	   Despite	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	   Afro-­‐Arab	   bloc	   in	   the	  UN	   to	  frame	  the	  Israel-­‐Arab	  dispute	  as	  a	  decolonisation	  issue,	  Israel	  was	  not	  viewed	  in	  this	   way	   by	   either	   Corner	   or	   Holyoake,	   and	   indeed	   the	   diplomatic	   team	  rigorously	  defended	  Israel	  from	  such	  accusations.	  	  In	  a	  comprehensive	  background	  paper	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  stint	  on	  the	  Security	  Council,	   a	   New	   Zealand	   official	   was	   asked	   to	   assess	   how	   New	   Zealand	   had	  interpreted	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   dispute	   historically.	   In	   their	   view,	   the	   dispute	  originated	   from	   Arab	   humiliations	   in	   war,	   resentment	   over	   Israel’s	  development	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  arising	  from	  territory	  taken	  in	  1947.	  Israel	  was	  described	  as	  a	  state	  unwilling	  “to	  make	  any	  significant	  concessions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  settlement	  ...	  She	  has	  proceeded	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  offence	  is	  not	  only	   the	   best	   form	   of	   defence,	   but	   also	   the	   only	   argument	   the	   Arabs	   will	  








understand.”124	  However,	  the	  assessment	  was	  still	  marginally	  in	  Israel’s	  favour	  as	  it	  maintained	  that	  “the	  present	  degree	  of	  political	  unreason	  prevailing	  in	  the	  Arab	   world	   cannot	   be	   ignored.”125	   In	   this	   way	   the	   critiques	   coming	   from	  External	  Affairs	  can	  be	  viewed	  a	  sort	  of	  concerned	  criticism	  that	  recognised	  an	  imperfect	  friend,	  but	  retained	  a	  loyalty	  and	  sympathy	  to	  Israel’s	  situation.	  	  As	   has	   been	   demonstrated,	   a	   major	   theme	   running	   through	   the	   archived	  materials	   from	   the	   Department	   of	   External	   Affairs	   was	   dissatisfaction	   with	  Israel’s	   record	  of	   abiding	  by	  UN	  Resolutions.	  However	  when	   Israel	   did	   follow	  UN	  procedure	  during	  this	  period,	  officials	  were	  quick	  to	  offer	  their	  praises.	  On	  an	   Israeli	   complaint	   against	   Syria	   for	   example	   they	   noted	   that	   “it	   is	  commendable	  that	  Israel	  should	  seek	  the	  Council’s	  assistance	  rather	  than	  take	  the	   law	   into	   its	   own	   hands”.126	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   Israel	   was	   still	   very	   much	  considered	  a	   friend	  of	  New	  Zealand,	   albeit	   a	   friend	   capable	  of	   “brutal	   action”,	  and	   there	  was	  much	   concern	   that	   its	   support	  base	  was	  being	  eroded	  by	  Arab	  and	  African	  efforts.	  	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  in	  any	  dispute	  to	  come	  before	  the	  UN	  “the	  Israelis	   lose	  ground	  because	   the	  Arabs	   can	  wring	   support	  out	  of	   their	  African	  brothers	   because	   of	   the	   argument	   that	   Palestine	   is	   a	   colonial	   problem	   and	  because	  of	  back-­‐biting	  and	  blackmail	  about	  oil”.127	  New	  Zealand	  felt	  it	  was	  safe	  to	   criticise	   the	  Arab	  Bloc	   because	   “we	  were	  not	   rrp	   [sic]	   not	   obliged	   to	   be	   as	  sensitive	   as	   other	   Western	   countries	   to	   the	   state	   of	   our	   relations	   with	   the	  Arabs.”128	   Indeed	   it	   was	   only	   after	   the	   oil	   shocks	   that	   New	   Zealand	   began	   to	  foster	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	   the	   Arab	   states,	   the	   first	   Middle	   Eastern	  embassy	  opening	  in	  Iran	  in	  1975.129	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In	  1966	  New	  Zealand	  once	  again	  took	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  Security	  Council.	  During	  its	  membership	  of	   the	  Council	  New	  Zealand	  was	  required	  to	  vote	  on	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	   Israel-­‐Palestine	   dispute:	   Resolution	   228	   which	   ‘deplored’	   and	   ‘censored’	  Israel	   for	   an	   attack	   on	   the	   southern	  Hebron	   area	   of	   Jordan.	   New	   Zealand	   felt	  that	  although	  the	  attack	  by	  Israel	  “could	  not	  be	  condoned	  and	  that	  the	  council	  was	  bound	  to	  condemn	  it”	  the	  Council	  was	  ignoring	  the	  deteriorating	  situation	  in	  the	  region	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  attack.130	  Consequently	  New	  Zealand	  abstained	  on	   this	  vote,	  and	  was	   the	  only	  country	   to	  do	  so,	  because	   it	  maintained	   that	   “a	  condemnation	  of	  one	  party	   [Israel]	  without	  attempt	   to	  remove	   the	  underlying	  causes	   of	   the	   tension	   could	   not	   be	   considered	   an	   adequate	   response	   on	   the	  Council’s	  part.”131	  This	  was	  clearly	  intended	  to	  be	  read	  as	  a	  sympathetic	  action	  towards	  Israel,	  and	  New	  Zealand	  continued	  throughout	  its	  time	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  support	  Israel	  in	  the	  debates.	  	  After	  casting	  its	  vote	  of	  abstention	  on	  this	  Resolution,	  Holyoake	  wrote	  a	  lengthy	  personal	   letter	   to	   Abba	   Eban,	   the	   Foreign	  Minister	   of	   Israel.	   In	   this	   letter	   he	  noted	   that	   his	   Government	   considered	   Arab	   sponsored	   terrorism	   to	   be	   a	  fundamental	  cause	  of	  the	  tensions	  in	  the	  region	  and	  agreed	  that	  the	  Arab	  states	  had	  made	  insufficient	  attempts	  to	  renounce	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  terrorists.	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  “no	  responsible	  Government	  can	  readily	  accept	  sustained	  loss	  of	  life	  and	   damage	   to	   property”	   and	   reminded	   the	   Israeli	   Prime	   Minister	   that	   New	  Zealand	  had	  always	  “defended	  the	  right	  of	  Israel	  to	  freedom	  from	  fear	  of	  attack	  by	   whatever	   means	   and	   from	   whatever	   quarter.”132	   However,	   he	   did	   retain	  reservations	   about	   the	   retaliatory	   acts	   by	   Israel	   against	   Jordan	   saying	   New	  Zealand	  could	  not	  condone	  them.	  Holyoake	  finished	  by	  saying	  that	  “You	  may	  be	  assured	   that	   New	   Zealand	   will	   make	   special	   efforts	   to	   ensure	   that	   its	   voting	  position	  should	  be	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  between	  Israel	  and	  its	  neighbours.”	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Holyoake	  was	  rewarded	  for	  New	  Zealand’s	  actions	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  when	  he	   received	  a	  personal	   letter	   from	   the	   Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	  Levi	  Eshkol	  who	  first	  congratulated	  him	  on	  his	  election	  victory	  and	  then	  expressed:	  	  
…the	  gratitude	  felt	  by	  the	  people	  of	  Israel	  for	  the	  courageous	  stand	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  delegate	  in	  the	  recent	  Security	  Council	  discussions	  on	  the	  Israel-­‐Jordan	  border	   incidents.	   His	   insistence	   that	   Israel’s	   action	   could	   not	   properly	   be	  treated	   in	   isolation	  and	   independently	  of	   the	   circumstances	   to	  which	   it	  was	  a	  response,	   reflected	   and	  was	   a	   tribute	   to	   New	   Zealand’s	   sense	   of	   fairness	   and	  justice.	   On	   behalf	   of	   my	   countrymen,	   my	   colleagues	   and	   I	   wish	   you	   and	   the	  people	  of	  NZ	  all	  happiness	  and	  prosperity	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.133	  	  The	  unusual	  length	  taken	  by	  Holyoake	  to	  ensure	  Israel	  understood	  the	  actions	  of	  New	  Zealand	  is	  interesting.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  is	  indicative	  of	  his	  personal	  attitudes	   towards	   Israel	   or	   his	   commitment	   to	   preserving	   New	   Zealand’s	  reputation	  at	   the	  UN	   is	  not	  overly	   clear.	  His	  biographer	  does	  not	  mention	  any	  particular	   affinity	   with	   the	   Jewish	   state	   but	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   deduce	   from	   the	  archived	  material	  that	  Holyoake	  was	  indeed	  very	  sympathetic	  to	  Israel.	  	  The	   Six-­‐Day	   War	   of	   1967	   involving	   an	   invasion	   by	   Egypt,	   Jordan	   and	   Syria	  against	   Israel	   was	   perceived	   by	   many	   New	   Zealanders	   as	   another	   test	   for	   a	  small	   state	   constantly	   under	   attack	   from	   its	   neighbours.	   For	   some	  commentators	   the	   aftermath	   of	   this	   conflict,	  where	   Israel	   claimed	   swathes	   of	  land	   designated	   for	   the	   Palestinian	   state,	   was	   also	   the	   beginning	   of	   New	  Zealand’s	  shift	  away	  from	  Israel	  due	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  Israel	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  small	  vulnerable	  state	  subject	  to	  Arab	  aggression.134	  David	  Cohen	  for	  example	  notes	   how	   the	   some	   New	   Zealanders	   began	   to	   feel	   that	   “perhaps	   Israel	   was	  getting	   a	   little	   less	   David	   and	   a	   little	   bit	   too	   much	   Goliath	   for	   comfort”.135	  However,	  while	  this	  perception	  may	  have	  been	  true	  in	  some	  sense	  and	  perhaps	  especially	   so	   within	   the	   Department	   of	   External	   Affairs,	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   an	  overstatement	   in	  regard	  to	  popular	  opinion	  and	  perceptions	  from	  the	  political	  parties.	   As	   Russell	   Marshall,	   Labour	   Party	   member	   at	   the	   time	   and	   future	  








Foreign	   Minister	   explained	   in	   an	   interview,	   feelings	   of	   antagonism	   towards	  Israel	   from	   within	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Labour	   Party	   did	   not	   come	   until	   much	  later.136	  	  	  Whilst	   New	   Zealand	   did	   not	   get	   involved	   militarily	   in	   the	   Six-­‐Day	   War,	   an	  External	  Affairs	  file	  from	  the	  time	  explains	  that	  the	  response	  of	  the	  Wellington	  Jewish	   community	   was	   to	   create	   a	   body	   called	   the	   ‘Israel	   Emergency	  Committee’	   and	   send	   volunteers	   to	   undertake	   ‘non-­‐combat	   duties’	   in	   the	  
kibbutzim.	   There	   was	   an	   implied	   suggestion	   that	   these	   volunteers	   may	   not	  restrain	   themselves	   to	   strictly	   non-­‐combat	   duties,	   but	   the	   volunteers	   were	  permitted	   to	   go	   to	   Israel,	   even	   though	   passports	   could	   have	   been	   revoked,	  because	   as	   the	   file	   noted	   “there	   is	   of	   course	   a	   good	   deal	   of	   sympathy	   for	   the	  Israeli	   cause.”137	   This	   sympathy	   was	   to	   be	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   UN	   through	  voting	  support	  and	  limited	  speaking	  support	  although	  officials	  were	  warned	  not	  to	  become	  too	  involved	  in	  the	  debates	  as	  “there	  seems	  no	  rrp	  no	  justification	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  real	  degree	  of	  our	  national	  interest	  involved	  for	  NZ	  to	  attempt	  any	  task	  of	  holding	  possible	  waverers	  in	  line.”138	  Within	   External	   Affairs	   however,	   there	   was	   a	   degree	   of	   antipathy	   towards	  Israel’s	  actions	  after	  the	  ceasefire	  which	  again	  related	  back	  to	  international	  law.	  Suspicions	  that	  Israel	  had	  deployed	  their	  troops	  after	  the	  ceasefire	  to	  secure	  the	  territorial	   gains	   they	   had	  made	  were	   quickly	   confirmed.	   One	   files	   notes	   how	  “[t]he	   feeling	   has	   become	   widespread	   among	   those	   who	   traditionally	   have	  sympathised	   with	   the	   Israeli	   position	   that	   they	   have	   in	   the	   last	   few	   days	  overplayed	   their	   hand...”139	   New	   Zealand	   was	   annoyed	   that	   Israel	   had	  “embarrassed	   their	   friends”	   by	  moving	   towards	   “formal	   full	   annexation”140	   of	  Jerusalem,	  contrary	   to	  Resolution	  242.	  However,	  expressing	   this	  criticism	  was	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overruled	   and	   Wellington	   instead	   proposed	   a	   strategy	   to	   “concentrate	   on	  desirability	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  international	  presence	  in	  Jerusalem	  ...	  rather	  than	  on	  rights	   and	  wrongs	  of	   Israeli	   annexation”	  which	   consequently	   avoided	  a	  direct	  criticism	  of	  Israel	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  141	  	  	  There	  were	  also	  criticisms	  over	  the	  use	  of	  disproportionate	  force	  in	  Jordan	  and	  a	   speech	   was	   drafted	   to	   condemn	   the	   “brutal	   actions”142	   which	   Wellington	  toned	  down	  to	  “extreme”	  so	  as	  to	  give	  “a	  slightly	  more	  sympathetic	  reference	  to	  Israel’s	   impossible	   position”.143	   Thus	  Holyoake	   evidently	   retained	   his	   support	  for	   Israel	   in	  the	   face	  of	  External	  Affairs	  dissatisfaction.	  He	  was	  responsible	   for	  New	  Zealand	  not	  co-­‐sponsoring	  a	  post	  conflict	  resolution	  as	  he	  felt	  that	  “even	  in	  its	   present	   form,	   the	   draft	   places	   too	   much	   stress	   on	   Israeli	   withdrawal	  independently	  of	  a	  general	  solution.”144	  After	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  he	  wrote	  to	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	   Levi	   Eshkol	   saying,	   “[i]n	   this	   period	   of	   stress	   may	   I	   reiterate	  New	  Zealand’s	   longstanding	   support,	   since	   the	   time	  of	   Israel’s	   foundation,	   for	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  live	  free	  from	  external	  pressures	  and	  enjoy	  freedom	  of	  trade.”145	  Other	  diplomats	  expressed	  jubilation	  at	  Israel’s	  win,	  including	  the	  New	  Zealand	  representative	   in	  Rome	  who	  reported	  how	  “the	   Israeli	   triumph	  and	   the	  bitter	  humiliation	  of	  the	  Arabs	  has	  been	  a	  remarkable	  spectacle.”146	  	  In	  July	  1967	  there	  was	  a	  vote	  called	  in	  the	  UN	  related	  to	  the	  territory	  Israel	  had	  gained	  after	  the	  Six	  Day	  War.	  New	  Zealand	  characterised	  itself	  as	  belonging	  to	  group	   that	   could	   be	   “described	   as	   pro-­‐Israel,	   although	   its	   advocates	   would	  describe	   it	   as	   balanced:	   those	   not	   prepared	   to	   condemn	   Israel	   nor	   call	   for	  unqualified	  withdrawal.”147	  One	  major	  point	  of	  difference	  with	  Israel	  was	  over	  the	  question	  of	  refugees	  which	  New	  Zealand	  thought	  should	  be	  repatriated	  back	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to	  the	  occupied	  areas.	  Wellington	  wrote	  to	  its	  diplomats	  in	  New	  York	  that	  “we	  see	  no	  rrp	  [sic]	  no	  reason	  why	  NZ	  should	  oppose	  reasonable	  pressure	  on	  Israel	  to	  permit	  return	  of	  all	  refugees	  to	  occupied	  areas.”148	  Israel	  had	  wanted	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  refugees	  repatriated	  to	  other	  Arab	  countries	  and	  complained	  about	  New	  Zealand’s	   “obsession”	  with	   the	  problem.149	  New	  Zealand	  explained	  that	   its	   main	   goal	   for	   the	   region	   was	   a	   peace	   settlement	   and	   rather	   than	  approving	   Israel’s	   tendency	   to	   “wait	   like	   a	   prickly	   hedgehog	   until	   the	   Arab’s	  become	  ‘reasonable’	  again...	  Israel	  should,	  if	  need	  be,	  be	  ready	  to	  go	  more	  than	  half-­‐way	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  settlement.”150	  	  This	  basic	   sympathy	  continued	  until	   the	  early	  1970’s	  and	  was	  recognised	  and	  valued	  by	   Israel.	   In	   a	   conversation	  with	   the	   Israeli	   Permanent	  Member	  of	   the	  UN	   Mr	   Cahana,	   the	   New	   Zealand	   equivalent	   recorded	   how	   Mr	   Cahana	   had	  remarked	  that	  “New	  Zealand,	  because	  of	  its	  consistent	  support	  for	  Israel,	  was	  at	  the	   top	   of	   Israel’s	   short	   list	   of	   friends	   here.	   If	   New	   Zealand	  was	   to	   show	   any	  indifference	  in	  its	  attitude,	  this	  would	  be	  regarded	  very	  seriously	  by	  Israel.”151	  However	   as	   New	   Zealand	   diplomats	   were	   becoming	   increasingly	   aware,	  “Israel’s	  position	  in	  the	  UN,	  and	  indeed	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  is	  not	  an	  enviable	   one.	   Within	   the	   Assembly,	   Israel	   walks	   a	   lonely	   path.”152	   Israel’s	  isolation	  in	  the	  UN	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  pressures	  imposed	  by	  the	  Arab	  Oil	  Embargo,	  which	  New	   Zealand	   gradually	   succumbed	   to	   under	   Kirk,	   explaining	  that	   they	   were	   “concerned	   to	   retain	   the	   benevolence	   of	   the	   Arabs”	   and	   by	  growing	   attention	   to	   the	   Palestinian	   cause	   and	   the	   problems	   of	   refugees.153	  Furthermore,	   from	  New	  Zealand’s	  end	   there	  was	   “a	  hint	  of	  dissatisfaction”	  on	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Israel’s	   attitude	   towards	   human	   rights	   within	   the	   Occupied	   Palestinian	  Territories.154	  	  
	  
Norman	  Kirk	  
	  Idealism	  in	  a	  Cold	  War	  World	  	  	  Upon	   assuming	   office	   the	   new	   Labour	   Government	   under	   Norman	   Kirk	  proclaimed	   that	   its	   foreign	  policy	  would	  be	   to	   “find,	  and	  hold	   to,	  a	   firm	  moral	  base	  for	  foreign	  policy	  …	  to	  base	  our	  foreign	  policies	  on	  moral	  principles	  is	  the	  most	   enlightened	   form	   of	   self-­‐interest.”155	   This	   commitment	   was	   not	   simply	  rhetoric.	  Within	   two	   weeks	   of	   becoming	   Prime	  Minister,	   Kirk	   recognised	   the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  announced	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  last	  New	  Zealand	  troops	  from	  Vietnam.	  He	  was	  committed	  to	  an	  independent	  foreign	  policy	  as	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  towards	  the	  evolution	  of	  national	  identity	  and	  believed	  there	  was	  an	  important	  place	  in	  the	  world	  for	  small	  powers.156	  He	  believed	  that	  small	  powers,	  through	  their	  dependence	  on	  international	  law	  would	  be	  able	  to	  succeed	   in	   “encouraging	   the	   great	   powers	   to	   relinquish	   strength	   and	   to	   seek	  justice,	   better	   relationships,	   and	   peace	   through	   cooperation	   and	   through	   a	  common	  community	  dedicated	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  human	  family.”157	  	  Like	  Nash	  and	  Fraser,	  Kirk	  was	  considered	  a	  “friend	  of	  Israel”	  who	  had	  visited	  the	  country	  several	  times	  including	  a	  visit	  whilst	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  and	  was	   deeply	   impressed	   with	   what	   he	   saw.	   158	   He	   was	   instrumental	   in	   the	  appointment	  of	  an	   Israeli	   Jew	  named	  Zvi	  Harmor	  as	   the	  personal	   secretary	  of	  Bill	   Rowling.	   Kirk	   and	   Harmor	   had	   met	   through	   the	   Socialist	   International	  organisation	  and	  were	  close	   friends	  –	  Kirk	  even	  gave	  him	  his	   favourite	  watch	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when	   Hamor’s	   broke.159	   The	   Rowling	   government,	   which	   succeeded	   the	   Kirk	  government	   following	   Kirk’s	   sudden	   death	   in	   1974,	   promoted	   Kirk’s	   ohu	  scheme,	  loosely	  based	  on	  the	  Israeli	  kibbutz	  model.	  This	  was	  a	  type	  of	  idealistic	  rural	   farming	   community,	  which	  Kirk	   had	   experienced	   firsthand	   in	   Israel	   and	  felt	  would	  be	  an	  antidote	   “to	   the	   ills	  of	  modern	  society,	   as	  well	   as	  a	  means	  of	  showing	  people	  the	  virtues	  of	  a	  simpler	   life.”160	  Unfortunately	  the	  ohu	  scheme	  failed	  due	  to	  poor	  choices	  of	   land	  for	   the	  communities	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  sustained	  interest	  in	  the	  projects.	  However,	  despite	  these	  deep	  and	  personal	  connections	  to	  Israel,	  the	  oil	  shocks	  eventually	  forced	  the	  Third	  Labour	  Government	  to	  begin	  to	  rethink	  their	  position	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  first	  oil	  shock	  occurred	  in	  1973	  after	  Israel’s	  victory	  in	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  and	   the	   subsequent	   Arab	   oil	   embargo.	   Rising	   oil	   prices	   and	   their	   perceived	  effect	   on	   national	   security	   began	   to	   transform	   the	   political	   landscape	   and	   it	  became	  increasingly	  important	  to	  have	  “friends	  in	  the	  right	  places”.161	  However,	  the	  rising	  price	  of	  oil	  also	  created	  an	  increased	  ability	  of	  various	  Arab	  nations	  to	  purchase	   imports	   and	   New	   Zealand	   perceived	   a	   distinct	   opportunity	   to	  capitalise	  on	  this.	  In	  1974	  the	  Kirk	  Government	  organised	  a	   ‘goodwill	  mission’	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  led	  by	  J.V	  Scott,	  the	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  They	  visited	  ten	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  in	  twenty-­‐two	  days	  including	  Egypt,	  Lebanon,	  Syria,	  and	   Iraq	  but	  did	  not	  visit	   Israel.162	  Following	   the	  goodwill	  mission	  New	  Zealand	  became	  accredited	  to	  Egypt	  in	  1974	  through	  its	  Embassy	  in	  Rome.	  This	  was	   also	   the	   first	   year	   that	   even-­‐handedness	   was	   explicitly	   pushed	   “in	   the	  interests	  of	  building	  up	  our	  relations	  with	  the	  Arab	  States.”163	  This	   eventually	   led	   to	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   first	   New	   Zealand	   Embassy	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  in	  January	  1975.	  It	  was	  decided	  to	  open	  this	  Embassy	  in	  Iran	  as	  it	  was	  “the	  country	  in	  the	  area	  which	  offered	  the	  most	  important	  export	  prospects	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for	  New	  Zealand.”164	  This	  was	   followed	   in	  quick	   succession	  by	  an	  Embassy	   in	  Iraq	   (1976)	   and	   a	   Consulate-­‐General	   in	   Bahrain	   (1977).	   When	   Kirk	   was	  criticised	  for	  forsaking	  a	  ‘moral’	  foreign	  policy	  by	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition,	  Robert	  Muldoon,	  in	  parliament	  and	  for	  his	  decision	  to	  “kowtow	  to	  the	  Arabs”165	  he	  replied	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  mission	  was	  to	  clarify	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  of	  even-­‐handedness	  as	  well	  as	  to	  “explore	  the	  possibilities	  in	  developing	  relations	  both	  politically	  and	  in	  trade.”166	  	  This	  criticism	  by	  Muldoon	  is	  interesting	  as	  he	  was	   later	   to	   overtly	   emphasise	   his	   preference	   for	   the	  Arab	   states	   over	   Israel.	  Thus,	   rather	   than	   demonstrating	   any	   real	   conviction	   or	   concern,	   Muldoon’s	  objection	  should	  probably	  be	  read	  simply	  as	  parliamentary	  point	  scoring.	  	  Israel’s	   major	   objective	   during	   the	   Kirk	   years	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   get	   New	  Zealand	   to	   present	   its	   credentials	   to	   the	   Israeli	   Government	   and	   have	   either	  residential	   or	   non-­‐residential	   representation	   in	   Israel.	   Israel	   had	   lost	   a	   great	  deal	  of	  support	  within	  multi-­‐state	  institutions	  and	  around	  twenty	  African	  states	  had	  severed	  diplomatic	  relations	  following	  the	  1973	  October/Yom	  Kippur	  War.	  Given	   this	   context,	   as	   Secretary	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Frank	   Corner	   noted,	   “it	   is	  understandable	  that	  they	  are	  anxious	  to	  strengthen	  the	  friendly	  links	  they	  still	  maintain	  with	  us.”167	  Israel	  also	  worked	  hard	  to	  get	  New	  Zealand	  to	  agree	  to	  an	  Israeli	  Embassy	   in	  Wellington.	  One	  New	  Zealand	   representative	  Mr	  Holloway,	  accredited	  to	  Egypt,	  was	  adamantly	  opposed	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Israeli	  mission	   in	  New	  Zealand	  due	   to	   fears	  over	  oil	  but	  Kirk	  override	  such	  concerns	  and	  approved	   the	  opening	   in	   January	  1973.	  He	   told	   the	   Israeli	  Ambassador	   in	  Canberra	  that	  “an	  Israeli	  post	  in	  New	  Zealand	  would	  be	  welcome.	  The	  question	  raised	   no	   problems	   whatsoever.”168	   This	   commitment	   was	   reconsidered	  following	  the	  1973	  war	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  best	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interests	  to	  defer	  the	  opening.169	  After	  a	  tenuous	  ceasefire	  had	  been	  established,	  the	  issue	  was	  raised	  once	  again.	  Frank	  Corner	  noted	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Kirk	  that	  in	  his	  view	  the	  opening	  of	  an	  Israeli	  Embassy	  would	  be	  “politically	  acceptable	  in	  New	  Zealand	  where	  public	  opinion	  has	  always	  tended	  to	  support	  the	  Israeli	  cause.”	  170	  There	   was	   a	   feeling	   amongst	   some	   of	   the	   officials	   in	   Wellington	   that	   even-­‐handedness	   was	   not	   being	   properly	   exercised	   despite	   reassurances	   to	   the	  contrary	   from	  Kirk	   in	  parliament.	   In	   July,	  while	  Kirk	  was	   still	   Prime	  Minister,	  Corner	  advised	  him	  that	  after	  the	  Goodwill	  mission	  and	  accreditation	  to	  Cairo,	  “[t]he	  Israelis	  will	  soon	  be	  entitled	  to	  think	  that	  we	  are	  not	  as	  even-­‐handed	  as	  we	  claim,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  think	  so	  already.”171	  However	  only	  four	  months	  later	  the	  new	  Secretary	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	   J.	   V.	   Scott	   in	   a	   submission	   to	   the	   new	  Prime	  Minister	  Bill	  Rowling	  in	  October	  1974	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  justify	  an	  Israeli	  Embassy	  opening	  under	  even-­‐handedness.	  He	  argued	  that	  “[i]f	  we	  had	  no	  doubts	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Israeli	  cause	  and	  felt	  we	  had	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  support	  it,	  then	  in	  my	  view	  we	  should	  do	  so	  and	  risk	  the	  consequences.	  
But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case”	  [Emphasis	  mine].172	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  only	  acceptable	  way	  to	   exercise	   even-­‐handedness	   would	   be	   to	   allow	   Israel	   to	   establish	   a	   mission	  only	  when	  Egypt	  was	  ready	  to	  do	  the	  same.173	  	  Kirk	  died	  in	  office	  in	  August	  1974	  and	  Bill	  Rowling	  took	  over	  as	  Prime	  Minister.	  The	   Rowling	   Government	   oversaw	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   Liberation	  Organisation	  (PLO)	  into	  the	  UN	  as	  an	  observer.	  The	  Palestinian	  cause	  had	  been	  blown	   into	   global	   consciousness	   by	   a	   fatal	   attack	   on	   eleven	   Israeli	   athletes	   at	  the	  1972	  Munich	  Olympic	  Games	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  pseudo	  paramilitary	  arm	  of	  the	   PLO	   called	   Black	   September.174	   The	   decision	   by	   New	   Zealand	   to	   vote	   to	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designate	   permanent	   observer	   status	   onto	   the	   PLO	   in	   the	   UN	   was	   a	   fairly	  uncontroversial	   one	   despite	   a	   heated	  parliamentary	   question	   session,	   as	  New	  Zealand’s	  vote	  reflected	  the	  majority	  view	  within	  the	  UN,	  with	  105	  voting	  in	  the	  affirmative	  and	  only	  four	  negative	  votes.175	  Rowling	  contended	  that	   if	   the	  PLO	  were	   not	   granted	   the	   right	   to	   be	   heard	   in	   the	   UN,	   then	   it	   “might	   well	   have	  concluded	   that	   it	   had	   no	   alternative	   to	   a	   resurgence	   of	   violence	   and	  terrorism.”176	   Yosef	   Hassin,	   the	   Israeli	   Charge	   d’Affairs	   met	   with	   Rowling	   to	  express	   Israel’s	   discontent	   at	   this	   move	   saying	   that	   New	   Zealand	   had	   “sided	  with	  the	  opposition.”177	  Rowling	  defended	  his	  position	  by	  saying	  that	  Israel	  had	  been	  in	  a	  similar	  situation	  in	  1947	  and	  it	  was	  now	  the	  Palestinians	  right	  to	  be	  heard	   too.	   He	   concluded	   by	   expressing	   disappointment	   at	   the	   disagreement	  saying	  “[w]e	  have	  known	  many	  of	  your	  people	  on	  a	  personal	  basis	  and	  we	  must	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  even-­‐handed	  by	  others.”178	  At	  the	  same	  time	  diplomats	  did	  their	  best	  to	  ensure	  that	  Israel	  was	  not	  excluded	  from	   multilateral	   institutions	   in	   the	   face	   of	   considerable	   attempts	   from	   the	  Afro-­‐Arab	   lobby	   to	   do	   so	   throughout	   1975.	   Their	   strategy	   to	   prevent	   this	  happening	   in	   the	  UN	   and	   it’s	   various	   bodies	   involved	   a	   three-­‐pronged	   attack:	  New	   Zealand’s	   representatives	   in	   the	   UN	   lobbied	   their	   counterparts	   from	  Tanzania	  and	  Zambia,	  “the	  two	  Africans	  to	  whom	  we	  can	  probably	  speak	  most	  easily”	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Organisation	  of	  African	  Unity	  states	  did	  not	  resolve	  to	  exclude	   Israel	   from	   the	   General	   Assembly.	   179	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   in	   Kuala	  Lumpur	   were	   responsible	   for	   lobbying	   the	   Malaysians	   before	   the	   Islamic	  Foreign	  Ministers	   Conference	   in	   Jeddah.	   	   Finally,	   the	   Embassy	   in	   Jakarta	  was	  instructed	   to	   communicate	   to	   “the	   appropriate	   people	   in	   Foreign	   Affairs	   our	  








hope	   that	   no	   action	  will	   be	   taken	   at	   the	   [Non-­‐Aligned]	   Conference”.180	   These	  efforts	   were	   acknowledged	   by	   the	   Israeli	   representative	   in	   Canberra	   Hassin	  who	  phoned	  Foreign	  Affairs	  “with	  a	  special	  word	  of	  thanks	  from	  Tel	  Aviv”	  who	  interestingly	   also	   noted	   that	   the	   “Australians	   are	   still	   considering	   what	   they	  should	  do.”181	  These	  diplomatic	  efforts	  were	  unsuccessful	  in	  that	  both	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	   and	   Islamic	   Foreign	   Minister’s	   conferences	   declared	   a	   link	   between	  Zionism,	  imperialism	  and	  racism.	  Despite	  this,	  Israel	  remained	  a	  member	  of	  the	  UN.	  	  In	   1975,	   after	   years	   of	   behind	   the	   scenes	   pressure,	   the	   Rowling	   Government	  was	   instrumental	   in	   staging	   one	   of	   the	   more	   elaborate	   symbols	   of	   even-­‐handedness	   by	   accepting	   the	   credentials	   from	   both	   an	   Israeli	   and	   Egyptian	  Embassy	   in	  Wellington	   on	   the	   same	   day.	   This	   was	   a	   deliberate	   move	   by	   the	  Rowling	  Government	  who	  had	  come	  under	  accusations	  of	  being	  ‘over	  cautious’	  by	   Israel.	   Government	   files	   reveal	   that	   this	   decision	   was	   viewed	   with	  puzzlement	  by	   the	   two	  states:	   “both	   Israeli	  and	  Egyptian	  embassies	  at	  deputy	  level	  professed	  to	  be	  mildly	  put	  out”.182	  	  But	  as	  External	  Affairs	  explained	  in	  an	  internal	  memo	  the	  decision	  was	  “a	  reasonably	  logical	  thing,	  in	  terms	  of	  need	  not	  only	  to	  be	  even-­‐handed	  but	  to	  be	  seen	  logically	  to	  be	  so	  [sic].”183	  The	  diplomatic	  activities	  of	  these	  two	  embassies	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  ensured	  that	  Middle	  Eastern	  issues	  were	  elevated	  within	  the	  popular	  consciousness	  of	  many	  New	  Zealanders	  during	  this	  period	  and	  well	  into	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1970’s	   moreover,	   many	   Labour	   members	   were	   becoming	  increasingly	   disillusioned	   by	   Israeli	   policies	   towards	   the	   Palestinian	   people.	  This	  issue	  was	  made	  particularly	  problematic	  for	  many	  Labourites	  both	  because	  of	  changes	  within	  Israel	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  election	  of	  the	  right-­‐wing	  Likud	  party	   in	   1977,	   the	   first	   rightwing	   government	   since	   Israel’s	   inception,	   and	  because	  of	  Labour’s	  commitment	   to	   indigenous	  people’s	  self-­‐determination.184	  








Labour	  had	  taken	  an	  outspoken	  stance	  against	  South	  Africa’s	  apartheid	  policies	  and	  would	   later	  be	  highly	  critical	  of	   the	  1981	  Springbok	  tour	   in	  New	  Zealand.	  This	   moral	   stance	   affected	   attitudes	   towards	   Israel	   because	   of	   military	   ties	  between	   South	   Africa	   and	   Israel,	   and	   because	   of	   a	   long-­‐running	   campaign	  within	  the	  UN	  to	  link	  apartheid	  with	  Zionism.185	  	  New	   Zealand	   had	   in	   fact	   abstained	   on	   the	   now	   notorious	   General	   Assembly	  Resolution	  3379	  condemning	  racism	  in	  the	  UN	  which	  it	  otherwise	  would	  have	  supported	   because	   the	   Resolution	   declared	   that	   “Zionism	   is	   a	   form	   of	   racism	  and	   racial	   discrimination.”186	  The	  Resolution	   also	   linked	  Zionism,	   imperialism	  and	   colonisation	   with	   the	   statement	   that	   “the	   racist	   régime	   in	   occupied	  Palestine	  and	  the	  racist	  régimes	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  a	  common	  imperialist	  origin”.187	  Officials	  explained	  their	  decision	  to	  abstain	  because	  they	  had	   not	  wanted	   to	   “link	   issues	  which	   are	   not	   linked	   or	   to	   engage	   in	   an	   anti-­‐Semitic	  witch	  hunt.”188	  The	  controversial	  resolution	  was	  later	  revoked	  in	  1991	  through	   a	   campaign	   by	  US	   President	  George	  H.W.	   Bush,	   one	   of	   the	   few	   times	  this	  occurred	  in	  UN	  history.	  New	  Zealand	  along	  with	  seventy-­‐seven	  other	  states	  cosponsored	  the	  repeal.	  	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  overstate	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  Israel	  in	  this	  period.	  Rather	  than	   a	   shift	   away,	   the	   incremental	   changes	   to	   the	   relationship	   are	   perhaps	  better	   viewed	   as	   a	   pull	   towards	   the	   Arab	   states.	   Within	   the	   Labour	   Party,	  attitudes	   were	   beginning	   to	   change,	   but	   this	   was	   not	   reflected	   in	   the	   official	  bilateral	   relationship	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   that	   it	   would	   be	   in	   later	   Labour	  governments	   and	   any	   shift	   was	   explained	   relatively	   credibly	   within	   the	  parameters	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   even-­‐handed	   policy.	   Officials	   retained	   their	  traditional	  unease	  towards	  Israel	  and	  were	  distinctively	  unimpressed	  with	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  various	  Israeli	  Embassy	  staff,	  both	  in	  Wellington	  and	  in	  Canberra.	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However,	   they	   also	   kept	   track	  of	   public	   opinion	   in	  New	  Zealand	   and	  believed	  that	  this	  remained	  fairly	  supportive	  of	  Israel.	  	  
	  
Even-­handedness	  explained	  
 “From	  a	  moral	  as	  well	  as	  a	  practical	  viewpoint,	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  dispute	  can	  only	  be	  one	  of	  even-­‐handedness.	  Amidst	  all	  the	  emotion	  and	  bitterness	  there	  are	  genuine	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  on	  both	  sides	  and	  I	  see	  no	  moral	  grounds	  for	  lending	  particular	  support	  to	  either.”	  
Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  J.	  V.	  Scott	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Bill	  Rowling,	  October	  1974	  	  It	   is	   perhaps	   important	   at	   this	   point	   to	   pause	   and	   reflect	   on	   New	   Zealand’s	  overarching	   Middle	   Eastern	   policy,	   that	   of	   even-­‐handedness.	   Despite	   being	   a	  tried	  and	  tested	  approach	  within	  the	  UN	  for	  years,	  it	  was	  really	  only	  under	  the	  Kirk	  Government	  that	  even-­‐handedness	  became	  the	  standard	  rhetorical	  phrase	  for	  Middle	  Eastern	   issues.	  The	  policy	  was	  confirmed	  at	   the	   start	  of	  Muldoon’s	  first	  term	  in	  office	  at	  the	  suggestion	  of	  his	  advisors.	  He	  retained	  the	  policy	  as	  it	  enabled	  New	  Zealand	  “to	  avoid	  an	  undignified	  flip-­‐flop,	  if	  for	  example,	  the	  Arabs	  were	   to	   resort	   again	   to	   the	   oil	  weapon.”189	   The	   term	   itself	   implies	   a	   sense	   of	  impartiality	  which	  in	  reality	  has	  never	  really	  been	  exercised	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  As	  Leslie	  Munro,	  New	  Zealand’s	  permanent	  ambassador	  to	  the	   UN,	   pointed	   out	   in	   a	   testy	   letter	   to	   Clifton	  Webb	   in	   1954,	   “in	   practice	   ...	  [there]	   must	   be	   a	   decision	   to	   come	   down	   on	   one	   side	   or	   the	   other...	   In	   the	  Security	  Council	  even	  an	  abstention	  is	  a	  vote	  for	  one	  party[.]”190	  	  According	  to	  Palestinian	  campaigner	  and	  Canterbury	  University	  Professor	  Ron	  Macintyre,	   in	   general	   even-­‐handedness	   “amounted	   to	   a	   form	   of	   concerned	  neutrality,	   often	   expressed	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   wider	   Western/US	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interests	   in	   the	  Middle	   East”.	   191	   This	   became	   even	  more	   pronounced	   as	   this	  region	  was	   swept	   into	   the	  maelstrom	  of	  Cold	  War	   rivalries,	   and	   Israel	   turned	  from	  close	  ties	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  become	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  1966	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  released	  an	  internal	  fact	  sheet	   explaining	   how	   even-­‐handedness	   “was	   ostensibly	   designed	   to	   avoid	   a	  choice	   between	   them	   [Israel	   and	   the	  Arab	   states]”	   but	  which	   tended	   to	   come	  down	  on	   Israel’s	   side.192	  After	   the	  oil	   shocks,	   and	  especially	  during	   the	   fourth	  and	   fifth	   Labour	   Governments,	   this	   tendency	  was	   reversed,	   and	   according	   to	  Israel’s	  former	  Honorary	  Consul	  in	  New	  Zealand	  David	  Zwartz,	  began	  to	  be	  used	  against	   Israel.	   According	   to	   Zwartz,	   “if	   you’re	   even-­‐handed	  with	   a	   country	   on	  the	  one	   side,	   and	  a	   group	  of	  people	  who	  want	   to	  destroy	   that	   country	  on	   the	  other	   side,	   what	   sort	   of	   even-­‐handedness	   is	   it?”193	   He	   argues	   that	   even-­‐handedness	   is	   “an	  attempt	   to	   create	  a	  moral	   equivalence	  which	   supporters	  of	  Israel	  say	  simply	  does	  not	  exist.”194	  There	   are	   several	   UN	   Resolutions	   which	   are	   particularly	   important	   to	   New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  decisions	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  These	  include	  the	  1947	  Partition	  Resolution	  181	  and	  the	  November	  1967	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  242	  after	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  war.	  Other	  Resolutions	  of	  more	  contemporary	   importance	   that	  do	  not	   impact	   on	   even-­‐handedness,	   but	   which	   are	   a	   result	   of	   its	   interpretation,	  include	   the	  decision	  by	   the	  Clark	  Government	   to	  uphold	   the	   ruling	  on	   the	   so-­‐called	   security	   fence	   in	   the	  West	   Bank	   in	   2003	   and	   the	   decision	   by	   the	   Key	  Government	   to	   cast	   an	   affirmative	   vote	   to	   send	   the	   Goldstone	   report	   to	   the	  Security	  Council	   in	  2010.	  The	  decision	  to	  support	  of	  a	  resolution	  is	  contingent	  on	   a	   number	   of	   factors:	   that	   it	   supports	   the	   two	   state	   solution,	   that	   it	   is	  balanced,	   that	   it	   upholds	   international	   law	   and	   previous	   Resolutions,	   and	  finally,	  whether	  New	  Zealand’s	  vote	  would	  be	  in	   ‘good	  international	  company.’	  This	   last	  criteria	  has	  remained	  fluid	  and	  certainly	  in	  the	  post-­‐Bolger	  years	  has	  








not	  included	  Australia	  or	  the	  US	  but	  rather	  European	  countries	  like	  Ireland	  and	  Italy	  as	  well	  as	  Asian	  states	  like	  South	  Korea.	  The	  earliest	   comprehensive	  articulation	  of	   even-­‐handedness	  was	  made	  by	  UN	  Permanent	   Representative	   Malcolm	   Templeton	   in	   November	   1974.	   Looking	  back	   on	   it	   three	   years	   later	   the	  Ministry	  maintained	   in	   a	   confidential	   bulletin	  that	   it	   was	   a	   very	   forward-­‐looking	   statement	   particularly	   in	   regard	   to	   its	  comments	  on	  Palestine.	  The	  statement	  recognised	  Israel’s	  right	  as	  a	  sovereign	  independent	   state	   to	   live	   in	   peace	   and	   security	   as	   well	   as	   “New	   Zealand’s	  unalterable	  opposition	  to	  the	  terrorism	  and	  violence”	  but	  iterated	  the	  need	  for	  Israel	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  territories	  occupied	  in	  1967.	  195	  It	  emphasised	  the	  need	   for	   refugees	   to	   be	   either	   repatriated	   or	   compensated.	   It	   recognised	   the	  rights	   of	   the	   Palestinians,	   “including	   the	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   and	  establishing	   an	   independent	   Arab	   state	   of	   Palestine	   if	   they	   so	   wish.”196	  Regarding	   the	   PLO,	   it	   recognised	   that	   “the	   PLO	   has	   a	   role	   to	   play	   as	   a	  representative,	   though	   not	   the	   sole	   legal	   representative	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  people.”197	  This	  initial	  statement	  has	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  defining	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  in	  the	   Israel-­‐Palestine	   dispute	   with	   slight	   variances	   in	   language	   and	   nuance	  representing	   the	   only	   significant	   change.	   It	   remains	   the	   official	   policy	   of	  New	  Zealand	   to	   support	   a	   two	   state	   solution,	   a	   just	   settlement	   and	   Israel’s	  withdrawal	   from	   the	   occupied	   territories.	   The	   only	   substantial	   elaboration	   to	  even-­‐handedness	   is	   the	  addition	  of	   the	  need	  for	  a	  “balanced	  and	  constructive”	  approach	  with	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   promotion	   of	   dialogue.198	   The	  Ministry	   of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  argue	  that	  even-­‐handedness	  is	  underpinned	  through	  contributions	   to	   peacekeeping	   operations	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   particularly	  UNTSO	   and	   the	   Sinai	   Multinational	   Force	   and	   Observers	   (MFO)	   which	   was	  established	   in	   1982.	   They	   also	   argue	   that	   even-­‐handedness	   is	   concretely	  expressed	  through	  New	  Zealand’s	  core	  funding	  of	  the	  UNRWA.	  























Muldoon	  to	  Bolger	  








this	  period	  that	  the	  influence	  by	  the	  external	  became	  of	  paramount	  motivational	  relevance.202	  	  	  
Muldoon	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  A	  Grocer-­Consumer	  Policy?	  
 “New	  Zealand	  was	  a	  small	  country	  far	  from	  the	  major	  scenes	  of	  international	  conflict	  such	  as	  the	  Middle	  East	  …	  we	  tended	  to	  follow	  the	  positions	  adopted	  by	  other	  countries	  ‘like	  us’	  in	  respect	  to	  such	  issues.”203	  
Prime	  Minister	  Robert	  Muldoon	  explaining	  his	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
	  Although	   Muldoon	   did	   not	   hold	   the	   Foreign	   Affairs	   portfolio	   officially,	   in	  practice	   he	   dominated	   it,	   just	   as	   he	   did	  most	   other	   parts	   of	   his	   Government.	  Gerald	  Hensley	  has	  described	  Muldoon’s	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy	  as	  being	  “as	  scrappy,	   instinctive	   and	   matter	   of	   fact	   as	   the	   man	   himself.”204	   His	   “blunt,	  confrontational	  manner”	   led	  Muldoon	   to	  make	   a	   number	   of	   diplomatic	   gaffes	  which	  often	   left	  officials	   in	  damage	  control	  mode,	   the	  most	   infamous	  of	  which	  was	   when	   he	   labelled	   the	   US	   President	   Jimmy	   Carter	   a	   “peanut	   farmer	   from	  Georgia”	   and	   insulted	   his	   family.205	   He	   mistrusted	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	  whom	  he	   regarded	  as	   “a	  bunch	  of	  prima	  donnas	   and	   socialists”206	   and	  told	   a	   former	   staffer	   that	   he	   “did	   not	   particularly	   like	   the	   Foreign	  Ministry	  …	  and	   he	   wouldn’t	   ‘take	   any	   nonsense’	   from	   Foreign	   Affairs.”207	   This	   antipathy	  








was	  reciprocated,	  particularly	  by	  Frank	  Corner,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  who	  had	  been	  an	  advocate	  of	  Kirk’s	   idealist	   approach	   to	   foreign	  policy	   issues	  and	  who	  felt	  “despair	  and	  frustration	  at	  the	  premature	  death	  of	  both	  Kirk	  and	  the	   policies	   he	   had	   initiated,	   pursued	   and	   come	   to	   symbolise	   in	   international	  affairs.”208	  Muldoon’s	  mental	  map	  for	  making	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  was	  based	  upon	  his	  wartime	   experiences	   and	   he	   had	   a	   deep	   sentimental	   attachment	   to	   Britain	  whom	  he	  continued	  to	  call	  the	  ‘Mother	  Country’	  throughout	  his	  period	  as	  Prime	  Minister.209	   As	   Ian	   McGibbon	   explains,	   Muldoon’s	   cabinet	   was	   the	   last	   to	   be	  made	  up	  of	  World	  War	   II	  veterans	  and	   it	  was	  notable	   for	   the	  way	   it	   “failed	   to	  perceive,	  indeed	  actively	  resisted,	  changing	  social	  attitudes.”210	  Muldoon	  did	  not	  share	   the	   romantic	   fascination	   with	   Israel	   that	   his	   Labour	   predecessors	   held	  and	  moreover	   harboured	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   prejudice	   against	   Israel	   due	   the	  Jewish	  terrorism	  against	  Britain	  in	  Palestine.	  He	  made	  a	  number	  of	  insensitive	  remarks	  about	  Israel	  and	  Jewish	  people	  in	  general,	  including	  an	  incident	  where	  he	  referred	  to	  Israeli	  President	  Menachem	  Begin	  as	  a	  “terrorist”	  shortly	  before	  the	   arrival	   of	   a	   new	   Israeli	   Ambassador	   to	   New	   Zealand.211	   The	   Ambassador	  made	  a	  vehement	  defence	  of	  his	  President	  on	  National	  Radio	  in	  response,	  which	  gave	   the	   issue	  an	  even	  greater	  public	  profile.	  Muldoon	   incurred	   the	   ire	  of	   the	  New	   Zealand	   Jewish	   community	   by	   imploring	   them	   to	   be	   more	   “objective”	  towards	   the	   Middle	   East	   dispute	   in	   an	   address	   on	   the	   Jewish	   New	   Year.212	  Finally,	   he	  was	   quoted	   in	   the	  Evening	   Post	   criticising	   US	   President	   Carter	   for	  “wooing”	  the	  Jewish	  vote	  and	  labelling	  the	  Israeli	  policies	  on	  Jerusalem	  as	  “very	  foolish”.213	  This	  attitude	  was	  not	  shared	  by	  all	  National	  Party	  voters.	  One	  wrote	  to	   Foreign	   Minister	   Talboys	   to	   express	   grave	   concern	   that	   Muldoon	   was	  unsympathetic	   to	   Israel’s	   security	   concerns.	   He	   asked	   how	   “New	   Zealand	   (a	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small	   country	   itself,	   although	   luckily	   not	   surrounded	  by	   fanatical	   neighbours)	  [could]	  wish	   to	   see	   Israel’s	   borders	   reduced	   to	   a	   situation	  where	   she	   can	   no	  longer	  defend	  herself?”214	  According	   to	   Simon	   Murdoch,	   Muldoon’s	   foreign	   policy	   revolved	   around	   his	  “concerns	  and	   fears	  about	   the	  New	  Zealand	  economy	  and	   its	   future.”215	  These	  fears	  were	  based	  largely	  upon	  the	  implications	  of	  Britain’s	  accession	  to	  the	  EEC	  in	   1973	   which	   “necessitated	   a	   radical	   diversification	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	  economy,	  export	  products	  and	  overseas	  markets.”216	  They	  also	  revolved	  around	  the	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	   oil	   shocks.	   As	   noted	   previously,	   the	   first	   oil	   shock	   in	  1973	   had	   forced	   the	   Kirk	   Government	   to	   reach	   out	   diplomatically	   to	   various	  Middle	   Eastern	   states.	   The	   second	   oil	   shock	   occurred	   under	   Muldoon’s	  Government	   in	  1979	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	   Iranian	   Islamic	  Revolution.	  After	   this,	  Foreign	  Minister	  Brian	  Talboys	  declared	   that	   “nothing	   is	   traditional	   anymore,	  we	  are	  on	  our	  own.”217	  New	  Zealand	  began	  to	  cultivate	  a	   ‘special	  relationship’	  with	   Saudi	   Arabia	   based	   on	   both	   import	   and	   export	   incentives.218	   This	  relationship	  was	  deemed	  so	  important	  that	  in	  1980	  New	  Zealand’s	  state-­‐owned	  Broadcasting	  Standards	  Authority	  refused	  to	  screen	  the	  British	  film	  Death	  of	  a	  
Princess	   because	  of	   concerns	   that	   it	  would	  upset	   the	  Saudis.	  The	   film	   told	   the	  fictional	  story	  of	  the	  public	  execution	  of	  a	  Saudi	  princess	  and	  her	   lover	  after	  a	  charge	   of	   adultery	   and	  was	   based	   on	   the	   actual	   life	   of	   Princess	  Masha’il.	   The	  reason	   given	   by	   the	   Broadcasting	   Standards	   Authority	   was	   that	   “it	   was	   a	  distortion	  of	  Saudi	  values.”219	  	  To	   address	   these	   growing	   economic	   insecurities,	  Muldoon	   elevated	   increased	  and	   diversified	   trade	   as	   the	   core	   national	   interest	   to	   be	   pursued	   by	   the	  diplomatic	  service.	   In	  1980	  he	  declared	   that	   “[o]ur	   foreign	  policy	   is	   trade.	  We	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  normal	  foreign	  policy	  matters	  to	  any	  great	  extent,	  we	  
                                                      








are	  interested	  in	  trade.”220	  This	  resulted	  in	  an	  uproar	  within	  Foreign	  Affairs	  as	  the	   new	   policy	   created	   deep	   cleavages	   between	   professional	   diplomats	   and	  their	   more	   trade	   focused	   colleagues.	   The	   Consul-­‐General	   for	   Bahrain,	   George	  Horsburgh,	   in	   an	   exceptional	   move,	   even	   wrote	   to	   Wellington	   attacking	   the	  application	   of	   the	   policy	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	   He	   questioned	   whether	   New	  Zealand	  had	  “jumped	  from	  the	  British	   frying	  pan	   into	   the	   Iranian	   fire?”221	  and	  furiously	  maintained	   that	   “we	   cannot	   build	   a	  Middle	   East	   policy	   on	   a	   grocer-­‐consumer	  basis.”222	  The	  supremacy	  of	  the	  trade	  interest	  was	  further	  illustrated	  in	  1980	  when	  New	  Zealand	  not	  only	  refused	  to	  impose	  a	  trade	  embargo	  on	  Iran	  despite	  the	  request	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  whose	  embassy	  had	  been	  taken	  hostage	  by	  Iranian	  students,	  but	  also	  retained	  its	  embassy	  in	  Tehran	  which	  had	  opened	  in	  1975.	  The	   indirect	   effect	   of	   the	   trade	   policy	   on	   New	   Zealand’s	   relations	  with	   Israel	  was	   substantial.	   Trade	  with	   the	   Arab	   nations	   far	   surpassed	   trade	  with	   Israel,	  and	   the	   diplomatic	   relationship	   reflected	   this	   disparity.	   In	   1977	   in	   Cairo	   for	  example,	  Muldoon	  met	  with	  Mahmoud	  Riad,	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Arab	  League,	  who	  was	  “delighted	  to	  assist	  in	  arranging	  meetings	  with	  Arab	  leaders”	  to	  discuss	  increasing	  the	  trade	  connections	  but	  never	  sent	  any	  senior	  Ministers	  to	  Israel.223	  Seventy	  percent	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  oil	  came	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  region,	  especially	  Iran	  and	  Iraq,	  provided	  a	  market	  for	  forty	  percent	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  meat.224	  	  New	  Zealand	  had	  several	  diplomatic	  missions	  in	  Arab	  states	  that	   lobbied	   Wellington	   to	   ensure	   that	   no	   moves	   were	   made	   to	   open	   New	  
                                                      220	  David	  McCraw,	  ‘New	  Zealand’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  Under	  National	  and	  Labour	  Governments:	  Variations	  on	  the	  ‘Small	  State’	  Theme?’	  Pacific	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  67,	  No.	  1,	  1994,	  p.	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Zealand	   missions	   in	   either	   Tel	   Aviv	   or	   Jerusalem.	   The	   New	   Zealand	   Charge	  d’Affairs	  in	  Baghdad,	  I.	  G.	  Eskrigge,	  for	  example	  argued	  that	  “New	  Zealand	  needs	  better	  relations	  with	  the	  Arab	  countries	  than	  it	  does	  with	  Israel”	  and	  suggested	  that	   a	   better	   move	   would	   be	   to	   make	   a	   gesture	   to	   the	   Palestinians.	   As	   he	  explained,	   “they,	   after	   all,	   are	   the	   people	   in	   greater	   need	   of	   sympathy	   and	  practical	  help.	  That	  they	  are	  not	  receiving	  enough	  from	  their	  brother	  Arabs	  is	  all	  the	  more	  reason	  for	  countries	  like	  ours	  to	  encourage	  a	  fairer	  deal	  for	  them	  from	  the	  Israelis.”225	  In	  1979	  an	  Israeli	  Knesset	  delegation	  visited	  New	  Zealand	  led	  by	  then	  Speaker	  and	   future	   Prime	   Minister	   Yitzchak	   Shamir.	   The	   delegation	   called	   upon	  Muldoon	  in	  his	  parliamentary	  office	  and	  were	  witnesses	  to	  a	  puzzling	  incident	  that	  succinctly	  illustrates	  his	  antipathy	  towards	  Foreign	  Affairs	  staff	  as	  well	  as	  his	  leadership	  style.	  Unable	  to	  remember	  New	  Zealand’s	  official	  policy	  towards	  the	  PLO,	  Muldoon	  asked	  the	  Israeli	  Ambassador,	  Yaakov	  Morris,	   to	  summarise	  it,	   despite	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   New	   Zealand	   Foreign	   Affairs	   official	   who	   would	  have	  been	  able	   to	  give	  a	  more	   than	  adequate	  answer.226	  Muldoon	  was	  able	   to	  discuss	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Israeli	  economy	  with	  a	  much	  greater	  level	  of	  confidence,	  noting	  how	  the	  war	  between	  Egypt	  and	   Israel	  had	  been	  very	  damaging	   to	   the	  economies	  of	  both	  states.	  The	  official	  record	  of	  the	  meeting	  notes	  that	  we	  went	  on	   to	   add	   that	   the	   peace	   accord	   between	   Israel	   and	   Egypt	  was	   a	   courageous	  move	  from	  Egypt’s	  President	  Anwar	  El	  Sadat	  “inter	  alia	  because	  the	  President	  was	  risking	  the	  loss	  of	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  other	  Arab	  states.”227	  Ambassador	  Morris	  was	  a	   tenacious	  and	  outspoken	  advocate	  of	   Israel.	  He	  did	  not	  fit	   the	  stereotypical	   image	  of	  an	  Israeli	  diplomat	  as	  he	  was	  originally	  from	  Ireland	  and	  published	  a	  book	  of	  his	  poetry	  entitled	   I	  Met	  Four	  Gulls.228	  Morris	  








frequently	  appeared	  on	  the	  radio	  and	  in	  newspapers	  and	  was	  not	  afraid	  to	  make	  statements	  that	  embarrassed	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Government.	  One	  such	  incident	  involved	  directly	   criticising	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Government’s	  policy	  on	   the	  PLO	  on	   National	   Radio.	   Officials	   raged	   against	   this	   “less	   than	   distinguished	  intervention”,	   “total	   impropriety”	   and	   “infringement	   of	   the	   rules	   that	   govern	  diplomatic	  behaviour”	  and	  raised	  the	  matter	  with	  the	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Warren	  Cooper.229	   Morris	   also	   engaged	   in	   public	   spats	   with	   New	   Zealand	   University	  Students	   Association	   representative	   Don	   Carson	   who	   complained	   to	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  about	  the	  “vitriolic	  attack”	  and	  engaged	  the	  help	  of	  a	  solicitor.230	   (Carson	   would	   go	   on	   to	   become	   the	   leading	   advocate	   of	   the	  Palestinian	   cause	   in	   New	   Zealand,	   eventually	   founding	   the	   Wellington	  Palestinian	   Group.)	   After	   the	   incident	   Morris	   received	   a	   phone	   call	   from	   the	  Foreign	  Ministry’s	  Chief	  of	  Protocol	  “in	  which	  he	  was	  informed	  of	  our	  hope	  that	  situations	  of	  this	  kind	  could	  be	  avoided	  in	  the	  future.”231	  Foreign	  Affairs	  officials	  in	  New	  Zealand	  were	  clearly	  exasperated	  by	  the	  diplomatic	  strategies	  of	  Morris	  with	   one	  unidentified	   staff	  member	   asking,	   “how	  much	   rope	   is	   to	   be	   given	   to	  this	  joker?”232	  In	  a	  1981	  interview	  with	  Mohammad	  Salamawi,	  a	  journalist	  from	  the	  Egyptian	  newspaper	  Al	  Ahram,	  Muldoon	  made	   the	   indiscreet	   comment	   that	   “our	  policy	  would	   be	   closer	   to	   that	   of	   the	   Arab	   world	   than	   it	   would	   be	   to	   the	   Jewish	  persuasion.	   And	   if	   you	   had	   to	   say	  which	   side,	   I	   think	   that	  would	   be	   the	   best	  analysis	  of	   it.”233	  This	  attitude	  was	  borne	  out	   in	  practice,	   for	  example	  when	   it	  
                                                                                                                                                          Seeking	  info	  and	  answers	  hurried,	  /	  But	  ministers	  and	  staff	  all	  roam	  /	  So	  diplomats	  have	  to	  be	  patient,	  /	  Play	  with	  stamps,	  golf,	  or	  try	  bowls,	  /	  Whatever	  their	  fate,	  they	  must	  hibernate,	  /	  Till	  the	  Kiwis	  return	  to	  their	  roles.”	  Anther	  poem	  derides	  the	  UN	  for	  its	  perceived	  failings.	  Entitled	  ‘Lower	  that	  the	  Dead	  Sea’	  it	  reads:	  “There	  was	  nothing	  lower/	  On	  this	  earth	  /	  Than	  the	  Dead	  Sea	  /	  Until	  the	  world	  /	  Gave	  birth	  /	  To	  deliberations	  /	  Of	  the	  United	  Nations.”	  The	  book	  of	  poetry	  was	  illustrated	  by	  the	  then	  Mayor	  of	  Wellington,	  Michael	  Fowler	  who	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Morris.	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came	  to	  organising	  official	  visits.	   In	  one	   incident	   in	  1982,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  staff	  worried	   about	   a	   planned	   visit	   of	   Israeli	   Foreign	   Minister	   Shamir	   due	   to	   the	  concern	  that	   it	  would	  “tend	  to	  confuse	  public	  understanding	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  interests	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.”234	   In	   any	   event,	   their	   concern	  was	   unnecessary.	  Shamir	  postponed	  the	  visit	  due	  to	  the	  Israeli	  invasion	  of	  Southern	  Lebanon.	  	  Israel	   invaded	   Southern	   Lebanon	   in	   response	   to	   the	   PLO’s	   attempted	  assassination	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Shlomo	  Argov.	  Due	  to	  the	  high	  Lebanese	  civilian	  casualties	   in	  the	  conflict,	   Israel	  was	  strongly	  condemned	   for	   its	   actions	   in	   the	   UN.	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   in	   New	   York	  reminded	  Wellington	  that	   failure	  to	  make	  a	  strong	  statement	   in	  the	  UN	  would	  certainly	  be	  noticed,	  and	  commented	  that	  it	  would	  “accord	  with	  New	  Zealand’s	  traditional	   stand	   if	   we	   were	   to	   speak	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   small	   country	   and	   its	  helpless	  population.”235	  The	  statement	  that	  was	  eventually	  made	   in	   June	  1982	  strongly	   condemned	   Israel.	   It	  maintained	   that	   “the	   scale	  of	   [Israel’s]	   response	  has	  been	  frighteningly	  disproportionate”,	  argued	  that	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  peace	  was	  “realisation	  of	   the	   legitimate	  rights	  and	  aspirations	  of	   the	  Palestine	  people”	   and	   finally	   urged	   Israel	   to	   “live	   up	   to	   its	   responsibility	   to	   act	   as	   an	  acceptable	  neighbour.”236	  Only	   twenty	  years	  earlier	   this	   same	   language	  would	  have	   been	   used	   in	   Israel’s	   favour,	   but	   its	   use	   of	   force	   and	   its	   perceived	  unwillingness	   to	   follow	   international	   law	   had	   hardened	   diplomatic	   attitudes.	  The	  official	  response	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Government	  was	  to	  give	  $50,000	  in	  aid,	  split	  between	  the	   International	  Red	  Cross	  and	  the	  UNRWA	  for	  Palestinian	  refugees.237	  The	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon	  was	  also	  noted	  with	  dismay	  by	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  some	   of	   whom	   were	   moved	   to	   write	   to	   Cooper,	   Ambassador	   Morris	   and	  Muldoon.	  The	  majority	  supported	  the	  condemnatory	  tone	  the	  Government	  had	  taken	  against	  Israel,	  with	  a	  large	  number	  coming	  from	  religious	  groups	  like	  the	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Quaker	  Society	  and	   the	  Young	  Women’s	  Christian	  Association.	  A	  couple	  of	   the	  letter	  writers	  urged	  the	  Government	  to	  go	  further	  than	  it	  had	  by	  expelling	  the	  Israeli	  Ambassador.	  They	  noted	  that	  this	  would	  not	  be	  uncharacteristic	  from	  a	  Government	  who	   had	   expelled	   the	   Argentine	   Ambassador	   over	   the	   Falklands	  dispute.	  N.W.	  Nyer	  for	  example	  noted	  that	  the	  Falklands	  dispute	  had	  resulted	  in	  no	   civilian	   casualties	   or	   damage	   to	   property,	   whereas	   in	   the	   Lebanon	   war	  “thousands	   of	   civilians	   were	   killed,	   injured	   and	   made	   homeless	   [but]	   …	   the	  Israeli	  Ambassador	  has	  remained	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  continues	  to	  use	  the	  local	  press	  for	  what	  can	  only	  be	  described	  as	  propaganda	  exercises	  in	  trying	  to	  justify	  the	  actions	  of	  his	  country’s	  armed	  forces.”238	  Based	  on	  the	  party’s	  historic	  and	  ongoing	   activist	   tradition,	   there	   is	   not	   unreasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   many	  members	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  although	  not	  identified	  in	  the	  letters,	  would	  have	  shared	  these	  anti-­‐war	  sympathies.	  	  During	   this	   period,	   the	   plight	   of	   the	   Palestinians	   was	   becoming	   increasingly	  publicised	   and	   Foreign	   Affairs	   noted	   that,	   “we	   and	   others	   are	   reviewing	   our	  attitude	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  problem.”239	  Muldoon	  doubted	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  PLO,	   as	   he	  was	   inclined	   to	   think	   them	   purely	   a	   terrorist	   organisation,	   but	   he	  conceded	  that	  “[t]hey’ve	  shot	  their	  way	  to	  respectability,	  like	  most	  of	  the	  others	  I	   suppose.”240	  Foreign	  Minister	  Warren	  Cooper	  surprised	  many	  commentators	  when	  he	  made	  the	   first	  unofficial	  effort	  by	  a	  New	  Zealand	  Foreign	  Minister	   to	  engage	  with	  the	  PLO,	  meeting	  their	  Australian	  representative	  Ali	  Kazak	  in	  1982.	  For	   veteran	   Palestinian	   campaigner	   Don	   Carson,	   this	   was	   a	   significant	   step	  towards	  adopting	  a	  more	  balanced	  position	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  because	  it	  was	  “a	  conservative	   Minister	   in	   a	   Western	   Government	   meeting	   someone	   who	   was	  clearly	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  PLO	  …	  [despite]	  a	  broad	  Western	  consensus	  that	  you	   don’t	   have	   any	   association	   with	   the	   PLO	   because	   that	   would	   upset	   the	  Israelis.”241	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In	  Opposition	  from	  1975	  to	  1984,	  Labour	  had	  begun	  to	  formulate	  policies	  that	  increasingly	   shifted	   support	   away	   from	   Israel.	   One	   of	   these	   moves	   was	   a	  declaration	   in	   the	  Auckland	  Party	  Conference	  of	  1983	  to	  recognise	  the	  PLO	  as	  the	   legitimate	   representative	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   people.242	   In	   response	   to	   the	  decision,	  a	  Jewish	  Council	  pamphlet	  decried	  the	  move,	  saying	  it	  was	  voting	  for	  “violence	  and	  extremism”	  and	  expressing	  “grief	  that	  the	  long	  recognised	  values	  held	  in	  common	  between	  Jewish	  tradition	  and	  the	  Labour	  tradition	  -­‐	  values	  of	  democracy,	   social	   justice,	  moderation,	   the	  seeking	  of	   rational	  solutions	   -­‐	   seem	  to	  have	  been	  ignored.”243	  A	  strong	  pro-­‐Palestinian	  lobby	  group	  was	  also	  forming	  in	  New	   Zealand,	  which	   found	   sympathetic	   ears	  within	   the	   Labour	   Party.	   This	  lobby	  was	   comprised	   of	   people	   like	  Don	  Carson	  who	  had	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	  Palestine	   since	   his	   days	   as	   a	   student	   representative	   at	   NZUSA.	   Another	   key	  figure,	  Canterbury	  University	  academic	  Ron	  Macintyre,	  edited	  the	  New	  Zealand	  
Aotearoa	  Palestine	  Review	  and	  lobbied	  the	  Government	  about	  Palestinian	  issues.	  Several	  of	  Macintyre’s	  articles	  and	  commentaries	  were	  sent	   to	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  who	  kept	  copies	   in	   their	  archives.	  This	  shift	  within	  the	  Labour	  party,	  while	  initially	  only	  reflected	  in	  arcane	  party	  remits	  and	  resolutions	  would	  become	  much	  more	  important	  when	  Labour	  returned	  to	  office	  in	  1984.	  
	  
The	  Fourth	  Labour	  Government:	  The	  Mouse	  that	  Roared?	  
 “Well	  they	  don’t	  deserve	  uncritical	  support	  and	  they	  haven’t	  deserved	  it	  for	  a	  long	  time.”	  	  Russell	  Marshall,	  former	  Foreign	  Minister,	  on	  Israel	  in	  an	  interview,	  2009244	  	  Muldoon’s	  Government,	  undone	  by	  its	  reluctance	  to	  make	  changes	  in	  domestic	  or	  foreign	  policy,	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  David	  Lange’s	  Labour	  Government	  to	  sweep	  into	  power	  in	  1984.	  Lange	  was	  the	  first	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  who	  was	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from	  the	  ‘baby	  boomer’	  rather	  than	  the	  ‘RSA	  generation’.245	  His	  image	  of	  Israel	  was	  consequently	  shaped,	  not	  by	  images	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  but	  by	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  War,	  the	  war	  in	  Lebanon,	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  plight	  of	   the	   Palestinians.	   Upon	   coming	   to	   power	   the	   Lange	   Government	  minimised	  the	   relevance	   of	   the	   traditional	   connection	   to	   Britain	   but	   explained	   that	   they	  “did	  not	  want	   to	  replace	   it	  with	  dependence	  on	  the	  Americans.”246	  This	  desire	  for	  a	  more	  independent	  path,	  culminated	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  nuclear	  free	  policy	  which	  put	  the	  government	  at	  odds	  with	  Washington.	  Indeed,	  as	  Malcolm	  McKinnon	   explains,	   in	   discussions	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   international	   affairs,	   the	  Fourth	   Labour	   Government’s	   nuclear	   stance	   policy	   has	   often	   been	   treated	   as	  being	   almost	   synonymous	   with	   the	   achievement	   of	   independence	   in	   foreign	  policy.247	  	  The	  Fourth	  Labour	  Government	  moved	  away	   from	  the	  emphasis	   the	  Muldoon	  Government	   had	   placed	   on	   trade	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	   Lange’s	   Government	   was	  more	   in	   tune	  with	   the	   idealism	  of	   the	  Kirk	  years.	  Whilst	   in	  Opposition,	   Lange	  had	  derided	  Muldoon’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  Middle	  East	  saying	  sarcastically	  in	  an	  interview	   with	   an	   American	   newspaper	   that	   New	   Zealand	   had	   become	   an	  “international	   harlot.	   We	   could	   do	   so	   much	   more	   business	   with	   the	   Arabs,	  therefore	  Arabs	   good,	   Israel	   bad.”248	  Russell	  Marshall,	   Foreign	  Minister	   under	  Lange	  from	  1987	  to	  1990,	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  Lange	  himself	  did	  not	  meet	  with	  any	  Palestinians	  and	  Stephen	  Rainbow	  also	  notes	   that	   “Lange	  was	  never	  anti-­‐Israel.”249	  The	  cordial	  relationship	  with	   Israel	  remained	  unchanged	  during	  the	  first	   term	   of	   the	   Labour	   Government,	   overseen	   by	   Foreign	   Minister	   Frank	  O’Flynn	   who	   was	   staunchly	   supportive	   of	   the	   Jewish	   state.	   However,	   during	  Labour’s	  second	  term,	  Russell	  Marshall,	  a	  former	  Methodist	  Minister,	  took	  over	  the	   Foreign	   Affairs	   portfolio	   and	   set	   about	   recalibrating	   the	   relationship.	  According	  to	  Marshall,	  this	  shift	  received	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry.	  As	  








he	  later	  explained	  in	  an	  interview:	  “I’ve	  always	  had	  the	  impression	  that	  Foreign	  Affairs	   had	   always	   wanted	   a	   more	   balanced	   stance	   towards	   Israel	   and	   that	  happened	   to	   coincide	   with	   my	   view.”250	   Then	   Trade	   Minister	   Mike	   Moore	  explained	   the	   new	   position	   in	   an	   interview	   saying	   that,	   “from	   being	   too	  romantically	  in	  support	  of	  Israel,	  we	  went	  too	  far	  against,	  and	  then	  we	  fell	  back	  into	  a	  more	  so	  called	  even-­‐handed	  approach.	  But	  the	  even-­‐handed	  approach	  is	  basically	   what	   the	   UN	   says.	   The	   even-­‐handed	   approach	   was	   always	   anti-­‐Israel.”251	  By	   the	   time	   of	   Lange’s	   second	   term	   the	   romance	   associated	  with	   Israel	   from	  within	  the	  Labour	  Party	  had	  largely	  dissipated.	  Marshall	  argues	  that	  this	  change	  was	  both	  fairly	  universal	  among	  Labourites	  but	  had	  come	  about	  incrementally,	  “unwittingly	   we’d	   come	   to	   a	   conclusion	   without	   even	   having	   talked	   about	   it	  particularly.”252	   A	   degree	   of	   support	   for	   Israel	   remained	   from	   certain	   Labour	  members,	   notably	   the	   former	   Foreign	   Minister	   Frank	   O’Flynn	   and	   long-­‐time	  party	  activist	  David	  Zwartz,	  but	  this	  was	  a	  minority	  view	  within	  a	  party	  which	  saw	   itself	   as	  progressive	   and	   consequently	   tended	   to	   side	  with	   the	  underdog,	  which	   had	   become	   Palestine.253	   During	   Labour’s	   time	   in	   Opposition,	   a	   new	  generation	   of	   leaders	   had	   risen	   to	   the	   fore	   who	   were	   shaped	   by	   different	  experiences	  and	  held	  different	  perspectives	  from	  the	  older	  Labour	  generation.	  Whereas	   the	   older	   generation	   would	   associate	   Israel	   with	   the	   Holocaust	   and	  budding	   socialism,	   the	   baby	  boomers	  were	  more	   inclined	   to	   be	   influenced	  by	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  see	  Israel	  as	  a	  belligerent,	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Lebanon.	  	  Generalisations	   obscure	   the	   complexities	   behind	   generational	   changes	   in	  attitude	  outlook,	  but	  Jock	  Phillips	  argues	  that	  certain	  grand	  trends	  can	  be	  drawn	  out	   to	   differentiate	   the	   baby-­‐boomer	   generation	   from	   their	   predecessors.	   He	  argues	   that	   the	   shifting	   values	   between	   the	   old	   and	   new	   generation	   were	  influenced	  by	  urban	  culture	  and	  cosmopolitanism.	  Corresponding	  with	  the	  shift	  








towards	  urbanism,	  there	  was	  a	  rise	  in	  university	  education.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Fourth	   Labour	   Government	   were	   the	   most	   educated	   government	   that	   had	  existed	   in	   New	   Zealand’s	   history,	   comprising	   of	   several	   lawyers,	   three	  historians	   and	  many	   others	   of	   academic	   or	   professional	   backgrounds.254	   The	  backdrop	  of	  international	  student	  protest	  movements	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  the	  shared	   experiences	   of	   protests	   against	   French	   nuclear	   testing	   created	   a	   new	  political	  consciousness	  that	  was	  enhanced	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  feminism.	  A	  feeling	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	   emerged,	   compounded	   by	   the	   Vietnam	   War,	   which	   was	  reflected	  in	  the	  attitudes	  towards	  Israel	  because	  “at	  that	  time,	  the	  US	  was	  about	  the	  only	  major	  party	  supporting	  Israel,	  so	  it	  was	  like	  an	  automatic	  carry-­‐over	  to	  oppose	   Israel	   as	   well.”255	   This	   generation	   was	   also	   more	   aware	   of	   racism,	   a	  prejudice	   that	   was	   fervently	   attacked	   during	   the	   1981	   Springbok	   Tour.	  Attempts	  to	  label	  Zionism	  as	  racism	  and	  to	  associate	  Israel	  with	  South	  Africa	  in	  the	   UN	   may	   have	   contributed	   towards	   critical	   attitudes	   towards	   Israel	   from	  many	  who	  “had	  come	  to	  political	  consciousness	  in	  the	  1960’s	  [and	  who]	  would	  be	  ministers	  in	  David	  Lange’s	  Cabinet.”256	  New	   Zealand’s	   staunchly	   anti-­‐nuclear	   policy	   further	   undermined	   the	   bilateral	  relationship.	   There	  were	   strong	   suspicions	   that	   Israel	  was	   producing	   nuclear	  weapons.	   These	   were	   never	   confirmed	   by	   Israel	   but	   most	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	  political	   circles	   assumed	   Israel	   had	   such	   weapons.257	   This	   issue	   became	  inflamed	  when	  Israeli	  nuclear	  technician	  Mordechai	  Vanunu,	  who	  was	  about	  to	  blow	   the	  whistle	   on	   Israel’s	   nuclear	  weapon	   activities	   in	  Dimona	   to	   London’s	  
Sunday	   Times,	   was	   kidnapped	   and	   forced	   back	   to	   Israel	   where	   he	   was	  imprisoned	  for	  treason.258	  The	  New	  Zealand	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movement	  was	  vocal	  in	   its	   condemnation	   of	   Vanunu’s	   arrest	   and	   imprisonment	   and	   remains	   so	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today.	  Green	  MP	  Keith	  Locke	  has	  even	  suggested	  giving	  a	  New	  Zealand	  passport	  to	  Vanunu	  upon	  his	  release.259	  	  Whilst	   the	   link	   between	   various	   international	   issues	   like	   apartheid,	   Palestine,	  nuclear	  weapons,	   de-­‐colonisation	   and	   so	  on,	  may	   seem	   tenuous	   at	   first,	   these	  issues	   were	   connected	   in	   a	   complex	   and	   intangible	   way	   and	   are	   integral	   to	  understanding	  attitude	  formation	  within	  individuals	  motivated	  by	  social	  justice	  concerns.	  According	  to	  journalist	  and	  former	  anti-­‐nuclear	  activist	  Nicky	  Hager,	  on	  any	  given	  protest	  march	  or	  rally,	  half	  of	  the	  people	  marching	  were	  there	  for	  other	  things	  too.	  Protests	  are	  an	  opportunity	  for	  likeminded	  people	  to	  discuss	  a	  plethora	   of	   other	   topics	   of	   interest	   in	   a	   charged	   political	   setting.	   In	   this	  way,	  people	  who	  were	  concerned	  about	  nuclear	  issues	  might	  well	  have	  been	  thinking	  about	  the	  treatment	  of	  Palestinians.	  As	  Hager	  explains,	  “if	  you	  try	  to	  pick	  [these	  issues]	  apart	  it	  doesn’t	  quite	  make	  sense,	  but	  if	  you	  see	  them	  as	  a	  cluster	  then	  there	  is	  a	  consistency	  there.”260	  These	  attitudes	  came	  through	  in	  concrete	  terms	  as	  remits	  from	  regional	  bodies	  to	  modify	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party.	  One	   such	   example	   was	   Remit	   6.1.5	   in	   1989	   that	   called	   for	   the	   Labour	   Party	  support	  at	  every	  opportunity	  of	  the	  “self-­‐determination	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  East-­‐Timor,	  West	  Papua,	  Kanaky,	  Eritrea,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Palestine.”261	  	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  an	  influential	  figure	  on	  Israel	  during	  the	  Lange	  Government’s	  second	   term	  was	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Minister	  Russell	  Marshall.	  Rainbow	  refers	   to	  “several	  diplomatic	   ‘incidents’”	   that	  occurred	  under	  Marshall	  which	  he	  argues	  “left	  no	  doubt,	   in	   the	  minds	  of	   the	   Israelis	  at	   least,	   that	  a	  qualitative	   shift	  had	  occurred	   in	   New	   Zealand’s	   traditional	   ‘even-­‐handed’	   approach	   in	   the	   Middle	  East.”262	   Ron	   McIntyre	   similarly	   makes	   a	   reference	   to	   “a	   certain	   measure	   of	  injudicious	   comment”	   towards	   Israel	   during	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Lange	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Government.263	   One	   of	   these	   incidents	   was	   undoubtedly	   when	   Marshall	   was	  quoted	  in	  the	  Evening	  Post	  referring	  to	  PLO	  leader	  Yasser	  Arafat	  as	  “President	  Arafat.”264	  While	  Marshall	  maintains	   that	   it	  was	   “making	   a	  mountain	   out	   of	   a	  molehill”,	   for	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Jewish	   community	   it	   was	   a	   sign	   that	   New	  Zealand	   was	   moving	   away	   from	   its	   former	   friendliness	   towards	   Israel.265	   In	  1989	  Marshall	  met	  with	  Arafat	   at	   a	  meeting	  of	   the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	   in	  Belgrade,	   an	   encounter	   described	   as	   “friendly	   and	   cordial.”266	   When	   Israeli	  President	  Chaim	  Herzog	  visited	  New	  Zealand	  in	  1986,	  he	  received	  a	  lukewarm	  welcome	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   reception	   he	   had	   in	   Australia,	   then	   under	   the	  leadership	  of	  the	  explicitly	  pro-­‐Israel	  Bob	  Hawke.	  Another	  incident	  involved	  the	  delaying	   of	   accreditations	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Ambassador	   Ken	   Cunningham	   to	  Israel,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  within	  the	  occupied	  territories	  in	  1988.267	  	  Stephen	   Levine,	   an	   academic	   and	   former	   editor	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Jewish	  
Chronicle,	   has	   claimed	   there	   was	   an	   informal	   boycott	   on	   ministerial	   visits	   to	  Israel	   during	   the	   Lange	   years.268	   According	   to	  Marshall	   this	  was	   not	   a	   formal	  policy,	  it	  was	  simply	  that	  “there	  was	  no	  particular	  reason	  to	  go”	  and	  there	  were	  other	  more	   important	   strategic	   states	   to	  visit.269	  The	  only	  Cabinet	  Minister	   to	  visit	  Israel	  during	  the	  six	  years	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Labour	  Government	  was	  Margaret	  Shields	  -­‐	  a	  fairly	  junior	  Minister	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs.	  She	  went	  to	  Israel	  as	  part	  of	  a	   trip	   to	   meet	   with	   women’s	   groups	   that	   included	   travel	   to	   Europe	   and	   the	  United	   States.270	  However,	   the	  Government	  went	   to	   great	   pains	   to	   ensure	   the	  media	   understood	   that	   her	   visit	   would	   be	   used	   as	   an	   opportunity	   for	   New	  Zealand’s	   non-­‐resident	   Ambassador	   to	   Israel,	   Ken	   Cunningham,	   to	   convey	  “fairly	  bluntly”	  a	  message	  of	  disapproval	  about	  the	  treatment	  of	  Palestinians.271	  Shields	  was	  heavily	  criticised	  by	   the	  New	  Zealand-­Aotearoa	  Palestinian	  Review	  








for	  her	  comments	  that	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  conflict	  had	  taken	  a	  “quantum	  leap,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  had	  not	  met	  with	  any	  Palestinians.	  	  Compounding	   the	   unease	   towards	   Israel	   felt	   by	   many	   Labourites	   was	   the	  presence	   of	   an	   antagonistic	   Israeli	   Ambassador	   in	  Wellington,	   Shmuel	   Ovnat.	  Personal	  relations	  between	  the	  ambassador	  and	  political	   figures	  were	  tepid	  at	  best.	   Shortly	   after	   the	   Labour	   Party	   lost	   the	   election,	   Marshall	   recalled	   an	  anecdote	  where,	  he	   claims,	   at	   a	   farewell	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Ambassador,	   the	   Israeli	  Ambassador	  almost	  spat	  on	  him	  and	  said	  “you,	  you	  anti-­‐Semite!”272	  There	  was	  also	  no	  strong	   Israeli	   counter-­‐narrative	   to	  offset	   Israel’s	  growing	  alienation	   in	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  Zionist	  lobby	  in	  New	  Zealand	  was	  described	  as	  “hopeless”	  by	  David	   Lange	   and	   the	   local	   Jewish	   population	   remained	   a	   quiet	   and	   relatively	  politically	   inactive	   community.273	   The	   Jewish	   Chronicle	   was	   one	   of	   the	   few	  vehicles	   for	   pro-­‐Israeli	   dialogue	   and	   a	   1989	   editorial	   (written	   by	   Stephen	  Levine)	   entitled	   “A	   Spreading	   Stain”	   derided	   what	   it	   called	   the	   “fashionable	  disdain	   for	   Israel”	   and	   explicitly	   attacked	  Marshall	   for	   his	   views	   on	   Palestine	  describing	  them	  as	  “romantic	  attachments.”274	   In	  contrast,	  by	  this	  time	  a	  well-­‐organised	  and	  vocal	  pro-­‐Palestine	  organisation	  had	  developed	  with	  Canterbury	  University	   lecturer	   Ron	   Macintyre	   at	   its	   fore.	   This	   group	   used	   The	   New	  
Zealand/Aotearoa	   Palestinian	   Review	   to	   lobby	   the	   government	   to	   give	  diplomatic	   recognition	   to	   Palestine,	   arguing	   that	   inequality	   of	   status	   had	   left	  Palestine	  in	  a	  much	  weaker	  negotiating	  position.275	  	  	  	  	  








Bolger	  and	  McKinnon	  	  
Open	  Political	  Dialogue	  
 At	  the	  time	  I	  was	  in	  power	  …	  Israel	  had	  burnt	  off	  their	  friends.	  They	  seemed	  to	  do	  it	  with	  indifference.276	  
Jim	  Bolger,	  interview	  Wellington	  24th	  February	  2010	  	  Jim	   Bolger’s	   National	   Government,	   elected	   in	   1990,	   quickly	   announced	   its	  aversion	   to	   the	   purportedly	   moral	   foreign	   policy	   espoused	   by	   the	   Lange	  Government.	  	  As	  Foreign	  Minister	  Don	  McKinnon	  put	  it,	  “we	  cannot	  afford	  to	  be	  hindered	   by	   a	   single	   ideological	   approach,	   to	   take	   the	  moral	   high	   ground	   on	  every	  international	  issue	  of	  the	  day,	  or	  feel	  we	  have	  some	  divine	  right	  to	  lecture	  the	   world.”277	   In	   practice	   however,	   there	   was	   only	   minimal	   change:	   New	  Zealand’s	   foreign	   policy	   was	   notable	   more	   for	   its	   continuity	   in	   policy	   rather	  than	  any	  major	  changes	  along	   ideological	  grounds.	  The	  outspoken	  criticism	  of	  Israel	   from	   Marshall	   disappeared	   under	   the	   Bolger	   Government,	   but	   the	  exercise	  of	  even-­‐handedness	  did	  not	  change	  substantially.	  	  The	  new	  foreign	  minister	  Don	  McKinnon,	  was	  initially	  unprepared	  for	  the	  role,	  having	   served	   as	   shadow	   Minister	   for	   Health	   during	   his	   time	   in	   Opposition.	  Consequently,	   he	   relied	   heavily	   on	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   for	   advice,	  particularly	   during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   his	   time	   as	   Foreign	   Minister.	   As	   he	  explained	  in	  an	  interview,	  “I	  was	  stepping	  into	  territory	  which	  I	  had	  really	  just	  no	   knowledge	   of”	   but	   “I	   was	   well	   trained	   by	   New	   Zealand	   Foreign	   Affairs	  officials.”278	  As	  argued	  earlier,	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  were	  resolutely	  based	  on	  even-­‐handedness,	  a	  preoccupation	  with	   international	   law,	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  trading	  interests.	  The	  Ministry	  encouraged	  McKinnon	   to	   exercise	   balance	   and	   maintain	   dialogue	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	  Middle	  East.	  	  








Bolger	  reiterated	  the	  argument	  that	  Labour	  Party	  attitudes	  had	  made	  an	  about	  face	  by	  the	  time	  he	  was	   in	  power:	   “there	   is	  no	  question	  that	   the	  Labour	  Party	  had	   been	   very	   sympathetic	   towards	   the	   Israeli	   position	   …	   what	   they	   saw	  happening	   to	   the	   Palestinians	   made	   a	   lot	   of	   them	   move	   across.”279	   His	  Government	  attempted	  a	  nuanced	  change,	   in	   that	   it	   focused	  more	  on	  what	  he	  called	  an	   “open	  political	  dialogue”	  rather	   than	  open	  support	   for	  one	  side	  over	  the	  other.280	  In	  1992	  Don	  McKinnon	  made	  a	  carefully	  planned	  four-­‐day	  visit	  to	  Israel	  to	  signal	  the	  new	  approach.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  visit	  by	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Government	  to	  Israel	  in	  seventeen	  years.	  According	  to	  McKinnon,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  officials	  argued	  that	  a	  visit	  to	  Israel	  should	  be	  made	  about	  every	  five	   years.	   After	   the	   hold	   on	   visits	   throughout	   the	   Muldoon	   and	   Lange	  Governments,	   McKinnon	   suggested	   that,	   “Foreign	   Affairs	   was	   quite	   keen	   that	  we	   shake	  hands	   again.”281	  While	   in	   Israel	   he	  met	  with	  Prime	  Minister	   Shamir	  and	   Foreign	   Minister	   David	   Levy.282	   The	   Bolger	   Government	   retained	   the	  traditional	  support	  for	  a	  two	  state	  solution	  as	  part	  of	  an	  even-­‐handed	  approach	  and	  as	  a	  means	  to	  resolve	  grievances	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East.	  As	  McKinnon	  explained,	  “I	  am	  quite	  convinced	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  active	  Palestinian	  state	  would	  take	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  angst	  out	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.”283	  	  Jacob	   Abadi	   has	   suggested	   the	   Bolger	   Government’s	   concern	   to	   break	   away	  from	   Labour’s	   position	   on	   Israel	   was	   also	   influenced	   by	   the	   National	   Party’s	  desire	  to	  improve	  ties	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Closer	  ties	  with	  Israel	  would	  help	  “promote	  Wellington’s	  standing	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  influential	  Jewish	  community	  in	   the	   United	   States.”284	   McKinnon	   rejects	   this,	   arguing	   that	   “it’s	   a	   pretty	  tenuous	  link”	  but	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  governmental	  statements	  on	  events	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  were	  notably	  less	  strident	  compared	  with	  the	  statements	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Labour	  Government,	  which	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  at	  least	  partly	  a	  result	  of	   US	   lobbying.	   In	   1993	   Israel	   launched	   Operation	   Accountability,	   attacking	  Hezbollah	   fighters	   in	   Southern	  Lebanon.	  This	   caused	   the	   largest	   loss	  of	   life	   in	  








the	   region	   since	   the	   1982	   Lebanon	   War.	   McKinnon’s	   press	   release	   simply	  argued	   that	   “[t]he	   New	   Zealand	   Government	   cannot	   condone	   indiscriminate	  attacks	   on	   civilian	   areas	   by	   Hezbollah	   or	   by	   the	   Israeli	   Defence	   Force	   in	  retaliation”	  rather	  than	  describing	  such	  attacks	  as	  disproportionate	  or	  singling	  out	   one	   side	   as	   culpable	   over	   the	   other	   as	   had	   been	   done	   in	   the	   past.	   285	  McKinnon	  also	  said	  that	  “[a]ggression,	  particularly	  against	  civilian	  targets,	  can	  only	  fuel	  bitterness	  and	  make	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  more	  difficult."286	  This	  rather	  bland	   rhetoric	   clearly	   did	   not	   carry	   the	   same	  diplomatic	  weight	   and	   levels	   of	  condemnation	  against	  Israel	  that	  the	  former	  government	  employed.	  	  Bolger’s	   government	   had	   the	   good	   fortune	   to	   be	   in	   office	   when	   viable	   peace	  deals	  were	  being	  forged	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  more	  genuinely	  even-­‐handed	   than	   their	   predecessors.	   In	   October	   1991	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Soviet	  Union	  jointly	  sponsored	  the	  Madrid	  Conference	  which	  included	  delegates	  from	  Israel,	  Syria,	  Jordan,	  Lebanon	  and	  Palestine.	  The	  outcome	  eventually	  led	  to	  peace	  deals	  between	  Israel	  and	  Jordan,	  as	  well	  as	  Israel	  and	  Palestine.	  In	  1993	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  were	  signed	  between	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	   in	  the	  presence	  of	  US	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  and	  two	  years	  later	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  agreement,	   Oslo	   II,	   was	   signed.	   Though	   the	   agreements	   disintegrated	   in	   the	  forthcoming	   years,	   tensions	   flared	   with	   Lebanon,	   and	   Palestinian	   suicide	  bombings	  increased,	  by	  this	  stage	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Government	  had	  been	  diverted	  to	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific.	  Israel	  was	  simply	  not	  a	  priority	  once	  McKinnon	  felt	  he	  had	  re-­‐established	  a	  balanced	  approach	  to	  the	  relationship.	  In	   1998,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   new	   policy	   of	   supporting	   ‘open	   political	   dialogue’	  McKinnon	  oversaw	  the	  appointment	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  first	  Honorary	  Consul	  in	  Israel,	  Gad	  Propper.	  McKinnon	  preferred	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  Israeli	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  position	  rather	  than	  an	  expatriate	  New	  Zealander,	  believing	  that	  a	  “local	  person	  will	  always	  have	  far	  more	  clout	  and	  influence	  than	  an	  expat	  New	  Zealander.”287	   McKinnon	   says	   the	   appointment	   came	   about	   after	   a	   lobbying	  campaign	   in	  New	  Zealand:	   “we	  did	  have	  a	  community	  here	  who	  wanted	  us	   to	  








show	   more	   active	   representation	   with	   Israel.	   Geoff	   Braybrooke,	   the	   MP	   for	  Napier,	   he	  was	   very	   steeped	   in	   this.”288	   Braybrooke	  was	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	  New	   Zealand-­‐Israel	   Friendship	   Society	   in	   Parliament.	   The	   appointment	   of	  Propper	   as	   Consul	   provided	   New	   Zealand	  with	   a	   degree	   of	   representation	   in	  Israel	  to	  balance	  the	  numerous	  embassies	  in	  the	  Arab	  states	  and	  Iran.	  McKinnon	  also	  held	   low-­‐key	  meetings	  with	  visiting	  PLO	  officials	  when	  they	  came	  to	  New	  Zealand.	   One	   such	   visit	   was	   with	   Farouk	   Kaddoumi,	   the	   PLO	   equivalent	   of	   a	  Foreign	  Minister	   who	   came	   to	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia	   shortly	   before	   the	  Oslo	   Accords	   in	   1995.	   Press	   reports	   described	   Kaddoumi	   as	   “a	   significant	  spokesman	   for	   the	   Palestinian	   community”	   and	   reported	   that	  McKinnon	   “had	  had	  a	  ‘fruitful’	  discussion	  with	  him	  on	  several	  issues.”289	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  foreign	  policy	  achievements	  during	  the	  Bolger	  years	  was	  New	  Zealand’s	  securing	  of	  a	  seat	  on	   the	  UN	  Security	  Council	   in	  1993	  and	  1994.	   The	   Security	   Council	   frequently	   sees	   discussion	   of	   events	   concerning	  Israel	  and	  its	  neighbours,	  meaning	  that	  the	  Middle	  East	  began	  to	  get	  attention	  from	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  beyond	  what	  would	  be	  the	  norm.	  However,	  during	  these	   two	   years	   the	   Security	   Council	   was	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   wars	   in	   the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	   the	  genocide	   in	  Rwanda	  and	  other	  global	  crises.	  Unusually,	  the	   Middle	   East	   rarely	   appeared	   on	   the	   Council’s	   agenda.	   The	   tumultuous	  period	   of	   the	   first	   Intifada	   (spontaneous	   Palestinian	   uprising)	   had	   ended	   and	  relations	  between	  Israel	  and	  Palestine	  were	  in	  a	  period	  of	  détente.	  However,	  it	  is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  merely	  being	  voted	  onto	   the	  Security	  Council	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  required	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  diplomatic	  lobbying	  that	  would	  have	  involved	  discussions	  with	  Arab	  states	  whose	  main	  preoccupation	  was	  the	  Israel-­‐Palestine	   dispute.	   However,	   given	   that	   files	   from	   this	   period	   remain	  closed,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   know	   if	   there	   was	   pressure	   on	   New	   Zealand	   from	  states	  to	  toe	  a	  particular	  line	  in	  exchange	  for	  votes.	  	  








New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  world,	  or	  the	  world	  in	  New	  Zealand?	  	  The	  first	  chapter	  in	  this	  thesis	  discussed	  the	  small	  role	  that	  New	  Zealand	  played	  in	   shaping	   world	   affairs	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   Israel.	   This	   chapter	  moves	  beyond	  this	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  that	  developments	  outside	  New	  Zealand	  played	  in	  shaping	  this	  country’s	  policies	  towards	  the	  Middle	  East.	  According	  to	  David	   Capie,	   a	   ‘nationalist’	   tendency	   in	   the	   historiography	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	  foreign	  relations	  from	  scholars	  like	  Keith	  Sinclair	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  tendency	  to	  emphasise	   local	   factors	   and	   underestimate	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   external	  variables	  on	  foreign	  policy	  decision	  making.290	  This	  chapter	  consequently	  looks	  outwards,	  attempting	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  global	  economic	  realities	  as	  well	  as	  international	  human	  rights	  and	  social	   justice	  movements	  combined	   to	   refocus	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  	  In	   his	   study	   of	   New	   Zealand	   at	   war,	   Roberto	   Rabel	   coined	   the	   phrase	   the	  ‘primacy	   of	   the	   external’	   to	   suggest	   that	   “[b]efitting	   its	   location	   on	   the	  geographic	  periphery	  of	  world	  affairs,	  New	  Zealand’s	  participation	   in	  war	  has	  been	  reactive	  to	  developments	  abroad.”291	  This	  notion	  of	  a	  reactive	  response	  to	  international	   conflict	   seems	   broadly	   applicable	   to	   New	   Zealand’s	   response	   to	  the	  Middle	  East	   during	   the	  1970s.	  New	  Zealand	  did	  not	   set	   about	   proactively	  developing	  a	  Middle	  East	  strategy	  before	  the	  Oil	  Shocks	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  policy	  of	  ‘even-­‐handedness’	  was	  the	  only	  official	  position,	  but	  as	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  Two	   it	  had	   little	   success.	   Instead,	   the	  most	   significant	   change	   to	  New	  Zealand’s	  policy	   in	   the	   region	   came	  about	   as	   a	   result	  of	  others’	   economic	  and	  security	   goals,	   Britain’s	   attempts	   to	   enter	   the	   EEC	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   Oil	  Boycott.	   New	   Zealand’s	   reaction	   to	   these	   events	   was	   swift	   and	   dramatic	   and	  continued	   to	   shape	   the	   application	   of	   ‘even-­‐handedness’	   towards	   the	   Middle	  East	  from	  the	  1970s	  until	  well	  into	  the	  Bolger	  years.	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  David	  Capie,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  and	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  World:	  Imperial,	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  and	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  in	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  Oxford	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  Oxford	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  Press	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  Oxford	  History	  of	  New	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representatives,	   activists	   and	   the	   Israeli	   and	   Palestinian	   Ambassadors.292	  Additional	   information	  was	   retrieved	   from	   requests	   lodged	   under	   the	  Official	  Information	   Act.	   Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   details	   of	   some	   events	   remain	   unclear,	  partly	   because	   of	   differing	   recollections,	   and	   sometimes	   because	   of	   ongoing	  political	   and	  diplomatic	   sensitivities.	   	   The	   account	   offered	  here	   is	   accordingly	  ‘through	  a	  glass	  darkly’	  and	  will	  need	  to	  be	  revisited	  when	  the	  official	  archives	  are	   be	   opened	   in	   a	   few	   decades	   time.	   Consequently,	   this	   chapter	   should	   be	  viewed	  merely	  as	   the	   first	   step	   towards	  a	  history	  of	   the	  New	  Zealand	  –	   Israel	  relationship	  during	  the	  Clark	  and	  early	  Key	  years.	  
	  
 
The	  Fifth	  Labour	  Government	  
Left-­wing	  and	  Loathing?	  	  
 One	  of	  the	  things	  that	  attracts	  me	  to	  Israel	  is	  that	  it	  has	  retained	  its	  democracy.	  But	  that	  by	  itself	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  They	  also	  have	  to	  maintain	  their	  values	  and	  principles	  around	  international	  human	  rights.	  	  
Phil	  Goff,	  former	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Interview	  2010293	  	  For	   commentators	  who	   felt	   the	   relationship	   between	   Israel	   and	  New	  Zealand	  had	   reached	   a	   nadir	   under	   David	   Lange’s	   fourth	   Labour	   Government,	   things	  only	   got	  worse	  during	  Helen	  Clark’s	   fifth	   Labour	  Government	   (1999-­‐2008).	  A	  number	  of	  events	  in	  the	  first	  two	  terms	  of	  the	  government	  stand	  out	  for	  special	  attention:	   the	   Mossad	   spy	   scandal,	   Foreign	   Minister	   Phil	   Goff’s	   visit	   to	   meet	  Yasser	  Arafat,	  a	  proposed	  visit	  to	  New	  Zealand	  by	  Holocaust	  denier	  David	  Irving	  and	   the	   desecration	   of	   three	   Jewish	   cemeteries	   in	   New	   Zealand.	   Further	  compounding	  this	  sentiment	  was	  the	  marked	  absence	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Embassy	  in	  New	  Zealand.	   It	  had	  been	  closed	   in	  2002	   for	   financial	   reasons	  and	  because	  of	  








that,	   Israeli	   views	  on	  many	  of	   the	   key	   issues	   that	   came	  up	  during	   this	   period	  were	  not	  widely	  understood.	  	  Things	  changed	  somewhat	  in	  Helen	  Clark’s	  third	  term.	  After	  the	  2005	  election,	  Labour	   needed	   the	   support	   of	   Winston	   Peters’	   New	   Zealand	   First	   Party	   to	  remain	   in	   power.	   Peters	   joined	   the	   government	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   he	  was	  made	  Foreign	  Minister.	  He	  was	  a	  self-­‐described	  supporter	  of	  Israel	  and	  worked	  to	   improve	   the	   relationship,	   but	   his	   efforts	   ultimately	   did	   not	   convince	   those	  members	   of	   the	   Jewish	   community	  who	   I	   interviewed	   that	  much	   change	   had	  been	  made.	  	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	  earlier	  chapters,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  foreign	  policy	   towards	   Israel,	   the	  role	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	   individuals	  explains	  more	  than	   grand	   concepts	   of	   generational	   difference	   or	   party	   ideology.	   This	   claim	  needs	  to	  be	  qualified	  somewhat	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  case	  of	   the	  Fifth	  Labour	  Government.	   	  Merely	   focusing	   on	   the	   party	   leadership	   obscures	  what	   I	   argue	  were	   important	  dynamics	  within	   the	  Labour	  Party	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   These	   in	   turn	  need	   to	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   changing	   attitudes	   towards	   Israel	  among	  left	  wing	  parties	  globally.	  	  Since	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   liberal	   publications,	   both	   worldwide	   and	   within	   New	  Zealand,	   that	   had	   stridently	   supported	   the	   establishment	   of	   Israel	   began	  questioning	   its	   policies	   and	   actions.294	   Around	   the	   world,	   political	   leaders	  increasingly	   began	   to	   make	   critical	   statements	   within	   the	   UN	   about	   the	  situation	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  Territories.	  These	  sentiments	  were	  echoed	  by	  New	  Zealand	   representatives.	   In	   international	   socialist,	   student,	   or	   left-­‐wing	  conferences	  and	  summits,	   criticisms	  of	   Israel	  became	  commonplace	  and	   these	  attitudes	  were	  reported	  back	  by	  participants	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party.	  Respected	  international	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organisations	  (NGOs)	  like	  Amnesty	  International,	  Crisis	  Watch	  and	  Oxfam	  also	  increasingly	  took	  a	  strong	  stance	  on	  various	   Israeli	   policies.	   Some	   supporters	   of	   Israel	   have	   denigrated	   these	  NGO	  reports,	   arguing	   that	   the	   organisations	   are	   one-­‐sided.	   However,	   this	  
                                                      294	  See	  for	  example,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  changing	  views	  of	  the	  American	  left-­‐wing	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Nation	  in	  Ronald	  and	  Allis	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  When	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  Israel’,	  








demonstrates	   an	   unwillingness	   to	   admit	   at	   least	   partial	   Israeli	   culpability	   in	  many	  events	  and	  is	  often	  in	  fact	  based	  on	  a	  misrepresentation	  of	  the	  reports.295	  These	  changing	  international	  attitudes	  combined	  to	  influence	  the	  New	  Zealand	  political	  scene	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one	  Jewish	  Labour	  Party	  member	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	   was	   occasionally	   “attacked	   for	   his	   pro-­‐Israeli	   views	   by	   those	   who	  considered	  these	  incompatible	  with	  active	  Labour	  Party	  membership.”296	  	  	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  prior	  to	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  War,	  much	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  left-­‐wing	  had	  a	  reflexive	  sympathy	  for	  Israel	  that	  was	  based	  on	  their	  perception	  of	  Israel	  as	  a	  small	   socialist	   state	   built	   on	   the	   back	   of	   a	   horrific	   tragedy.	   This	   perception	  began	   to	   change	   slowly	   after	   the	   war,	   particularly	   as	   the	   plight	   of	   the	  Palestinians	  became	  better	  known,	  and	  especially	  after	  the	  political	  makeup	  of	  Israel	  changed	  and	  a	  right-­‐wing	  party,	  the	  Likud,	  was	  elected	  into	  government	  in	  1977.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  this	  greater	  awareness	  about	  Palestine	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  technological	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  which	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  New	  Zealanders	   to	   observe	   and	   engage	   with	   events	   beyond	   New	   Zealand.	   Matt	  Robson,	  a	  former	  Labour,	  Progressive	  and	  Alliance	  MP,	  explains	  that	  “suddenly	  you	   have	   unfavourable	   footage	   of	   the	   Israelis	  …	   [and]	   gradually	   it	   got	   harder	  and	  harder	  to	  have	  a	  unified	  picture	  of	  Israel	  as	  the	  victim,	  these	  other	  people	  as	  nasty	  aggressors.”297	   Israel	  was	  often	   in	   the	  news	  and	  unfavourable	   reporting	  began	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  image	  many	  Labourites	  had	  instinctively	  held.	  While	  these	  trends	  were	  by	  no	  means	  unique	  to	  New	  Zealand,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  argue	  








that	  they	  may	  be	  slightly	  more	  important,	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  strong	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  groups	  to	  counter	  their	  effects.298	  	  Although	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   sympathy	   for	   Palestine	   was	   expressed	   in	   the	  speeches	  of	   earlier	   governments,	   the	   rising	   tide	  of	   international	   concern	  over	  Israeli	  policies	  in	  the	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territories	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  in	   the	   attitudes	   and	   statements	   of	   the	   Fifth	   Labour	   Government.	   A	   study	   of	  Labour	  Party	  Conference	  remits	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century	  outlines	  the	  steady	   growth	   of	   this	   sentiment.	   Labour’s	   traditional	   policy	   towards	   Israel	  gradually	   began	   to	   shift	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   and	   then	   changed	   sharply	   in	   the	  1980s.	  One	  remit	  in	  1975,	  for	  example,	  congratulated	  the	  Rowling	  government	  for	   its	   decision	   to	   vote	   to	   give	   the	   PLO	   observer	   status	   in	   the	   UN	   and	  accompanied	   this	   by	   urging	   the	   government	   to	   recognise	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  Palestinians	  to	  “independence	  and	  nationhood	  in	  their	  own	  country.”299	  During	  the	   1970s,	   these	   sentiments	   were	   still	   tempered	   by	   the	   personal	   ties	   that	  connected	  the	  Israeli	  and	  New	  Zealand	  socialist	  movements.	  Guests	  to	  the	  1979	  Labour	   Party	   Conference	   for	   example	   included	   visiting	   Israeli	   Labour	   Party	  members	  who	  spoke	  warmly	  of	  the	  “sympathy	  and	  support	  of	  our	  New	  Zealand	  friends”	  to	  the	  recorded	  acclamation	  of	  the	  conference.300	  	  	  By	   1983,	   however,	   conference	   participants	   had	   to	   be	   reminded	   by	   Rowling	  before	   discussing	   the	   proposed	   foreign	   affairs	   remits	   that	   “the	   Party	   has	  consistently	   taken	   a	   strong	   line	   on	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Israel”	   and	  that	  recognition	  of	  the	  PLO	  had	  historically	  been	  opposed	  due	  to	  their	  record	  of	  terrorism	  and	  failure	  to	  recognise	  Israel.301	  Rowling	  also	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  1982	  Beirut	  Massacre	  for	  which	  he	  stated	  “the	  Israeli	  military	  authorities	  must	  bear	   considerable	   responsibility,	   [and	   it]	   has	   reflected	   badly	   on	   the	   Israeli	  cause”	   but	   reminded	   delegates	   that	   “a	   great	   section	   of	   the	   Israeli	   people	  








themselves	   were	   outraged	   by	   that	   event.”302	   Rainbow	   argues	   that	   Rowling	  “spoke	   for	   the	   traditional	   Labour	   Party	   position	   on	   Israel,	   but	   his	   generation	  was	   in	   decline	   in	   the	   party.”303	   In	   any	   case,	   a	   relatively	   balanced	   remit	   was	  sponsored	   by	   Phil	   Goff	   that	   recognised	   Israel’s	   right	   to	   security,	   the	   rights	   of	  Palestinians	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  and	  condemned	  Israeli	  colonisation	  [settlements]	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  peace.304	  	  	  The	  firmest	  support	  for	  Palestine	  came	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  decade.	  Remit	  231	  in	  1987	   included	   eight	   specific	   clauses	   pertaining	   to	   Israel/Palestine.	   These	  included	  a	  call	  for	  human	  rights	  to	  be	  upheld,	  an	  end	  to	  deportations,	  an	  end	  to	  the	   harassment	   of	   Palestinian	   journalists	   and	   trade	   unionists,	   and	   denounced	  the	   “collective	   punishment”	   of	   citizens	   in	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   Gaza.305	   The	  following	  year	  the	  criticisms	  became	  more	  vociferous.	  The	  links	  between	  Israeli	  and	   South	   African	   nuclear	   cooperation	   were	   condemned	   alongside	   grave	  concerns	   expressed	   about	   the	   occupation	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   territories.306	   In	  1989	   support	   for	   Palestine	   came	   to	   its	   most	   concrete	   expression	   when	   the	  conference	  moved	   that	   the	   Labour	   Government	   “afford	   the	   State	   of	   Palestine	  full	  diplomatic	  recognition”	  –	  a	  remit	  that	  was	  duly	  carried,	  but	  not	  executed	  by	  the	  Government	  who	  lost	  the	  election	  the	  following	  year.307	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  however	  as	  a	  concluding	  caveat	  that	  the	  international	  relations	  remits	  were	  also	  focussed	   on	   many	   other	   international	   causes	   like	   Vietnam,	   Nicaragua,	  apartheid,	  nuclear	  weapons,	  Chile	  and	  East	  Timor	  –	  Palestine	  was	  by	  no	  means	  an	  exceptional	  cause	  within	  the	  Labour	  Party.	  	  As	   was	   previously	   noted,	   Stephen	   Rainbow	   traces	   his	   conversion	   to	  conservatism	   predominantly	   to	   his	   passion	   for	   Israel.	   He	   grew	   increasingly	  concerned	  with	  how	  “fickle	  the	  left	  can	  be	  in	  its	  support	  for	  the	  latest	  underdog”	  








when	  it	  began	  side	  with	  Palestine	  over	  Israel,	  or	  at	  least	  express	  a	  more	  forceful	  critique	   of	   Israeli	   policy.308	   Perhaps	   not	   surprisingly	   a	   left-­‐wing	   tendency	   to	  support	   the	   underdog	   was	   forcefully	   critiqued	   by	   conservative	   sources	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis.	  A	  number	  of	  National	  Party	  representatives	  argued	  that	  left-­‐wing	  movements	  support	  ‘fashionable’	  social	  justice	  causes	  but	  do	  not	  understand	   the	   big	   picture,	   portraying	   them	   as	   simplistic	   and	   naive.	   The	  Chairman	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Israeli	  Parliamentary	  Friendship	  Group,	  National	  MP	  Paul	  Hutchinson,	  stated	   for	   instance	   that	  he	  was	  “concerned	  that	  Labour’s	  views,	   may	   not	   be	   all	   that	   sophisticated.”309	   The	   current	   Foreign	   Minister	  Murray	  McCully	  similarly	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  “a	  lot	  of	  these	  guys	  have	  been	  brought	  up	  attending	  Socialist	  International	  conferences	  and	  getting	  involved	  in	  fashionable	  Middle	  Eastern	  causes	  involving	  pro-­‐Palestinian	  leanings.	  It’s	  been	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party	  of	  New	  Zealand.”310	  	  These	  charges	  are	  rejected	  by	  Labour	  Party	  MPs,	   several	  of	  whom	  have	  had	  a	  longstanding	   and	   professional	   involvement	   in	   the	   region.	   Grant	   Robertson,	   a	  former	  diplomat,	  for	  example	  explained	  that	  he	  understood	  “the	  nuance	  of	  the	  position	  and	  how	  you	  have	  to	  be	  careful	  about	  what	  you	  say.	  New	  Zealand	  has	  traditionally	  been	  in	  that	  kind	  of	  middle	  space	  and	  in	  my	  own	  view	  I	  would	  like	  to	   see	   a	   two	   state	   solution.”311	   It	   was	   conceded	   however	   that	   Labourites	  generally	   tended	   to	   be	   more	   pro-­‐Palestinian	   than	   their	   conservative	  counterparts.	  According	  to	  Robertson	  “within	  the	  Labour	  Party	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  support	   for	   the	   Palestinian	   cause	   –	   probably	   a	   stronger	   support	   for	   the	  Palestinian	   cause	   than	   there	   is	   for	   Israel	   if	   you	   want	   to	   put	   it	   in	   a	   kind	   of	  dichotomous	   sort	   of	   situation.”312	   This	   was	   certainly	   recognised	   by	   the	  Palestinian	  Ambassador,	  Izzat	  Abdulhadi,	  who	  explained	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  bias	  at	  least	   from	   the	   Australian	   side,	   and	   in	   New	   Zealand	   now	   with	   the	   National	  government,	   it	   is	   also	   conservative.	   With	   the	   Labour	   Party	   it	   was	   different,	  








under	  Helen	  Clark.	  She	  was	  a	  very	  brave	  woman.	  She	  expressed	  her	  own	  ideas	  clearly.”313	  In	   some	   ways,	   the	   criticism	   from	   the	   left	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   being	   partly	   in	  accordance	  with	  Malcolm	  McKinnon’s	  notion	  of	  loyal	  dissent.	  Precisely	  because	  of	   the	   early	   concern	   with	   and	   attention	   to	   Israel,	   many	   left-­‐wing	   groups,	  including	   those	   in	  New	   Zealand,	   felt	   intrinsically	   involved	   in	   the	   small	   state’s	  politics.	  They	  wanted	  to	  see	  a	  state	  -­‐	  which	  after	  all	  was	  perceived	  to	  come	  from	  the	   same	   ‘club	   of	   nations’	   and	  more	   concretely,	   which	   belonged	   to	   the	   same	  regional	   Socialist	   Organisation	   -­‐	   live	   up	   to	   its	   full	   potential	   as	   a	   responsible	  international	  citizen.	  Labour	  MP	  David	  Shearer	  argues	   that	   the	  Labour	  Party’s	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  international	  law	  has	  dictated	  the	  position	  it	  has	  taken	  on	  the	  dispute	  rather	  than	  any	  sense	  of	  global	  politicking.	  He	  says	  that	  “as	  soon	  as	  you	  allow	  politics	  in,	  you	  either	  stand	  by	  international	  law	  and	  a	  set	  of	  rules,	  or	  you	  don’t.	  New	  Zealand	  benefits	  more	  as	  a	  small	  country	   if	  people	  adhere	  to	  international	  law”.314	  Returning	  now	  to	  the	  specific	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  under	  the	  Fifth	  Labour	  Government,	   I	   argue	   that	   by	   this	   point	   New	   Zealand	   had	   indeed	   become	   a	  “harsh	  critic	  of	  Israel”	  as	  former	  Jewish	  Chronicle	  editor	  Mike	  Regan	  asserts,	  but,	  when	   viewed	   in	   light	   of	   international	   and	   historic	   trends,	   this	   was	   hardly	  surprising.	  Colin	  James	  describes	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  Clark	  government	  as	  an	  “accentuation	  of	  a	  multilateralist	  and	  activist	  foreign	  policy”.315	  Clark	  placed	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  promulgation	  of	  a	  rules-­‐based	  order	  system	  with	  the	  UN	  and	  other	   international	   organisations	   at	   its	   centre.	   She	   explained	   that	  her	  objective	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  was	  “to	  see	  New	  Zealand	  positioned	  as	  a	  principled,	  
                                                      313	  Interview	  with	  Izzat	  Abdulhadi,	  Palestinian	  Ambassador,	  (Canberra,	  10	  June	  2010).	  This	  last	  point	  is	  interesting	  as	  supporters	  of	  Israel	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research	  argued	  that	  policies	  towards	  women	  in	  the	  Occupied	  Territories	  and	  Arab	  states	  more	  generally	  were	  abysmal	  and	  therefore	  argued	  that	  left-­‐wing	  attitudes	  were	  simplistic	  and	  naive.	  This	  claim	  was	  firmly	  denied	  by	  the	  Ambassador	  and	  his	  female	  Deputy-­‐Secretary,	  Suheir	  Gedeon.	  Their	  ideal	  concept	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  was	  one	  that	  served	  as	  a	  progressive	  model	  for	  other	  Arab	  states	  to	  follow,	  especially	  on	  women’s	  issues.	  One	  of	  their	  key	  public	  diplomacy	  measures	  to	  counter	  a	  perception	  of	  Palestine	  as	  a	  backward	  state	  was	  to	  encourage	  student	  exchanges	  to	  foster	  more	  dialogue	  and	  understanding	  between	  themselves	  and	  other	  nations,	  particularly	  in	  the	  West.	  314	  Interview	  with	  David	  Shearer,	  Labour	  MP,	  (Wellington,	  25	  March	  2010)	  315	  Colin	  James,	  ‘Norman	  Kirk,	  Robert	  Muldoon,	  David	  Lange,	  and	  Helen	  Clark	  –	  and	  John	  Key’,	  








constructive,	   and	   engaged	   international	   citizen.”316	   Her	   practise	   of	  multilateralism	  did	  not	   always	   follow	  a	   strict	  model	   of	   international	   idealism,	  Clark	   was	   a	   highly	   pragmatic	   leader,	   sending	   troops	   to	   support	   the	   war	   in	  Afghanistan	   and	   forging	   bilateral	   free	   arrangements	   with	   a	   host	   of	   nations	  including	  China.	  	  Paul	  Morris	  views	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  Clark	  Government	  as	  a	  realignment	  based	  on	  Clark’s	  desires	  to	  forge	  an	  independent	  foreign	  policy.	  He	  stated	  that	  “it’s	   a	   very	   comprehensive	   package	   but	   curiously	   it	   doesn’t	   give	   us	  independence.	   It	   gives	   us	   independence	   from	   Britain,	   America	   and	   Australia.	  But	   it	   actually	   just	   aligns	   us	   with	   a	   set	   of	   equally	   rigid	   and	   dogmatic	  concerns.”317	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  realignment	  had	  implications	  pertaining	  to	  the	  stance	  Clark	   and	  Goff	  would	   take	  over	  Palestine,	   implying	   that	   they	  would	  be	  more	   unthinkingly	   pro-­‐Palestine	   based	   on	   their	   stances	   with	   other	   political	  causes.	  In	  response	  to	  such	  claims,	  Colin	  James	  argues	  that	  alignment	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  forging	  independence,	  as	  societies	  are	  “not	  made	  resilient	  by	  self-­‐absorption	   and	   turning	   inwards.	   ...	   That	   at	   most	   would	   be	   independence	  
from	   the	  world	  which	  amounts	   to	   isolation,	  a	  negative.”318	  Clark’s	  preferences	  for	   multilateralism	   and	   international	   law	   created	   a	   logical	   support	   for	   the	  Palestinian	  cause	  due	  to	  its	  deep	  entrenchment	  within	  international	  law	  and	  its	  social	  justice	  implications.	  	  It	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   two	  main	   foreign	   policymakers	   in	   the	   Fifth	  Labour	   Government	   both	   had	   significant	   historic	   interests	   in	   Israel	   and	  Palestine.	  Clark	  had	  had	  a	  longstanding	  involvement	  in	  Palestinian	  affairs	  since	  her	  participation	  in	  the	  Labour	  Party	  Group	  on	  Palestine.	  Phil	  Goff,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  had	  a	  fairly	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  Israel	  based	  on	  his	  long	  interest	   in	   the	  region,	  which	  dated	  back	   to	   the	   late	  1970s	  when	  he,	   like	  many	  other	   young	   Labourites,	   stayed	   on	   Israeli	   kibbutzim.319	   His	   interaction	   with	  








Israelis	   through	  the	  International	  Union	  of	  Socialist	  Youth	  created	  a	  sympathy	  for	  a	  country	  whose	  people	  had	  “come	  through	  hell	  and	  had	  come	  together	  to	  try	   to	   create	   security	   for	   themselves	   with	   a	   strong	   spark	   of	   Western	   social	  idealism	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   country	   they	  wanted	   to	   create.”320	  However,	  over	  time	  Goff’s	  views	  on	  the	  dispute	  began	  to	  change	  and	  he	  became	  concerned	  with	   Israeli	   policy,	   explaining	   that	   “while	   they’d	   suffered	   persecution,	   the	  Palestinians,	   who	   had	   become	   stateless,	   were	   the	   new	   underclass,	   the	   new	  persecuted,	  the	  people	  who	  had	  lost	  their	  rights	  of	  citizenship	  and	  who	  had	  lost	  the	   land	   that	   had	  been	   their	   homeland.”321	   This	   familiarity	  with	   Israel	   helped	  Goff	  take	  a	  strong	  stand	  on	  Israeli	  issues	  and	  meant	  he	  was	  not	  afraid	  to	  make	  controversial	  gestures.	  	  In	   2003	   Goff	   visited	   Yasser	   Arafat	   in	   the	   West	   Bank.	   The	   visit	   was	   not	   well	  received	   by	   Israeli	   leaders	   and	   as	   a	   result	   Goff	   was	   denied	   access	   to	   certain	  high-­‐profile	   Israeli	   politicians,	   notably	   Prime	   Minister	   Ariel	   Sharon.	   David	  Zwartz	  describes	  this	  visit	  as	  “a	  bit	  of	  bravado	  really”	  but	  something	  which	  the	  Jewish	  community	  found	  “unpleasant”	  due	  to	  Arafat’s	  terrorist	  policies	  against	  Israelis.322	  However,	  Goff	   justified	   the	   trip	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  both	  New	  Zealand’s	  right	  to	  determine	  its	  own	  foreign	  policy	  and	  a	  determination	  to	  maintain	  even-­‐handedness	  in	  the	  region.	  He	  later	  said,	  “I	  could	  not	  allow	  one	  side	  to	  determine	  who	   I	   should	   or	   shouldn’t	   meet	   on	   the	   other	   side.	   That	   would	   be	   absolutely	  improper.”323	   David	   Shearer,	   who	   was	   working	   for	   the	   UN	   in	   Israel	   and	  Palestine	  at	  the	  time,	  accompanied	  Goff	  on	  his	  visit	  through	  the	  West	  Bank.	  He	  explained	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  visit:	  “[i]f	  you	  go	  there	  as	  a	  Foreign	  Minister	  and	  you	  are	  meeting	  Israelis	  then	  you	  also	  meet	  Arafat.	  Almost	  no	  visitor	  to	  that	  region	  would	  dare	  not	   to…”324	  He	  added	  that	   it	  had	  been	   the	  right	  decision	  at	  the	   time	   because	   if	   Goff	   had	   bowed	   to	   Israeli	   pressure	   not	   to	   see	   Arafat	  








“basically	   our	   foreign	   policy	   is	   not	   our	   own	   anymore,	   we’re	   being	   dictated	  to.”325	  	  The	   encounter	  with	   Arafat	   received	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   criticism	  within	   New	  Zealand,	   especially	   from	   the	   right-­‐wing	   Association	   of	   Consumers	   and	  Taxpayers	   (ACT)	   Party.	   Richard	   Prebble,	   an	   ACT	   politician	   and	   long	   time	  supporter	  of	  Israel,	  was	  furious	  about	  it,	  saying	  it	  was	  “yet	  another	  example	  of	  the	   Clark	   government’s	   incompetent,	   student-­‐like,	   anti-­‐American	   foreign	  policy.”326	   Another	   ACT	   politician,	   Rodney	   Hide	  went	   further,	   saying	   that	   the	  rationale	  behind	   the	  visit	  was	  simply	   that	   “Arafat’s	   sort	  of	   cool	   to	   lefties.	  He’s	  like	   Che	   Guevara.”327	   Goff	   later	   admitted	   that	   Arafat	   had	   come	   across	   as	   a	  somewhat	   tragic	   figure,	   someone	  who	  dwelt	   too	  much	  on	  history	  and	  seemed	  incapable	   of	  moving	   forwards.	   This	   recognition	   did	   not	   convince	   Goff	   that	   he	  had	  erred;	  he	  merely	  stated	   that	  he	   “came	   to	   the	  conclusion	   that	   [Arafat]	  was	  probably	   not	   a	   person	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   move	   the	   Middle	   East	   situation	  forward.	  He’d	  played	  an	  important	  role,	  he	  wasn’t	  purer	  than	  driven	  snow,	  but	  neither	  were	  the	  Israelis.”328	  	  Another	   source	   of	   friction	   was	   the	   New	   Zealand	   government’s	   criticism	   of	  Israel’s	   ‘security	   wall’	   in	   the	   West	   Bank,	   deemed	   illegal	   by	   the	   International	  Court	   of	   Justice.	   Goff	   described	   the	   erection	   of	   the	   wall	   as	   “tantamount	   to	  annexation.”329	   He	   added	   that,	   “the	   hardships	   experienced	   by	   Palestinians	  because	   of	   the	   wall	   were	   disproportionate	   to	   any	   benefit	   Israel	   received	  through	   protection	   of	   its	   citizens.”330	   New	   Zealand	   was	   in	   good	   company	   in	  declaring	  the	  wall	  illegal	  and	  calling	  for	  its	  demolition.	  	  When	  a	  vote	  was	  held	  in	  UN	  calling	  for	  its	  removal	  only	  six	  states	  voted	  against:	  Israel,	  the	  US,	  Australia	  and	  three	  small	  Pacific	  Island	  nations.	  Interestingly,	  there	  is	  a	  history	  of	  Pacific	  states	   supporting	   Israel	   within	   the	   UN,	   and	   Israel	   recognises	   their	   voting	  importance.	   According	   to	   Pasifika	   Labour	   MP	   Luamanuvao	   Winnie	   Laban,	  








lobbying	   for	  votes	   is	  a	  political	   reality	   in	   the	  Pacific	  and	   Israel	   is	  one	  of	  many	  states	   that	   seeks	   support	   in	   the	   region:	   “at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	   countries	   get	  lobbied.”331	  The	  relationship	  with	  the	  Pacific	  Islands	  is	  one	  that	  Israel	  believes	  can	   be	   improved	  with	   the	   help	   of	   New	   Zealand.	   Paul	  Morris	   argues	   that	   one	  factor	   of	   importance	   in	   the	  New	  Zealand	   –	   Israel	   relationship	   is	   the	   ability	   of	  New	   Zealand	   to	   act	   as	   a	   gatekeeper	   to	   the	   Pacific	   as	   it	   “had	   influence	   and	  knowledge	  and	  could	  open	  doors	  in	  the	  Pacific.”332	  In	  a	  2010	  interview,	  the	  new	  Israeli	   Ambassador	   to	   New	   Zealand	   explained	   that	   he	   would	   eventually	   be	  seeking	   cross	   accreditation	   to	   several	   states	   in	   the	   Pacific	   including	   Tonga,	  Samoa,	  the	  Cook	  Islands	  and	  Niue.333	  Despite	  the	  tensions	  discussed	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraphs,	  the	  lowest	  point	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  undoubtedly	  came	  in	  2004	  when	  Mossad	  agents	  were	  caught	  attempting	  to	  fraudulently	  obtain	  New	  Zealand	  passports	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  a	  local	  Jewish	  man,	  Tony	  Resnick.	  One	  agent	  attempted	  to	  assume	  the	  identity	  of	  a	   quadriplegic	   man.	   This	   was	   not	   the	   first	   time	   Israel	   had	   been	   involved	   in	  passport	   fraud.	   	   In	   1997	   two	   Israeli	   agents	   had	   been	   caught	   with	   Canadian	  passports	  during	  an	  attempted	  assassination	  of	  a	  Hamas	  operative	  in	  Jordan.334	  Nicky	  Hager,	  an	  investigative	  journalist	  with	  extensive	  ties	  into	  the	  intelligence	  community	  speculated	  that	  the	  passports	  gathered	  from	  New	  Zealand	  were	  to	  be	  used	  in	  similar	  covert	  missions.	  He	  claims	  that	  Mossad	  was	  simply	  collecting	  resources	  in	  New	  Zealand	  to	  use	  elsewhere	  in	  future	  operations:	  “they	  wanted	  the	  capacity	   to	  kill	   someone	   in	  Lebanon,	  or	   track	  someone	   in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  […]	  and	  having	  a	  New	  Zealand	  passport	  is	  a	  very	  useful	  thing	  to	  have.”335	  Following	  an	  extensive	   investigation,	  New	  Zealand	  police	  arrested	  two	  agents,	  but	   two	  others,	   including	   the	  New	  Zealand	  citizen	   involved,	  Resnick,	  managed	  to	   flee	   the	   country.	  The	   two	   captured	  agents,	  Uriel	  Kelman	  and	  Eli	   Cara	  were	  tried	  in	  a	  New	  Zealand	  court	  and	  pleaded	  guilty	  to	  the	  charges	  of	  “dishonestly	  








attempting	   to	   obtain	   a	   New	   Zealand	   passport”	   and	   for	   “participation	   in	   an	  organised	   criminal	   group”.336	   They	   were	   sentenced	   to	   six	   months	   in	   jail	   and	  ordered	  to	  pay	  the	  Cerebral	  Palsy	  Society	  $50,000	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  people	  targeted	   in	   the	   operation.	   The	   fine	  was	   later	   paid	   to	   the	   charity	   organisation	  through	  the	  courts	  system.	  	  	  According	   to	  Nicky	  Hager,	   Cara	   had	   a	   history	   of	   bungling	   spy	   operations	   and	  had	   been	   involved	   in	   a	   similar	   botch-­‐up	   in	   Cyprus	   in	   1998	   when	   a	   local	  fisherman	  discovered	  an	  intelligence	  collecting	  operation	  Cara	  was	  leading.	  This	  caused	  a	  major	  scandal	  in	  Cyprus	  and	  led	  to	  the	  two	  agents	  being	  arrested	  with	  minor	  charges.337	  In	  the	  New	  Zealand	  case,	  despite	  pleading	  guilty,	  initially	  Cara	  and	   Kelman	   intended	   to	   appeal	   their	   sentence,	   but	   this	   plan	   was	   eventually	  abandoned.338	   Kelman	   and	   Cara	   were	   released	   after	   serving	   three	  months	   of	  their	  sentence,	  as	  is	  normal	  under	  New	  Zealand	  law.	  They	  immediately	  returned	  to	  Israel.	  	  The	  political	   response	   to	   this	   incident	  was	  swift	  and	  dramatic.	  Prime	  Minister	  Helen	  Clark	  was	  reportedly	  furious	  at	  the	  assault	  on	  New	  Zealand’s	  sovereignty	  and	   froze	  high-­‐level	  diplomatic	   contacts	  between	   the	   two	   states.	  A	   channel	  of	  communication	   needed	   to	   remain	   open	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   an	   apology	   from	  Israel,	  but	  according	   to	  Simon	  Murdoch,	   the	   then	  Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  the	   freezing	   of	   contact	  meant	   that	   “until	   we	   received	  what	  we	   regarded	   as	   a	  satisfactory	  accounting	  for	  what	  this	  had	  all	  been	  about	  from	  the	  Government	  of	  Israel,	  and	  a	  public	  expression	  of	  accountability	  and	  regret,	  we	  were	  simply	  not	  going	   to	   conduct	   business	   as	   usual	   with	   them.”339	   According	   to	   Paul	   Morris,	  Clark	   took	   this	  policy	  very	   seriously.	  He	   recalls	   a	  dinner	   in	   the	  Parliamentary	  restaurant	  Bellamy’s	  after	  the	  scandal,	  where	  Clark	  refused	  even	  to	  meet	  with	  a	  visiting	   Israeli	   official	  Morris	   had	  brought	   along	   as	   a	   guest.	  He	   explained	   that	  this	   attitude	   was	   “a	   visceral	   thing	   for	   her”,	   suggested	   that	   “it	   was	   pretty	  








absolute	   and	   it	  was	   a	   very	   strong	   objection.”	   	  He	   suggested	  her	   reaction	  may	  have	  gone	  beyond	  the	  advice	  of	  her	  advisors	  or	  of	  MFAT.340	  For	   some	   New	   Zealanders,	   the	   passport	   incident	   brought	   back	   memories	   of	  another	   incident	  of	   state-­‐sponsored	  clandestine	  activity:	   the	  1985	  bombing	  of	  the	   Greenpeace	   ship	   Rainbow	   Warrior	   in	   Auckland	   Harbour.	   David	   Shearer	  makes	  this	  point,	  saying	  the	  scandal	  “evoked	  kind	  of	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  [motifs]:	  foreign	  agents	  coming	  in	  ….	   it	  had	  all	  those	  magic	  ingredients	  which	  made	  it	  a	  fantastic	   political	   issue.”341	   	   The	   Rainbow	   Warrior	   analogy	   frames	   the	   New	  Zealand	   response	   as	   a	   small	   country,	   courageously	   standing	  up	   to	   a	   larger	   or	  more	  aggressive	  state.	  There	  were	  some	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  incidents.	  In	   both	   cases,	   incompetence	   led	   to	   the	   agents	   getting	   caught.	   Indeed	   several	  interviewees	  suggested	  that	  for	  the	  Israel,	  the	  worst	  part	  of	  the	  Mossad	  scandal	  was	  not	  the	  passport	  fraud	  per	  se,	  but	  how	  poorly	  its	  agents	  performed.	  Former	  Foreign	  Minister	  Winston	  Peters,	   for	  example,	   joked	  how	  the	  whole	   thing	  was	  “deeply	   embarrassing	   to	   the	   Israeli	   government	   because	   it	   was	   so	  amateurish.”342	  The	  Mossad	  scandal	  was	  clearly	  a	  gross	  violation	  of	  New	  Zealand	  sovereignty,	  and	   a	  breach	  of	   international	   law,	   but	   some	   saw	  a	  degree	  of	   hypocrisy	   in	   the	  New	  Zealand	  government’s	  response.	  David	  Zwartz	  recalled	  a	  similar	  case	  that	  involved	   the	   forging	   of	   passports	   by	   two	   Kuwaitis	  with	   a	   link	   to	   the	   Kuwaiti	  government.	  While	  this	  case	  appeared	  in	  the	  media,	  it	  did	  not	  achieve	  the	  same	  level	   of	   governmental	   or	   media	   frenzy.343	   Moreover,	   some	   accused	   Clark	   of	  taking	   the	   incident	   too	   personally.344	   Labour	   MP	   Shane	   Jones	   recalled	   that	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  344	  Mike	  Regan	  in	  an	  interview	  stated	  that:	  “I	  have	  an	  image	  of	  Helen	  Clark	  getting	  off	  a	  plane	  and	  giving	  an	  interview	  for	  television	  after	  the	  so-­‐called	  Mossad	  Spy	  incident,	  but	  her	  face	  was	  a	  picture	  of	  hatred.	  Three	  hours	  later	  the	  cemetery	  at	  Bolton	  St	  was	  defaced	  and	  destroyed.	  …	  I	  see	  those	  desecrations	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  Clark’s	  disapproval	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  idiots	  who	  did	  it	  equated	  Israel	  to	  Jews	  because	  the	  grave	  sites	  have	  nothing	  what-­‐so-­‐ever	  to	  do	  with	  Israel.	  None	  of	  them	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  Israel,	  except	  in	  their	  eyes	  they	  saw	  approval	  to	  do	  something	  against	  Israel.”	  	  Interview	  with	  Mike	  Regan,	  Editor	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  








before	   a	   2006	   visit	   to	   Israel,	   Clark	   “was	   at	   pains	   to	   remind	  me	   that	   they	   had	  done	  this	  to	  us”	  and	  “was	  obviously	  stewed	  up	  about	  it,	  there’s	  no	  doubt	  about	  that”.	   	  He	  conceded,	  however,	  “Helen	  was	  capable	  about	  getting	  fired	  up	  about	  all	  manner	  of	  bloody	  things.	  I	  wouldn’t	  single	  out	  the	  Israelis.”345	  It	  was	  not	  only	  Clark	   that	   responded	   strongly.	   National	   Party	   Foreign	   Affairs	   spokesman	  Lockwood	  Smith	  cancelled	  a	  planned	  trip	  to	  Israel.	  	  In	  his	  view,	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  appropriate	   for	  him	  to	  make	  the	  visit	  as	  a	  representative	  of	   the	  Opposition.346	  Moreover,	   at	   the	   international	   level	   there	   was	   considerable	   support	   for	   New	  Zealand’s	  strong	  stance.	  Shearer	  said	  that	  it	  “gave	  us	  a	  level	  of	  kudos	  around	  the	  world,	   again	   in	   diplomatic	   circles,	   that	   was	   never	   public,	   which	   certainly	   I	  picked	   up	   in	   Jerusalem	   talking	   to	   diplomats	   in	   the	   area.”347	   Explanations	   that	  attribute	   the	   tough	   line	   specifically	   to	   Clark,	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   wider	  political	  support	  for	  her	  decision	  at	  the	  time.	  	  After	  the	  Mossad	  agents	  were	  jailed,	  Clark	  issued	  a	  statement	  condemning	  the	  actions	   of	   the	   Israelis	   in	   question,	   saying	   that	   the	   “New	   Zealand	   Government	  views	   the	   act	   carried	  out	   by	   the	   Israeli	   intelligence	   agents	   as	  not	   only	  utterly	  unacceptable	   but	   also	   a	   breach	   of	  New	  Zealand	   sovereignty	   and	   international	  law.”348	   She	   also	   said	   the	   case	   was	   a	   “sorry	   indictment”	   of	   Israel	   and	   an	  “unfriendly	   action”	   that	   had	   “seriously	   strained	   the	   relationship	   and	   it	   will	  remain	   strained	   for	   some	   time.”349	   The	   fact	   that	   Clark	   ‘outed’	   the	   spies	   as	  members	  of	  an	  Israeli	  intelligence	  agency	  was	  noteworthy,	  as	  Israel	  maintained	  throughout	   the	   scandal	   that	   they	  were	   Israeli	   citizens	   rather	   than	   intelligence	  agents.	   Even	   in	   its	   apology,	   Israel	   only	   referred	   to	   acts	   committed	   by	   Israeli	  citizens	   rather	   than	   intelligence	   agents.	   Goff	   explained	   later	   that	   the	  government	  was	  “more	  than	  one-­‐hundred	  percent	  sure	  [that	  they	  were	  Mossad]	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because	   I	  was	  contacted	  by	  agents	  of	   the	   Israeli	  Government	   to	  say	  would	  we	  back	  off	  and	  not	  embarrass	  them?”350	  	  The	  day	  after	  Clark’s	  statement	  several	  graves	  in	  the	  historic	  Wellington	  Bolton	  Street	   Cemetery	   were	   desecrated,	   deeply	   alarming	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Jewish	  community.	  Tombstones	  were	  pushed	  over	  and	  Nazi	  symbols	  were	  daubed	  on	  the	  graves.	  This	  attack	  was	  followed	  a	  few	  weeks	  later	  by	  a	  larger	  desecration	  at	  Makara	   Cemetery,	   also	   in	   Wellington.	   David	   Zwartz	   immediately	   linked	   the	  Bolton	  Street	  vandalism	  to	  a	  television	  interview	  Helen	  Clark	  given	  the	  previous	  night	   where	   she	   had	   criticised	   Israel.	   He	   claimed	   that	   the	   Government’s	  response	   to	   the	   passport	   incident	   had	   “triggered	   the	   desecration	   of	   Jewish	  graves.”351	   Others	   agreed.	   Mike	   Regan,	   the	   former	   editor	   of	   the	  New	   Zealand	  
Jewish	  Chronicle,	  saw	  the	  “desecrations	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  Clark’s	  disapproval	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  idiots	  who	  did	  it	  equated	  Israel	  to	  Jews”.352	  A	  former	  President	  of	   the	  Auckland	   Jewish	  Council	  spoke	  of	   the	  alarm	  felt	   from	  within	   the	   Jewish	  community	  and	  the	  fears	  that	  criticising	  Israel	  provoked	  anti-­‐Semitism,	  saying	  that	  “although	  there’s	  no	  fire,	  there	  are	  little	  pockets	  of	  flames	  here	  and	  there.	  And	  they	  can	  be	  fanned.”353	  	  The	  desecrations,	  according	  to	  Zwartz,	  compelled	  the	  Jewish	  community	  in	  New	  Zealand	  to	  become	  more	  politically	  engaged,	  overcoming	  a	  traditional	  view	  that	  it	  was	   “better	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   Jewish	   community	   not	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  politics	   and	   to	   keep	  our	   collective	  heads	  down	   so	   to	   speak.”354	  At	   the	   time	  of	  writing,	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  this	  crime	  remain	  unknown,	  although	  police	  believe	  at	  least	  two	  people	  were	  involved	  in	  each	  desecration.355	  There	  were	  suspicions	  that	   the	   culprits	   belonged	   to	   a	   small	   local	   White	   Supremacist	   movement,	  although	  this	  was	  never	  confirmed,	  and	  the	  investigation	  remains	  open,	  due	  to	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the	   refusal	   of	   the	   groups	   and	   individuals	   under	   investigation	   to	   cooperate.356	  Despite	   the	   accusations	   made	   by	   Zwartz	   and	   others,	   the	   police	   did	   not	  investigate	   any	   links	   between	   the	  Prime	  Minister’s	   statements	   on	   the	  Mossad	  passport	   scandal	   and	   the	   attacks,	   and	   did	   not	   conclude	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  Bolton	  Street	  and	  Makara	  desecrations	  were	  linked.357	  	  The	  acts	  of	  vandalism	  resulted	  in	  an	  outpouring	  of	  support	  for	  the	  local	  Jewish	  community.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  high-­‐level	  political	  response	  to	  the	  attacks.	  Acting	  Prime	   Minister	   Michael	   Cullen	   put	   forth	   a	   motion	   in	   Parliament	   on	   the	   10th	  August	   2004	   that	   expressed	   Parliament’s	   “unequivocal	   condemnation	   of	   anti-­‐Semitism,	   violence	   directed	   against	   Jews	   and	   Jewish	   religious	   and	   cultural	  institutions,	   and	   all	   forms	   of	   racial	   and	   ethnic	   hatred,	   persecution,	   and	  discrimination.”358	   This	  motion	  was	   unanimously	   passed	   in	   the	  House.	   Cullen	  admitted	   that	   the	   anti-­‐Semitic	   acts	   had	   been	   blamed	   on	   the	   Government’s	  response	   to	   the	   Mossad	   scandal	   (among	   other	   things)	   but	   warned	   that	   “the	  danger	   of	   entering	   into	   that	   area	   is	   that	   it	   gives	   some	   kind	   of	   rationale	   to	  something	   that	   is	   both	   evil	   and	   irrational,	   though,	   sadly,	   deep-­‐seated	   in	  European	  culture.”359	  All	  seven	  New	  Zealand	  political	  parties	  made	  a	  comment	  on	  the	  motion,	  expressing	  deep	  sadness	  about	  the	  attacks.	  	  Two	   of	   the	   smaller	   parties	   added	   comments	   to	   their	   formal	   statements	   that	  linked	   the	   attacks	   to	   Israel	   in	   some	   way.	   Matt	   Robson	   of	   the	   left-­‐wing	  Progressives	  declared	  that	  “when	  the	  Parliament	  stands	  in	  solidarity	  against	  the	  hateful	  bullies	  and	  racists	  …	  when	  there	  is	  an	  attack	  like	  this	  on	  people,	  whether	  they	  are	  Jews,	  Palestinians,	  immigrants,	  refugees,	  …	  we	  will	  not	  be	  disconnected	  from	  our	  common	  humanity.”360	  On	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum,	  Rodney	   Hide,	   leader	   of	   the	   right-­‐wing	   ACT	   Party,	   expressed	   concern	   at	   “the	  anti-­‐Israel	  sentiment	  that	  is	  growing	  in	  the	  West.	  […]	  As	  a	  democracy	  ourselves,	  we	  must	  support	  Israel	  as	  the	  only	  democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Sadly	  attacks	  








on	   Israel	   have	   become	   another	   outlet	   for	   anti-­‐Semitism.”361	   The	   Speaker,	  Jonathan	   Hunt,	   then	   took	   the	   highly	   unusual	   step	   of	   commenting	   on	   the	  resolution	  himself.	  He	  also	  sent	  it	  to	  the	  Israeli	  Parliament,	  the	  Knesset.	  	  Around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Mossad	   scandal	   and	   the	   cemetery	   desecrations,	  Wellington’s	  National	  Press	  Club	  had	  announced	   the	  visit	   of	   the	   controversial	  historian	  David	  Irving,	  best	  known	  for	  denying	  the	  Holocaust.	  Irving’s	  proposed	  visit	   was	   viewed	   with	   great	   trepidation	   by	   the	   local	   Jewish	   community	   and	  compounded	  the	  unease	  caused	  by	  the	  cemetery	  attacks.362	  When	  this	  visit	  was	  announced	  by	  the	  National	  Press	  Club,	  two	  of	  its	  members	  resigned	  in	  protest,	  including	   veteran	   peace	   campaigner	   Dame	   Laurie	   Salas.363	   Ultimately	   Irving	  was	   denied	   entrance	   by	   Immigration	   New	   Zealand	   after	   he	   offered	   a	   $1000	  reward	   for	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   people	   responsible	   for	   the	   cemetery	  desecrations,	  coupled	  with	  remarks	  suggesting	  it	  was	  a	  Jewish	  or	  an	  Israeli	  act	  to	  deflect	  heat	  away	  from	  the	  Mossad	  scandal.364	  Clark	  said	  the	  immigration	  ban	  was	  being	  upheld	  because	  “you'd	  be	  asking	  the	  Government	  to	  take	  a	  deliberate	  decision	  to	  ride	  over	  the	  law	  in	  favour	  of	  someone	  whose	  views	  are	  damaging	  to	  good	  relationships	  in	  the	  community	  and	  that	  would	  be	  an	  extraordinary	  thing	  to	  do.”365	  In	  June	  2005,	  New	  Zealand	  finally	  received	  an	  apology	  for	  the	  Mossad	  Scandal	  from	   the	   Israeli	   Government.	   The	   New	   Zealand	   government’s	   press	   release	  explained	   that	   “Israel	  apologises	   for	   the	   involvement	  of	   its	   two	  citizens	   in	   the	  activities	  which	   led	   to	   their	   arrest	   and	   convictions	   in	  New	  Zealand.”366	   It	   also	  noted	   that	   “Israel	  regrets	   these	  activities	  and	  commits	   itself	   to	   taking	  steps	   to	  prevent	  a	  recurrence	  of	  similar	  incidents	  in	  future.”	  The	  sincerity	  of	  this	  apology	  has	  since	  come	  under	  question,	  particularly	   following	   the	   January	  2010	  Dubai	  assassination	   of	   Hamas	   leader	   Mahmoud	   al-­‐Mabhouh,	   when	   Mossad	   agents	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used	  passports	  belonging	  to	  British	  and	  Australian	  citizens.367	  Phil	  Goff	  for	  one	  doubted	  the	  sincerity	  of	  the	  apology.	  He	  said,	  it	  “was	  sufficient	  for	  us	  to	  say	  we’ll	  move	  forward,	  but	  was	  it	  genuine?	  No	  –	  when	  you	  look	  at	  what	  happened	  with	  the	  latest	  assassination	  and	  the	  misuse	  of	  British	  and	  American	  passports.”368	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  apology,	  Israel	  demonstrated	  its	  desire	  to	  make	  amends	  to	  New	  Zealand	   in	  other	   less	  public	  ways.	  To	  Helen	  Clark’s	   surprise,	   it	   supported	  her	  nomination	   to	   head	   the	   UN	   Development	   Programme	   in	   2009.	   According	   to	  former	   Labour	   Foreign	   Affairs	   spokesman	   Chris	   Carter,	   this	   showed	   that	   the	  Israeli	  Government	  “clearly	  […]	  felt	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  make	  a	  gesture”.369	  	  In	  2005,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  First	  party	  leader,	  Winston	  Peters,	  replaced	  Phil	  Goff	  as	  Foreign	  Minister.	  One	  of	  his	  priorities	  was	  to	   improve	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  US	  that	  had	  suffered	  during	  the	  previous	  years,	  mainly	  due	  to	  Clark’s	  refusal	  to	   join	   the	   coalition	   forces	   in	   the	   2003	   Iraq	  War.	   Peters	   also	   claimed	   that	   he	  wanted	  to	  restore	  the	  relationship	  with	  Israel	  and	  in	  his	  view	  was	  successful	  in	  this	   endeavour.	   He	   conceded	   that	   New	   Zealand	   foreign	   policy,	   under	   Goff’s	  leadership,	   became	   unbalanced	   in	   the	   Middle	   East:	   “[t]hat’s	   the	   position	   I	  inherited	  and	   that’s	   the	  position	   I	   changed.”370	   	  At	  a	  2006	  New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	  Trade	  Association	  Awards	  night,	  for	  example,	  he	  informed	  the	  crowd	  that	  Israel	  would	   be	   “most	   welcome”	   to	   reopen	   its	   Embassy	   in	   Wellington	   should	   it	  wish.371	   Peters	   considers	   himself	   a	   friend	   of	   Israel.	   He	   studied	   Hebrew	   at	  Auckland	  University	  as	  a	  language	  requirement	  for	  his	  law	  degree,	  and	  made	  a	  study	  tour	  to	  Israel	  shortly	  become	  becoming	  Foreign	  Minister.	  During	  this	  visit	  he	  spent	  time	  with	   important	  defence	  and	  political	   figures	   in	  Israel,	  as	  well	  as	  visiting	   former	   Israeli	   Ambassadors	   to	   New	   Zealand.372	   Interestingly	   though,	  according	  to	  Paul	  Morris,	  this	  feeling	  of	  amity	  was	  not	  reciprocated	  with	  much	  








zeal	  by	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  community.	  	  This	  was	  apparently	  due	  to	  Peters’	  inflammatory	   comments	   about	   immigrants	   and	   ethnic	   minorities.	   Many	   New	  Zealand	  jews	  viewed	  Peters	  as	  a	  rogue,	  and	  indeed	  a	   loveable	  rogue,	  but	  were	  wary,	  because	  “people	  who	  have	  displayed	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  prejudice	  don’t	  stop	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  other	  races	  and	  ethnicities.”373	  Whatever	  the	  views	  of	  the	  local	  Jewish	   community,	   Peters	   certainly	   had	   a	   more	   positive	   view	   of	   the	   New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	  bilateral	  relationship	  than	  Clark	  or	  Goff.	  	  	  	  
John	  Key	  and	  Murray	  McCully	  	  
Conservative	  camaraderie	  
 The	  reason	  for	  trying	  to	  improve	  the	  relationship	  with	  Israel	  is	  because	  it	  was	  in	  a	  state	  of	  some	  disrepair	  relative	  to	  the	  common	  value	  sets	  that	  underpin	  our	  two	  societies.	  I	  felt	  that	  we	  had	  got	  off	  the	  centre	  line	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  view	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  conflict,	  so	  we	  have	  had	  no	  bigger	  agenda	  than	  that.	  	  
Murray	  McCully,	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  	  Shortly	   before	   the	   2008	   New	   Zealand	   election,	   The	   Jerusalem	   Post,	   a	  conservative	  Israeli	  newspaper,	  published	  an	  article	  predicting	  victory	  for	  John	  Key.	  It	  might	  seem	  strange	  that	  a	  leading	  daily	  in	  a	  far	  off	  country	  would	  take	  an	  interest	   in	   a	  New	  Zealand	  election,	   but	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	  The	   Jerusalem	  
Post	   was	   Key’s	   heritage.	   The	   would-­‐be	   prime	   minister	   was	   the	   son	   of	   Ruth	  Lazar,	   an	   Austrian	   Jew	   who	   escaped	   the	   Holocaust	   as	   a	   child	   by	   fleeing	   to	  Britain.374	  The	  Post	  proudly	  extolled	  the	  fact	  that	  Key	  was	  likely	  to	  become	  New	  Zealand’s	  third	  Jewish	  Prime	  Minister,	  hinting	  that	  this	  would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  New	  Zealand-­‐Israel	  relationship.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  Key’s	  Jewish	  heritage	  has	   impacted	   on	   the	   relationship	   is	   debatable.	   In	   my	   view,	   it	   seems	   quite	  








negligible.	  When	  asked	   about	   religion,	   the	  prime	  minister’s	   reply	   is	   that	   he	   is	  ‘relaxed’	  about	  it,	  and	  if	  he	  does	  attend	  religious	  service,	  it	  is	  of	  Christian	  rather	  than	   Jewish	   persuasion.	  However,	   Key	   has	   also	   said	   that	   he	   felt	   as	   though	   he	  was	   part	   of	   the	   Jewish	   community	   because	   his	  mother	   had	   sometimes	   taken	  him	   to	  synagogue	  and	  had	  been	  an	  active	  community	  member.	  Key	  has	  never	  been	   to	   Israel	  although	  he	  maintained	   in	  The	   Jerusalem	  Post	   that	  he	  would	  be	  interested	   in	   going	   if	   he	   became	   Prime	   Minister.	   However,	   as	   political	  commentator	  Fran	  O’Sullivan	  has	  noted,	   if	  Key	  is	  to	  visit	  Israel	  he	  will	  need	  to	  ensure	   he	   is	   not	   cast	   “in	   the	   role	   of	   personally	   endorsing	   strategies	   that	   are	  leading	   many	   in	   the	   Western	   world	   to	   increasingly	   view	   Israel	   as	   an	  international	  pariah.”375	  	  	  John	  Key	   is	  of	   course	   leader	  of	  a	   centre-­‐right	  coalition	  government.	   	  Recalling	  the	  earlier	  discussion	  about	  international	  trend	  for	  the	  left-­‐wing	  to	  increasingly	  oppose	  Israeli	  Government	  acts,	  is	  it	  useful	  to	  comment	  briefly	  on	  the	  relatively	  new	  romance	  towards	  Israel	  from	  the	  political	  right.	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  right	  is	  best	  represented	  by	  the	  ACT	  Party	  and	  by	  the	  centre-­‐right	  National	  Party.	  The	  curious	  shift	   from	  Israel	  as	  a	   left-­‐wing	  cause	   to	  a	  right-­‐wing	   fascination	   is	  not	  limited	   to	   New	   Zealand	   but	   the	   New	   Zealand	   political	   right’s	   admiration	   of	  Israel	  is	  something	  that	  has	  been	  neglected	  in	  previous	  academic	  pieces,	  which	  focus	  much	  more	  on,	   and	  critique,	   the	   left.	  This	   inattention	   can	  also	  partly	  be	  attributed	   to	   the	   relative	   shortage	   of	   scholarship	   on	   the	   attitudes	   or	   foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  National	  Party	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  general.	  What	  explains	   this	  warmth?	   	  One	   factor	   is	  almost	  certainly	  a	  desire	   to	   forge	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  although	  few	  explicitly	  frame	  their	  concerns	   in	   those	   terms.	   There	   are,	   however,	   often	  more	   complex,	   intangible,	  personal	   factors	   at	   play.	   ACT	   leader	   ACT	   Rodney	   Hide,	   for	   example,	   visited	  Israel	  in	  1981	  as	  a	  youth	  and	  was	  seriously	  impressed	  by	  its	  fighting	  spirit.	  He	  saw	  Israel	  as	  “an	  island	  of	  freedom	  and	  light	  in	  this	  big	  ocean	  of	  darkness	  and	  hostility”	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   “attitude	   to	   individual	   freedom,	   and	   civilised	  








living,	   science	   and	   tolerance.”376	   He	   added	   that	   “it’s	   not	   really	   a	   thought-­‐out	  process;	  it’s	  more	  of	  a	  gut	  instinct.”377	  There	  is	  also	  a	  religious	  component.	  The	  Christian	   Friends	   of	   Israel	   provide	   a	   significant	   body	   of	   support	   for	   Israel	   in	  New	  Zealand.378	  This	   religious	  dimension	   is	   an	   aspect	   of	   the	   relationship	   that	  can	  only	  be	  touched	  on	  here,	  except	  to	  point	  out	  the	  likelihood	  of	  transnational	  religious	  influence	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  several	  conservative	  MPs	  towards	  Israel.	  Attorney-­‐General	  Chris	  Finlayson,	  for	  example	  has	  made	  several	  trips	  to	  Israel,	  including	   a	   study	   tour	   with	   Shane	   Jones.	   Finlayson,	   who	   is	   a	   devout	   Roman	  Catholic,	  argues	  that	  “anyone	  who	  is	  anti-­‐Semitic	  as	  a	  Christian	  is	  ripping	  up	  the	  roots	  of	  their	  own	  church.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  it’s	  an	  absolute	  paradox	  that	  you	  can	  accept	  the	  Jewish	  God	  but	  deny	  the	  Jewish	  people.”379	  If	   the	   precise	   nature	   of	   John	   Key’s	   influence	   on	   New	   Zealand’s	   Israel	   policy	  remains	   contested,	   few	   would	   deny	   the	   role	   played	   by	   Murray	   McCully	   in	  changing	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship.	   Almost	   immediately	   after	   the	   2008	  election	  McCully	  began	  to	  recalibrate	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  relationship	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  end.	  He	  claimed	  that	   the	  Clark	  Government	  had	  “got	   itself	   into	  a	  one-­‐sided,	  pro-­‐Palestinian	  view	  of	  the	  Middle	  East”	  and	  consequently	  felt	  that	  “there	  was	  much	  need	  for	  a	  fairer,	  more	  balanced	  position	  to	  be	  adopted.”380	  	  Undoubtedly	  many	  factors	  have	  shaped	  McCully’s	  views	  on	  Israel,	  among	  them	  a	  visit	  he	  made	  to	   the	  country	  as	  a	  Young	  National	   in	  February	  1982.	  McCully	  was	  the	   first	  New	  Zealander	  to	  be	  sponsored	  to	  Israel	  under	  a	  scheme	  funded	  by	   the	   Israeli	   Government	   and	   administered	   by	   the	   Australasian	   Union	   of	  Jewish	   Students	   targeted	   at	   people	   “who	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   lengthy	  involvement	   in	   politics	   in	   their	   countries”.381	   Other	   National	   Party	   members	  identified	  as	   supportive	  of	   Israel	  by	  members	  of	   the	   Jewish	  community	  who	   I	  spoke	   with	   include	   Finlayson,	   Defence	   Minister	   Wayne	   Mapp,	   and	   Trade	  Minister	  Tim	  Groser.	  Mapp	  has	  signified	  an	  eagerness	  to	  make	  an	  official	  visit	  to	  








Israel	   in	   his	   capacity	   as	   Minister	   of	   Science	   and	   approached	   MFAT	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  broadening	  research	  sector	  contacts	  in	  science	  and	  technology.382	  	  Like	  Don	  McKinnon	  before	  him,	  McCully	  made	  an	  official	  visit	  to	  Israel	  relatively	  early	   into	   his	   first	   term	   as	   Foreign	   Minister	   as	   suggested	   by	   MFAT.	   He	   also	  visited	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  met	  with	  Palestinian	  Authority	  Prime	  Minister	  Salam	  Fayyad	   but	   did	   not	   request	   a	   visit	   to	   Gaza	   to	   meet	   with	   any	   Hamas	  representatives.	   Of	   his	   discussions	   with	   Fayyad,	   McCully	   explained	   that	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  had	  “microscopically	  watched	  the	  voting	  track	  record	  on	  various	   resolutions	   […]	   and	   regarded	   us	   as	   fair-­‐minded	   and	   balanced	   in	   our	  approach”.383	  He	  said	  that	  they	  distinguished	  New	  Zealand	  from	  countries	  who	  “have	  been	   simply	  pro-­‐Israeli	   on	  everything.”384	  He	  also	  met	  with	  many	  high-­‐ranking	  Israeli	  officials	  in	  government,	  including	  President	  Shimon	  Peres,	  Prime	  Minister	   Benjamin	   Netanyahu	   and	   the	   Leader	   of	   the	   Opposition.	   McCully	  acknowledged	  that	  these	  meetings	  were	  something	  Israeli	  leaders	  and	  officials	  “went	   out	   of	   their	   way	   to	   do	   as	   a	   demonstration	   of	   their	   appreciation”,	   and	  surpassed	  what	  might	  normally	  be	  expected	  for	  a	  visiting	  New	  Zealand	  Foreign	  Minister.385	  While	   in	   Israel	  McCully	  signed	  a	  working	  holiday	  scheme	  to	  allow	  Israeli	  tourists	  to	  work	  more	  easily	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  to	  encourage	  people-­‐to-­‐people	   links.	  This	  was	  publicised	  along	  with	  his	  meetings	  with	   Israeli	   leaders,	  but	   his	   visit	   to	   Ramallah	   was	   unreported	   in	   New	   Zealand	   and	   indeed	   many	  interviewees	  were	  unaware	  it	  had	  occurred.	  	  Rachel	  Korpus,	  President	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Federation	  of	  New	  Zealand	  argues	  that	  conservative	  governments	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  sympathetic	   to	   Israel	  because	  “they	   understand	   the	   bigger	   picture,	   the	   East	   meets	   West	   situation.”386	   Such	  strategic	   concerns	  were	   flagged	   in	   an	  MFAT	   brief	   to	  McCully	   and	   Key	   on	   the	  Middle	  East	  conflict.	  The	  paper	  argued	  that	  the	  Arab/Israel	  dispute	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  instability	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  thus	  “a	  significant	  negative	  








factor	  in	  wider	  Muslim	  perceptions	  of	  the	  West.”387	  It	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  dispute	  was	  exploited	  by	  Al	  Qa’ida	  “as	  a	  ‘legitimacy	  button’	  –	  something	  to	  push	  that	  will	  resonate	  with	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  as	  an	  example	  of	  western	  double	   standards	   and	  antagonism	   towards	  Muslims.”388	  Resolving	   the	  dispute	  would	   therefore	   help	   combat	   extremist	   forces.	   It	   also	   argued	   that	   Israel	   had	  become	  marginalised	  within	  international	  fora	  and	  stated	  that	  New	  Zealand	  felt	  that	   the	   high	   number	   of	   UN	   resolutions	   on	   the	   dispute	   was	   “unjustified,	   and	  should	  be	  rationalised.”389	  	  These	   sentiments	   must	   be	   contextualised	   however.	   New	   Zealand’s	   voting	  record	  in	  the	  UN	  has	  not	  changed	  substantially	  despite	  McCully’s	  recalibration.	  According	   to	  MFAT	  officials,	   there	   are	   three	  voting	   camps	  within	   the	  UN.	  The	  first	  includes	  most	  Non-­‐Aligned	  states	  as	  well	  as	  Arab	  and	  Muslim	  countries	  and	  considers	   most	   significant	   aspect	   of	   the	   conflict	   to	   be	   the	   plight	   of	   the	  Palestinians.	  A	  second	  camp	   is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  states	  who	  side	  with	   Israel	   and	  believe	   its	   security	   to	  be	  paramount.	  This	  group	   includes	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  scattering	  of	  Pacific	  Island	  states,	  and	  occasionally	  Australia	  and	  Canada.	  New	  Zealand	  belongs	  to	  the	  third	  camp	  whose	  goal	  is	  to	  promote	  “a	  middle	   ground	  dialogue”	   and	  negotiation	   as	   the	  means	   to	   achieve	   a	   two-­‐state	  solution.390	  	  Despite	  the	  changes	  since	  2008,	  New	  Zealand	  has	  not	  yet	  sought	  to	  reposition	  itself	  into	  the	  second	  group,	  and	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  McCully	  would	  incrementally	   make	   this	   shift.	   	   In	   the	   2010	   vote	   on	   whether	   to	   send	   the	  Goldstone	   Report	   to	   the	   Security	   Council	   for	   example,	   New	   Zealand	   voted	  alongside	   many	   European	   states	   in	   the	   majority,	   rather	   than	   siding	   with	  Australia,	   the	   US	   and	   Israel.	   Indeed	   McCully	   later	   commented	   that	   “we	   sit	  probably	  more	  naturally	  with	  the	  Europeans	  on	  these	  matters.”391	  	  The	  most	  fundamental	  change,	  described	  by	  MFAT	  as	  a	  “significant	  shift	  in	  our	  earlier	  approach”	  has	  been	  a	  strategy	  to	  “be	  more	  forthcoming	  with	  respect	  to	  








Israel’s	   ambitions	   for	   membership	   of	   international	   bodies”.392	   Israel	   was	  initially	  part	  of	  the	  group	  of	  Asian	  states	  within	  the	  UN	  but	  was	  disadvantaged	  in	   this	   group	   as	   a	   high	   number	   of	  member	   states	   sought	   to	   “frustrate	   its	   UN	  electoral	  ambitions”.393	  It	  consequently	  joined	  the	  ‘Western	  Europe	  and	  Others	  Group’	   in	   the	  UN	  on	  a	   temporary	  basis,	   and	  has	  also	  attempted	   to	   join	   “other	  like-­‐minded	   groups”.394	   New	   Zealand’s	   recalibration	   strategy	   consequently	  includes	   a	   more	   proactive	   approach	   in	   supporting	   Israel’s	   application	   to	   the	  OECD	   as	   well	   as	   a	   commitment	   to	   join	   any	   consensus	   formed	   about	   Israel’s	  attempted	   membership	   to	   western	   consultative	   groupings	   including	  JUSCANZ.395	   This	   is	   a	   distinct	   departure	   in	   tone	   from	   the	   Clark	   government,	  which	  under	  Winston	  Peters	  blocked	  the	  addition	  of	  Israel	  to	  JUSCANZ	  in	  2006	  on	   the	  basis	   that	  a	   “genuine	  consensus”	  did	  not	  exist	   for	   such	  a	  move	  despite	  intense	  American,	  Canadian	  and	  Australian	  pressure.396	  This	  recalibration	  of	  tone	  does	  draw	  the	  line	  on	  issues	  where	  like-­‐mindedness	  is	   problematic.	   A	   submission	   to	   McCully	   in	   January	   2009	   noted	   that	   Israel’s	  “non-­‐membership	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  puts	  them	  in	  a	  different	  camp	  on	   disarmament	   issues;	   and	   we	   have	   similar	   concerns	   in	   the	   human	   rights	  context.”397	   The	   recalibration	   has	   also	   seen	   New	   Zealand	   vote	   against	  Palestinian	   attempts	   to	   enter	   certain	   international	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	  World	  Health	  Organisation.	  Resolutions	  in	  non-­‐General	  Assembly	  bodies	  that	  deal	  with	  Palestinian	   issues	  were	   also	   voted	   against.	   Examples	   in	   this	   regard	   include	   a	  resolution	   in	   the	   UN	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	   on	   Palestinian	  women	   and	  certain	  paragraphs	  within	  the	  UN	  Interim	  Force	  in	  Lebanon	  resolution.	  Finally,	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New	  Zealand	  withdrew	  from	  the	  Durban	  Review	  Conference	  on	  Racism,	  which	  left	  Israel	  “particularly	  pleased”.398	  The	   recalibration	   also	   includes	   a	   subtle	   repositioning	   of	   General	   Assembly	  voting	   patterns.	   Resolutions	   in	   the	   UN	   on	   Israel	   or	   Palestine	   tend	   to	   fall	   into	  three	   categories:	   resolutions	   that	   favour	   the	   peace	   process;	   humanitarian	  resolutions;	   and	   process-­‐related	   resolutions.	   The	   last	   category	   of	   resolutions	  authorises	  other	   committees	  within	   the	  UN	   to	   report	   and	  publicise	   aspects	  of	  the	   situation	  within	   the	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territories.	   It	  was	   felt	   by	  MFAT	  that	  since	  it	  was	  “questionable	  whether	  the	  work	  adds	  anything	  to	  international	  efforts	   underway	   to	   bring	   about	   peace,	   or	   provides	   tangible	   humanitarian	  assistance	   to	   those	   on	   the	   ground,	   there	   are	   good	   grounds	   for	   reconsidering	  New	   Zealand’s	   traditional	   stance.”399	   The	   only	   change	   to	   be	   made	   on	   the	  process-­‐related	  resolutions	  between	  the	  63rd	  and	  64th	  Sessions	  of	  the	  Assembly	  was	   regarding	   the	   resolution	   entitled	   ‘Division	   for	   Palestinian	   Rights	   and	   the	  Secretariat’.	  New	  Zealand’s	  vote	  changed	  from	  an	  abstention	  to	  a	  negative	  vote	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  “was	  not	  a	  constructive	  use	  of	  resources”	  and	  “did	  little	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  Peace	  Process.”400	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  these	  recalibrations	  do	  not	  radically	  alter	  the	  application	   of	   even-­‐handedness.	   Rather	   they	   signify	   a	   small	   realignment	   of	  foreign	  policy	  that	   inches	  towards	   increased	  compatibility	  with	  the	  pro-­‐Israeli	  camp	  but	   remains	   firmly	  within	   the	  boundaries	   of	   the	  middle	  position	  within	  the	  UN.	   Tone	   and	   nuance	   are	   studied	  with	   such	   intense	   concentration	   in	   this	  conflict,	   both	   domestically	   and	   internationally,	   that	   any	   recalibration	   is	   noted	  immediately.	  After	  the	  2008	  Israeli	  incursion	  into	  Gaza,	  the	  American	  Embassy	  in	   Canberra	   noted	   the	   details	   of	   their	   conversation	   with	   Israeli	   Ambassador	  Yuval	  Rotem,	  who	  was	  also	  accredited	  New	  Zealand.	  Rotem	  explained	   that	  he	  was	   pleasantly	   surprised	   with	   the	   responses	   from	   both	   New	   Zealand	   and	  Australia	   to	   the	  war	  and	  noted	   that	   the	  new	  National	  government	  had	  been	  a	  




























CONCLUDING	  STATEMENTS	  	  
The story of New Zealand’s relationship with Israel over a period of sixty-five years 
is one of remarkable continuity interrupted periodically by the acts of individuals 
responding to either deep personal convictions or international trends. Beneath the 
veneer of an official policy committed to an even-handed stance on the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, lies a complex tale of shifting attitudes and changing language that has 
redefined the image of Israel in New Zealand political circles. The bilateral 
relationship is not an especially significant one to either country, but the high level 
of public and political interest in Israel has brought about a need for the relationship 
to be examined in depth and with dispassion. 
A lack of existing secondary resources necessitated an account drawing upon 
archival material and interviews. As a result, this research should very much be 
viewed as a ‘first cut’ account of the relationship with ample space and opportunity 
to expand on certain areas and delve further into various issues. Following a semi-
chronological structure, this thesis has tracked the development of the relationship 
from the formation of Israel under the UN Partition Plan through until the 
presentation of credentials by the new Israeli Ambassador in May 2010. Although a 
discussion purely focussed on the official policy of even-handedness is almost banal, 
as despite slight recalibrations by various Ministers the policy has remained 
remarkably consistent over time, dynamic tonal undercurrents in the relationship 
expose a more complicated tale of shifting attitudes and realignments. This thesis 
consequently argues that the attitudes of political elites within New Zealand have 
undergone major shifts as they responded to international trends or as certain causes 
were pressed by key individuals within New Zealand. These international shifts 
generally meant that by the late 1970s Israel began to shift from a left-wing cause to 
a right-wing fascination.  
The ‘Golden Age’ of the relationship came in the period around the Fraser and Nash 
years when Israel was seen as a shining example of idealism, socialism, new 
beginnings and pluckiness in the midst of a hostile region. During this time key 
individuals within the New Zealand Labour Party were enamoured with Israel and 








passionate speech in support of the formation of Israel in 1945, and his conservative 
diplomat Carl Berendsen fought for the adoption of the Partition Plan even in the 
face of British resistance. Moreover, although Sid Holland was not as enamoured 
with Israel, his representative in the UN, Sir Leslie Munro, espoused a more pro-
Israeli position than perhaps the Government would have liked. The one-sided nature 
of the relationship in this period was clear. New Zealand had no diplomatic 
representatives in the Middle East and links between states were largely sustained 
through personal connections. The lack of diplomatic connections with Arab states in 
this time meant that sympathy lay firmly with the Israeli cause. 
In the second period (1960 – 1975) ties remained cordial, although towards the end 
of the Rowling government, New Zealand was compelled to exercise a more 
balanced position in response to global economic incentives. Support for Israel 
initially came from conservative leader Keith Holyoake who was careful to ensure 
that New Zealand’s sympathetic position was sufficiently well understood by the 
Israelis. The Six-Day War in Israel was perceived as a further ordeal for the small 
state, but its occupation of Palestinian territories after the war created a degree of 
animosity from within the Department of External Affairs, which prioritised the 
application of international law in international relations. However the extent to 
which the Department influenced the tone of the relationship after this event was 
negligible. Attitudes remained generally positive. Norman Kirk was a friend of Israel 
who strongly supported and idealised some of its social policies, including the 
Kibbutz movement. He was replaced by Rowling, another supporter of Israel, but 
New Zealand policy began to shift towards a more even-handed position after the 
advent of the first oil shock forced the Government to establish robust ties with the 
Arab states and Iran.  
This manipulation of the relationship by external events continued into the third 
period of the relationship (1975 – 1999) and indeed became much more pronounced. 
The second oil shock encouraged the Muldoon Government to diversify its trading 
interests and establish robust relationships with the Arab states. This was eagerly 
embraced by Muldoon to the extent that he would confidently explain to journalists 
that New Zealand would be more likely to come down on the side of the Arabs over 








the relationship, less tangible factors relating to social justice concerns were also 
casting doubt on the Israeli cause. Israel’s invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1982 as 
well as its ongoing flouting of international law gradually began to change 
perceptions of the state within New Zealand. Thus, by the time of the Fourth Labour 
Government, Israel had ceased to become a cause that most Labourites could relate 
to, and attention instead turned to the plight of the Palestinians. The Bolger 
Government, which governed for the final decade of the twentieth century, returned 
the relationship to a degree of cordiality expressed primarily as a desire for open 
dialogue. This approach however was of a disinterested nature, especially once ties 
were restored and the Bolger government’s attention turned to other global issues.  
The final period explored the changing tone of the relationship under the Clark and 
Key Governments (1999-2010). The Clark Government included several key 
individuals, notably the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had 
closely followed the Palestinian cause and did not see Israel through the same 
romantic lens that earlier Labour Governments had. Their views were much more in 
line with the positions of other social democrat states. Irritants in the relationship 
such as the criticism of Israel’s security wall in the West Bank and Goff’s visit to 
Arafat did not help matters, however, relations were most severely hurt by the 
Passport Scandal which remains the lowest point of the relationship. Ties were 
frozen for a year when Israel failed to take responsibility for the actions of its agents 
and not reinstated until an acceptable apology was received. In 2008 a more 
conservative Government was elected under John Key. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Murray McCully, set about deliberately recalibrating the relationship to a 
position more favourable to Israel. This recalibration has not significantly altered the 
application of even-handedness despite a major shift in tone, and based on the 
historical record, the thesis concludes New Zealand is unlikely to move from its 
“middle” position in the UN to one that overtly favours Israel.  
Two broad themes have been identified in this study as explanatory factors behind 
changing attitudes. The first was the extent to which individuals acting as a result of 
instinct, passion, or prejudice have redirected the rhetoric and tone of the 
relationship. Certain people stand out quite clearly in this regard: Peter Fraser, Carl 








Carson, Helen Clark, Phil Goff and Murray McCully. When a strongly motivated 
individual took an interest they were able to substantially alter the tonal direction of 
the relationship. Muldoon, for example, was responsible for a major shift away from 
Israel and towards the Arab states and Iran during his period as leader as he was 
strongly motivated by pursuing an economic interest in the Middle East. 
The second theme discussed is the importance of factors outside New Zealand in 
altering the direction of the course of the relationship. This under-examined 
phenomenon dictated how groups in New Zealand, reacting to external events or 
trends, would respond to Israel. This thesis argues that, as is certainly the case with 
‘nationalist’ accounts of New Zealand foreign policy, there has been too much 
emphasis on internal, domestic factors at the expense of broader influences. In the 
case of Israel, material pressures after the 1970s oil shocks combined with the 
growing influence of international social justice concerns worked to influence and 
redirect political attitudes in New Zealand.  
 
Where to go from here 
One goal of this thesis was to set down a substantive foundational basis for a history 
on the New Zealand-Israel relationship to date. Unfortunately, space constraints and 
the dearth of secondary material meant that aspects of the relationship were not able 
to be analysed here. Some of these deserve a much greater level of academic 
attention than could have been accommodated in this thesis. The final paragraphs of 
this thesis will consequently identify six areas where further research is needed. 
First, the role and influence of people-to-people links between New Zealanders and 
Israelis deserves close scrutiny. The importance of these links has been identified by 
both Israel and Palestine as a major priority in their public diplomacy campaigns. In 
the case of Israel, significant resources are spent encouraging well-placed individuals 
to make a trip to Israel to give them a more rounded impression of the country, 
beyond the news headlines. Several of the interviewees for this research had been on 
such trips including MPs, business people, journalists and academics. This aspect of 
the relationship was further enhanced by Foreign Minister McCully’s visit to Israel 








of discussion. This provides a greater incentive for New Zealanders and Israelis to 
work, holiday and study in each others countries.  Personal links between individuals 
within Arab states and New Zealanders before the oil shocks also need scrutiny, in 
order to allow us to understand how these links may have influenced governmental 
responses towards economic and security issues in the Middle East.  
As well as people-to-people links, there is also great scope to better understand the 
role of other non-governmental actors in the direction of foreign policy. Business 
and trade links between Israel and New Zealand are increasingly being promoted by 
both states. There are opportunities for business partnerships, especially in the fields 
of science and technology – particularly agricultural and geothermal technology. 
Trade with Israel is minimal at present. Exports from New Zealand totalled only $52 
million and imports from Israel totalled $120 million for the year ended December 
2008.403 There are serious barriers - religious, economic and political  - to overcome 
if this is to be improved. For example New Zealand has recently passed legislation 
which rules that animals are to be stunned before killing, something which 
problematises the practice of kosher kill. On the economic side, Israel has high tariff 
and non-tariff barriers which have de-prioritised trade to Israel. Finally, on the 
political front there are significant issues arising from the trading of dual-use 
technologies. This has been a domestic issue in New Zealand in the past in light of 
protest activities organised against an Auckland company, Rakon, which was 
accused of manufacturing crystal oscillators used in the guidance systems of smart 
bombs that were sold to the Israel Defence Force.404   
There is also a fascinating project to be pursued which would assess the role of 
religious connections or church activism. There is a tumultuous history of religious 
support for criticism of Israel and Jewish people more generally. Father Burns, a 
Catholic priest in Wellington was one of the most vocal critics of Israel’s incursion 
into Gaza in 2008-2009. In an act which received substantial publicity, Burns poured 
red paint over a memorial to Yitzhak Rabin as well as a few drops of his own blood. 
On the other hand, the Christian Friends of Israel make up a substantial component 
of support for Israel within New Zealand and have been active in lobbying 
                                                      
403 Information obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade under the Official 
Information Act 1982 








campaigns. There is also great potential for a research project that would track the 
increasing activism from NGOs like Amnesty International or Crisis Watch as well 
as the remarkable internationalisation of the Israel-Palestine dispute. Especially in 
the context of the 2010 Aid Flotilla tragedy, it would be of value to explore the 
politicisation of aid in this conflict and examine the motivations of New Zealand aid 
workers like Nicola Enchmarch to fight for the cause of a people far removed from 
New Zealand.  
Another remarkable component of the relationship is the nature of attitudes from 
Māori towards Israel. To some extent there has been a significant amount of 
fascination about Israel from Māori with some iwi groups even claiming to be one of 
the ten lost tribes of Israel. On the other hand, there have been attempts by some 
Māori to link Māori and Palestinian issues together in a sort of indigenous solidarity 
claim. One Māori activist to do this is Te Kupu who travelled to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories to write and record a section for a ‘rapumentary’ about such 
oppressed peoples’ connections.405 This rapumentary is entitled ‘Ngatahi – Know the 
Links’ and the Palestinian section includes politically charged songs including ‘West 
Bank Cage’, ‘The Apartheid Wall’ and ‘The Reign of the Thief’. Other aspects of 
Māori connection to Israel involve studies that have been done by Israeli scholars 
who have analysed the Treaty of Waitangi in an attempt to better understand the 
extent to which this treaty could serve as a useful tool for understanding the potential 
future legalistic dimensions of the Israel/Palestine dispute.  
Rather than pursue a trilateral history of the ties between New Zealand and Palestine 
alongside the relationship with Israel, I chose to narrow the scope down to only 
examining the bilateral ties between Israel and New Zealand. There were several 
reasons for this. First, the thesis already covers an enormous period of history in this 
thesis and could only do justice to one facet of the relationship. Second, there has 
never been a Palestinian Embassy or Information Office in New Zealand so the 
opportunity to explore archival material was more limited. Third, other academics 
like Ron Macintyre and Nigel Parsons have been fastidiously documenting the New 
                                                      
405 A rapumentary is described by Te Kupu as a “hiphop infused music-documentary without 
narration, featuring spoken word performance and conscious discourse interwoven with music.” A 









Zealand-Palestine relationship, particularly from the mid-1980s until now. Finally, 
because New Zealand does not officially recognise Palestine, I believed it may have 
been more difficult to get forthright comments on the relationship and consequently 
thought it necessary to establish a solid understanding of the New Zealand-Israel 
relationship initially so this could be used as a springboard to examine the 
relationship with Palestine later. Thus, the New Zealand-Palestine relationship is one 
that deserves a much greater exploration than has currently been completed.  
 A final major component in this area that should be pursued is the examination of 
the convergences and (significant) divergences between New Zealand and Australian 
attitudes and policies towards Israel. These differences were alluded to by several of 
the interviewees including both the Israeli and Palestinian Ambassadors. Australia 
has tended to be more overtly supportive of Israel right from the beginning of 
Israel’s formation and can often be included in the ‘pro-Israel’ voting camp in the 
UN. Australia has also had leaders like Bob Hawke who was so passionate about the 
Israeli cause that he was sometimes reduced to tears on national television. This level 
of perceived personal interest in Israel or Palestine has not been replicated in New 
Zealand. The differences between the Jewish communities of the two states are 
substantial and could be a possible explanatory factor behind the divergences. The 
Australian Jewish community is much bigger and more effective at lobbying than its 
New Zealand counterpart. Finally, Australia’s identity as a rising middle power is 
another possible factor behind the neighbourly differences. Australia’s more robust 
relationship with the United States and its desires to become a serious international 
player may have led it to take a less impartial stance towards the conflict than New 
Zealand would be comfortable with. 
Thus, in conclusion there is considerable scope for further research in various 
components of this relationship beyond that of the diplomatic and historical nature of 
this thesis. It is hoped that the research undertaken for this thesis will provide future 
researchers with a firm foundation upon which to conduct further investigations into 
the relationship as well as to explore the comparative nature of relations with Israel 
within the Asia-Pacific region. One aim of this thesis was to provide a context 
through which to explain the progression of a dynamic and shifting relationship 








analysis of two broader themes within New Zealand’s foreign affairs and to explain 
how interaction between the outside world and key individuals inside New Zealand 
has impacted on this relationship. In doing so, it is hoped that there will be a better 










Books,	  Journal	  Articles	  and	  Speeches	  Abadi,	  Jacob,	  ‘New	  Zealand-­‐Israeli	  Relations:	  The	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Imperatives’,	  The	  Round	  Table,	  No.	  351,	  1999	  Ashby,	  Michael,	  ‘Fraser’s	  Foreign	  Policy’	  in	  Margaret	  Clark	  (ed.),	  Peter	  Fraser:	  
Master	  Politician,	  (Palmerston	  North:	  Dunmore	  Press,	  1998)	  Bassett,	  Michael,	  ‘New	  Zealand’s	  Security	  Blanket’,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Issue	  135,	  Mar/Apr,	  2003	  Bassett,	  Michael	  and	  King,	  Michael,	  Tomorrow	  Comes	  the	  Song:	  A	  Life	  of	  Peter	  
Fraser,	  (Auckland:	  Penguin,	  2000)	  Beach,	  Andrew,	  ‘NZ-­‐PLO	  Dialogue	  Boosted’,	  Evening	  Post,	  20	  June	  1989	  Beaglehole,	  Ann,	  A	  Small	  Price	  to	  Pay:	  Refugees	  from	  Hitler	  in	  New	  Zealand	  1936-­
46,	  (Wellington:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1988)	  Beaglehole,	  Ann,	  Facing	  the	  Past:	  Looking	  Back	  at	  Refugee	  Childhood	  in	  New	  
Zealand,	  (Wellington:	  Victoria	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  Bruce	  Brown,	  ‘Holyoake’s	  Precursors’,	  in	  Clark	  (ed.),	  Holyoake’s	  Lieutenants,	  (Palmerston	  North:	  Dunmore	  Press,	  2003)	  	  Brown,	  Bruce,	  ‘The	  Middle	  East	  after	  the	  Cold	  War’,	  New	  Zealand	  International	  








Clark,	  Helen,	  ‘NZ	  Receives	  Formal	  Apology	  From	  Israel’,	  Beehive	  Press	  Release,	  26	  June	  2005,	  available	  from	  http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/23486,	  accessed	  6	  June	  2010	  Clune,	  Dan,	  ‘Gaza:	  Australian	  Response	  Makes	  Israeli	  Ambassador	  Happy’,	  January	  9	  2009,	  available	  from	  The	  Australian,	  http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-­‐affairs/australian-­‐wikileaks-­‐cables/story-­‐fn59niix-­‐1225971723172,	  accessed	  January	  3	  2011	  Cohen,	  David,	  ‘When	  ‘Sorry’	  Isn’t	  Enough’,	  The	  Jerusalem	  Report,	  August	  9	  2004	  Cullen,	  Michael,	  ‘Opening	  Remarks’	  in	  Margaret	  Clark	  (ed.),	  For	  the	  Record:	  
Lange	  and	  the	  Fourth	  Labour	  Government,	  Wellington:	  Dunmore	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2005	  The	  Dominion,	  ‘PLO’s	  Kaddoumi	  on	  Low-­‐Key	  Visit’,	  The	  Dominion,	  5	  April	  1995	  Enright,	  Paul	  Thomas,	  New	  Zealand’s	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Partitioning	  of	  Palestine	  
and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel,	  (Otago:	  University	  of	  Otago	  Press,	  1982)	  Espiner,	  Colin,	  ‘Apology	  Not	  Enough	  for	  PM,	  Jewish	  Graves	  Attacked,	  Opposition	  Visit	  Off’,	  The	  Press,	  17	  July	  2004	  Garnier,	  Tony,	  The	  Hunter	  and	  the	  Hill:	  New	  Zealand	  Politics	  in	  the	  Kirk	  Years,	  (Auckland:	  Cassell	  New	  Zealand,	  1978)	  Goff,	  Phil,	  ‘NZ	  welcomes	  Court	  ruling	  on	  Israeli	  wall’,	  Parliament	  Press	  Release,	  12	  July	  2004,	  available	  from	  http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/20299,	  accessed	  1	  September	  2009	  Gustafson,	  Barry,	  His	  Way:	  A	  Biography	  of	  Robert	  Muldoon,	  (Auckland:	  Auckland	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  Gustafson,	  Barry,	  Kiwi	  Keith:	  A	  Biography	  of	  Keith	  Holyoake,	  (Auckland:	  Auckland	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  Hager,	  Nicky,	  ‘Mossad	  Man’s	  History	  of	  Bungles’,	  Sunday	  Star	  Times,	  27	  February	  2005	  Haywood,	  Margaret,	  Diary	  of	  the	  Kirk	  Years,	  (Wellington:	  Reed	  Publishing,	  1981)	  Hensley,	  Gerald,	  ‘Muldoon	  and	  the	  World’,	  in	  Margaret	  Clark	  (ed.),	  Muldoon	  








Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  ‘Statement	  to	  the	  Urgent	  Debate	  on	  the	  Raid	  on	  the	  Flotilla’,	  2	  June	  2010,	  available	  from	  http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/02/statement-­‐flotilla-­‐attack,	  accessed	  20	  June	  2010	  James,	  Colin,	  ‘Norman	  Kirk,	  Robert	  Muldoon,	  David	  Lange,	  and	  Helen	  Clark	  –	  and	  John	  Key’,	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  60,	  No.	  2,	  2008	  The	  Jerusalem	  Post,	  ‘Meeting	  with	  New	  Zealand’,	  The	  Jerusalem	  Post,	  15	  March	  1992	  Key,	  John,	  Speech	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  Wellington,	  8	  August	  2008	  Kilroy,	  Simon,	  ‘Visits	  to	  Israel	  Begin	  Again’,	  The	  Dominion,	  11	  May	  1989	  Len,	  Jackie,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  Gets	  Ready	  to	  Elect	  Third	  Jewish	  Prime	  Minister:	  John	  Key,	  Son	  of	  an	  Australian	  Jewish	  Women,	  Enjoys	  Big	  Lead	  in	  Polls’,	  The	  
Jerusalem	  Post,	  1	  August	  2008	  Levine,	  Hal	  and	  Geneztsvey,	  Michelle,	  ‘The	  Wellington	  Cemetery	  Desecrations	  of	  2004:	  Their	  Impact	  on	  Local	  Jews’,	  Journal	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Studies,	  Issue	  4/5,	  Oct	  2005-­‐2006	  Levine,	  Stephen,	  ‘A	  Spreading	  Stain’,	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  Chronicle,	  August	  1989	  Levine,	  Stephen,	  ‘New	  Zealand’,	  in	  Encyclopaedia	  Judaica,	  Vol.	  12,	  2007	  Locke,	  Keith,	  ‘Give	  Israeli	  Nuclear	  Whistleblower	  a	  Kiwi	  Passport’,	  Green	  Party	  
of	  Aotearoa	  New	  Zealand	  Website,	  20	  March	  2005,	  http://www.greens.org.nz/press-­‐releases/give-­‐israeli-­‐nuclear-­‐whistleblower-­‐kiwi-­‐passport,	  accessed	  3	  September	  2009	  Lynch,	  Jacqui,	  ‘Palestinian	  Recognition	  Urged’,	  The	  Dominion,	  21	  June	  1989	  Macintyre,	  Ron,	  ‘Editorial’,	  New	  Zealand/	  Aotearoa	  Palestine	  Review,	  No,	  2,	  1989	  Macintyre,	  Ron	  (ed.),	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Politics,	  Energy	  and	  
Trade,	  (Christchurch:	  University	  of	  Canterbury	  Press,	  1985)	  Macintyre,	  Ron,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Question’,	  in	  New	  








Maley,	  Paul,	  ‘Mossad	  Chief	  Expelled	  from	  Australia	  Amid	  Passport	  Alert’,	  The	  
Australian,	  1	  June	  2010	  McCraw,	  David,	  ‘New	  Zealand’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  Under	  National	  and	  Labour	  Governments:	  Variations	  on	  the	  ‘Small	  State’	  Theme?’	  Pacific	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  67,	  No.	  1,	  1994	  McCraw,	  David,	  ‘New	  Zealand’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  Under	  the	  Clark	  Government:	  High	  Tide	  of	  Liberal	  Internationalism’,	  Pacific	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  78,	  No.	  2,	  2005	  	  McCully,	  Murray,	  ‘Israeli	  Ambassador	  Called	  In’,	  Beehive	  Press	  Releases,	  1	  June	  2010	  McGeough,	  Paul,	  ‘The	  Plot	  to	  Kill	  Hamas:	  How	  Canada	  Got	  Tangled	  in	  an	  Israeli	  Assassination	  Plan	  that	  Reverberates	  in	  the	  Mideast	  Still’,	  The	  Toronto	  Star,	  28	  February	  2009	  McGibbon,	  Ian,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  Defence	  Policy’,	  in	  Bruce	  Brown	  (ed.),	  New	  
Zealand	  in	  World	  Affairs:	  1972-­1990,	  (Wellington:	  Victoria	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  McGibbon,	  Ian	  (ed.),	  Undiplomatic	  Dialogue:	  Letters	  Between	  Carl	  Berendsen	  and	  
Alister	  McIntosh	  1943-­52,	  (Auckland:	  Auckland	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  McGibbon,	  Ian	  (ed.),	  Unofficial	  Channels:	  Letters	  between	  Alister	  McIntosh	  and	  
Foss	  Shanahan,	  George	  Laking	  and	  Frank	  Corner	  1946-­66,	  (Wellington:	  Victoria	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  McKinnon,	  Malcolm,	  Independence	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  World	  
Since	  1935,	  (Auckland:	  Auckland	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  ‘Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict:	  New	  Zealand	  Position’,	  New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  Website,	  4	  August	  2009,	  available	  from	  http://mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-­‐Relations/Middle-­‐East/2-­‐Arab-­‐Israeli-­‐conflict.php,	  accessed	  15	  June	  2010	  	  Morris,	  Ya’akov,	  I	  Met	  Four	  Gulls	  and	  Other	  Poems,	  (Wellington:	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  Chronicle	  Press,	  1982)	  Murdoch,	  Simon,	  ‘Muldoon	  in	  the	  World’,	  in	  Margaret	  Clark	  (ed.),	  Muldoon	  
Revisited,	  (Palmerston	  North:	  Dunmore	  Press,	  2004)	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  ‘Goff	  criticised	  over	  Arafat	  meeting’,	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  27	  May	  2003	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  ‘Holocaust	  Denier	  Irving	  May	  Try	  to	  Enter	  NZ	  Next	  Week’,	  








New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  ‘Refugees	  Jailed	  for	  Huge	  Passport	  Conspiracy’,	  New	  
Zealand	  Herald,	  21	  December	  2004	  	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  ‘WikiLeaks	  Cable:	  NZ	  Remains	  Cool	  to	  Israeli	  JUSCANZ	  Participation’,	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  December	  19	  2010	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  Chronicle,	  ‘Untitled’,	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  Chronicle,	  Vol.	  1,	  No.	  7/8	  April/May,	  1945	  New	  Zealand	  Jewish	  Council,	  ‘Statement	  of	  the	  Auckland	  Jewish	  Communities	  Response	  to	  the	  Auckland	  Regional	  Labour	  Party	  Conference	  Resolutions	  Concerning	  the	  PLO’,	  Educational	  Papers,	  No.	  12,	  1983	  The	  New	  Zealand	  National	  Party,	  The	  National	  Government	  1949-­1954,	  (Wellington,	  1955)	  O’Sullivan,	  Fran,	  ‘Israel	  Visit	  Prickly	  Issue	  for	  Key’,	  New	  Zealand	  Herald,	  5	  June	  2010	  Peters,	  Winston,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  Israel	  Trade	  Association	  Annual	  Trade	  Awards’,	  Speech,	  17	  February	  2006,	  available	  from	  http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/24960,	  accessed	  3	  May	  2010	  Phillips,	  Jock,	  ‘A	  Nation	  of	  Two	  Halves’,	  New	  Zealand	  Listener,	  Vol.	  204,	  No.	  3452,	  2006	  Powles,	  C.	  Guy,	  The	  New	  Zealanders	  in	  Sinai	  and	  Palestine,	  (Auckland:	  Whitcombe	  and	  Tombs,	  1922)	  Rabel,	  Roberto,	  ‘New	  Zealand’s	  Wars’	  in	  Giselle	  Byrnes	  (ed.),	  The	  New	  Oxford	  
History	  of	  New	  Zealand,	  (South	  Melbourne:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  Radosh,	  Ronald	  and	  Allis,	  ‘Righteous	  Among	  the	  Editors:	  When	  the	  Left	  Loved	  Israel’,	  World	  Affairs,	  Summer,	  2008	  Rainbow,	  Stephen,	  The	  Changing	  Attitude	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Towards	  Israel	  from	  
1948-­1993,	  (Palmerton	  North:	  International	  Pacific	  College,	  1997)	  Reeve,	  Simon,	  One	  Day	  in	  September:	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  1972	  Munich	  Olympic	  








Steinberg,	  Gerald	  M.,	  ‘Soft	  Powers	  Play	  Hardball:	  NGOs	  Wage	  War	  Against	  Israel’,	  Israel	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  12,	  No.	  4,	  2006	  Taylor,	  Phil,	  ‘The	  Rakon	  Files:	  NZ	  Company’s	  Weapons	  Role’,	  Weekend	  Herald,	  27	  May	  2006	  Templeton,	  Hugh	  (ed.),	  Mr.	  Ambassador:	  Memoirs	  of	  Sir	  Carl	  Berendsen,	  (Wellington:	  Victoria	  University	  of	  Wellington	  Press,	  2009)	  Templeton,	  Malcolm,	  Ties	  of	  Blood	  and	  Empire:	  New	  Zealand’s	  Involvement	  in	  
Middle	  East	  Defence	  and	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  1947-­57,	  (Auckland:	  Auckland	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  Trevett,	  Claire	  and	  Carter,	  Bridget,	  ‘Angry	  Prime	  Minister	  Hammers	  Israel’,	  New	  
Zealand	  Herald,	  16	  July	  2004	  Washington,	  Sally,	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Oil	  Crisis	  on	  New	  Zealand’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  Trade	  Initiatives	  Towards	  the	  Middle	  East’,	  in	  Ron	  Macintyre	  (ed.),	  New	  
Zealand	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Politics,	  Energy	  and	  Trade,	  (Christchurch:	  University	  of	  Canterbury,	  1987)	  Woods,	  Richard,	  ‘Notes	  for	  a	  Talk	  to	  Canterbury	  University	  Pols	  303	  Students’,	  Speech,	  10	  September	  1991	  Zwartz,	  David,	  ‘Israel’s	  Birthday	  an	  Occasion	  Worth	  Celebrating’,	  in	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Herald,	  May	  13	  2008	  
	  
















Tzur,	  Shemi,	  Ambassador	  of	  Israel,	  (Wellington,	  9	  and	  23	  June	  2010)	  Zwartz,	  David,	  Honorary	  Consul	  for	  Israel,	  (Wellington,	  22	  July	  2009)	  	  




Cabinet	  Files	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  ‘Memorandum	  for	  Cabinet:	  De	  Jure	  Recognition	  of	  Israel’,	  Wellington,	  21	  July	  1950,	  Cabinet	  Office	  Files,	  CAB	  303/10/1	  
	  
Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files	  Berendsen	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Memorandum’,	  15	  May	  1950,	  Department	  of	  External	  
Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/4/4	  Part	  1	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  ‘Memorandum:	  Israel	  –	  Developments	  Since	  Recognition’,	  17	  June	  1949,	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/4/4	  Part	  1	  Fraser,	  Peter,	  ‘Letter	  from	  Mr	  Fraser	  to	  Mr	  Goldman’,	  15	  Mat	  1947,	  Department	  
of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/5/2	  Part	  5	  Fraser,	  Peter,	  ‘Letter	  from	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  Kerjessod	  Jerusalem’,	  19	  September	  1945,	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA277/5/2	  Part	  2	  Fraser,	  Peter,	  ‘Personal	  for	  Mr	  Attlee	  from	  Mr	  Fraser’,	  17	  September	  1947,	  








Munro,	  Leslie,	  ‘Statement	  on	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  Question’,	  17	  January	  1957,	  
Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/5/9	  Part	  5	  Phillips,	  Louis,	  ‘Letter	  to	  Mr	  Fraser	  from	  Louis	  Phillips’,	  2	  May	  1947,	  Department	  
of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/5/2	  Part	  5	  Sharett,	  Moshe,	  ‘Letter	  from	  Moshe	  Sharett	  to	  Frederick	  Doidge’,	  10	  August	  1950,	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/4/4	  Part	  1	  Templeton,	  Malcolm,	  ‘Letter	  to	  O.	  Paul	  Gabites	  from	  Malcolm	  Templeton’,	  6	  June	  1950,	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Files,	  EA	  277/4/4	  Part	  1	  	  	  
	  
Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  Wellington,	  ‘Security	  Council	  Background	  Paper’,	  Wellington,	  15	  March	  1966,	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files,	  KL	  305/1/1	  Part	  1	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Confidential	  Memorandum:	  Israel-­‐Syria’,	  14	  October	  1966,	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files,	  KL	  305/2/2	  Part	  1	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Confidential:	  Prime	  Minister	  Secretary	  for	  External	  Affairs’,	  30	  June	  1967,	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files,	  KL	  305/2/4	  Part	  1	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Middle	  East	  for	  Corner	  from	  Laking’,	  30	  June	  1967,	  
Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files,	  KL	  305/2/4	  Part	  1	  
	  
Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Head	  Office	  Files	  Cooper,	  W.	  E.,	  ‘Question	  for	  Oral’,	  4	  August	  1982,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  277/2/5	  Part	  2	  Corner,	  Frank,	  to	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘Relations	  with	  Israel’,	  28	  June	  1974,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  61/277/1	  Part	  1	  Day,	  Cecil,	  to	  Secretary	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  ‘Israel-­‐Syrian	  Affair:	  Lake	  Huleh’,	  12	  April	  1951,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  471/2/1	  Part	  1	  Drucker,	  P.P.	  to	  B.	  Talboys,	  ‘Letter:	  re:	  Israel’,	  31	  July	  1980,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  Dunn,	  D.	  of	  the	  American	  and	  Middle	  East	  Division	  to	  Mr	  Roberts	  and	  Mr	  McArthur,	  ‘Knesset	  Delegation:	  Call	  on	  Prime	  Minister’,	  16	  March	  1979,	  Head	  








Eskrigge,	  I.G.,	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Wellington,	  ‘Middle	  East:	  New	  Zealand/Israel’,	  16	  July	  1979,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  Evening	  Post,	  ‘Carter’s	  ‘wooing’	  of	  Jewish	  vote	  doesn’t	  sit	  well	  with	  Muldoon’,	  29	  October	  1980,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  Foreign	  Affairs	  staff,	  ‘Scribbled	  notes	  on	  the	  transcript	  of	  a	  radio	  interview	  with	  Ya’akov	  Morris’,	  6	  –	  8	  May	  1982,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  3	  Fuhrman,	  O.C.W.,	  quoted	  in	  a	  Departmental	  Dispatch,	  ‘The	  Israel/Syrian	  Dispute,	  Australian	  Legation	  Tel	  Aviv’,	  4	  June	  1951,	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Head	  Office	  Files,	  471/2/1	  Part	  2	  Gosling,	  C.J.,	  to	  Mr.	  Talboys,	  ‘Letter’,	  5	  February	  1979,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  Kirk,	  Norman,	  quoted	  in	  Ministry	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  ‘Israeli	  Representation	  in	  New	  Zealand’,	  25	  January	  1973,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  61/277/1	  Part	  1	  	  McCully,	  Murray,	  to	  Mr.	  Talboys,	  ‘Letter’,	  24	  September	  1981,	  Head	  Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  3	  Morris,	  Ya’akov,	  ‘Morning	  Report	  Transcript’,	  Date	  not	  Recorded,	  Head	  Office	  
Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  	  Munroe,	  Sir	  Leslie	  to	  Mr	  T.	  Clifton	  Webb.	  ‘Letter’,	  16	  February	  1954,	  Ministry	  of	  








Secretary	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  to	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘Alleged	  Defamation	  of	  a	  Former	  Officer	  of	  NZUSA	  by	  the	  Israeli	  Ambassador’,	  27	  June	  1979,	  Head	  
Office	  Files,	  58/277/1	  Part	  2	  
	  
New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files	  Canberra	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Israel	  and	  the	  UN’,	  23	  July	  1975,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/16	  Part	  2	  	  Canberra	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Visit	  of	  Israeli	  Counsellor:	  Middle	  East	  Situation’,	  16	  February	  1970,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/14	  Part	  8	  	  Corner,	  F.H	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Memorandum’,	  10	  July	  1958,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  1	  	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  ‘Israel	  and	  the	  Arabs:	  The	  Palestinian	  Question’,	  August	  1966,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  1	  Eban,	  Abba	  to	  Sir	  Leslie	  Munroe,	  ‘Letter’,	  25	  January	  1955,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission,	  NYP	  3/11/13	  Part	  2	  Holyoake,	  Keith	  to	  Levi	  Eshkol,	  ‘Letter’,	  9	  June	  1967,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  3	  Holyoake,	  Keith,	  ‘Message	  from	  Keith	  Holyoake	  to	  Abba	  Eban’,	  2	  December	  1966,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/12	  Part	  2	  Laking,	  G.	  R,	  ‘Notes	  prepared	  for	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  for	  a	  call	  by	  the	  Israeli	  Ambassador’,	  Mr	  Simcha	  Pratt,	  13	  June	  1969,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  8	  	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘31st	  Regular	  Session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  UN	  1976:	  Question	  of	  Palestine;	  The	  Middle	  East	  Situation’,	  27	  September	  1976,	  
New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP3/11/15	  Part	  16	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  in	  Wellington,	  ‘34th	  Session	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly’,	  21	  September	  1979,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  19	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘Notes	  on	  Meeting:	  Muldoon	  meets	  with	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  Arab	  League	  (Mahmaoud	  Riad)	  Cairo’,	  2	  April	  1977,	  New	  York	  








Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘Transcript	  of	  Interview	  between	  Mr	  Mohammed	  Salamawi	  and	  Robert	  Muldoon’,	  10	  September	  1981,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  22	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  ‘Vote	  on	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  Question	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly’,	  4	  July	  1967,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  1	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Commentary	  No.	  2:	  Middle	  East’,	  18	  December	  1973,	  
New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/14	  Part	  14	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Commentary	  No.	  7:	  The	  Middle	  East’,	  14	  December	  1971,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/14	  Part	  11	  	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Middle	  East	  Crisis’,	  31	  May	  1967,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  1	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Middle	  East	  Crisis’,	  12	  June	  1967,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  3	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Recent	  Illegal	  Israeli	  Measures’,	  2	  November	  1977,	  
New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/14	  Part	  17	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Recent	  Illegal	  Israeli	  Measures’,	  1	  December	  1977,	  
New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/14	  Part	  17	  New	  York	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘UN	  General	  Assembly	  31:	  Item	  29:	  Middle	  East	  (Israeli	  Draft)’,	  7	  December	  1976,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  16	  New	  Zealand	  Consulate	  General	  in	  Bahrain,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Do	  We	  Have	  a	  Policy?’	  29	  July	  1981,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  22	  Office	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  ‘New	  Zealand	  deplore	  escalation	  of	  violence	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Israel’,	  29	  July	  1993,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  3/11/14	  Part	  4	  Rome	  to	  Wellington,	  ‘Memorandum’,	  21	  June	  1967,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  








Wellington	  to	  Canberra,	  ‘Jewish	  Volunteers	  for	  Israel’,	  9	  June	  1967,	  New	  York	  
Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  3	  Wellington	  to	  Jakarta,	  ‘Israel	  and	  the	  UN:	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Foreign	  Ministers	  Meeting,	  Lima’,	  25	  August	  1975,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/16	  Part	  2	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Confidential	  Memorandum:	  Israel-­‐Syria’,	  14	  October	  1966,	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  High	  Commission	  Files,	  KL	  305/2/2	  Part	  1	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Israel	  and	  the	  UN’,	  16	  July	  1975,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  
Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/16	  Part	  2	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘Israel/Jordan’,	  17	  November	  1966,	  New	  York	  
Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/12	  Part	  2	  Wellington	  to	  New	  York,	  ‘UN	  General	  Assembly:	  Plenary:	  Item	  25:	  Middle	  East’,	  6	  December	  1979,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  19	  Wellington	  to	  Washington,	  ‘Middle	  East’,	  18	  September	  1967,	  New	  York	  
Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  5	  Wellington	  to	  Washington,	  ‘Visit	  of	  US	  Congressmen:	  Sinai	  MFO’,	  12	  August	  1981,	  New	  York	  Permanent	  Mission	  Files,	  NYP	  3/11/15	  Part	  22	  
	  
New	  Zealand	  Parliamentary	  Debates	  Cullen,	  Michael,	  Matt	  Robson,	  and	  Rodney	  Hide,	  ‘Motions	  –	  Jewish	  Graves	  and	  Chapel,	  Wellington	  –	  Vandalism’,	  New	  Zealand	  Parliamentary	  Debates,	  First	  Session,	  47th	  Parliament,	  Vol.	  619,	  2004,	  p.	  14715	  Muldoon,	  Robert,	  New	  Zealand	  Parliamentary	  Debates,	  Second	  Session,	  37th	  Parliament,	  Vol.	  391,	  1974,	  p.	  2644	  	  Nash,	  Walter,	  New	  Zealand	  Parliamentary	  Debates,	  Second	  Session,	  31st	  Parliament,	  Vol.	  308,	  1956,	  p.	  615	  	  Rowling,	  William,	  New	  Zealand	  Parliamentary	  Debates,	  Second	  Session,	  37th	  Parliament,	  Vol.	  391,1974,	  p.	  5467	  
	  








	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  A/RES/181	  (II):	  Future	  Government	  of	  Palestine,	  29	  November	  1947	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/242	  (1967),	  22	  November	  1967	  	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/338,	  22	  October	  1973	  
	  
Labour	  Party	  Remits	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Fraternal	  Delegations”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1979	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “International	  Affairs	  Remits	  23	  and	  24”,	  Conference	  
Report,	  1983	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Remit	  6.1.5”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1989	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Remit	  86”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1983	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Remit	  114”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1975	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Remit	  210”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1988	  New	  Zealand	  Labour	  Party,	  “Remit	  231”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1987	  Rowling,	  Bill,	  “Foreign	  Affairs:	  Introduction	  to	  Remits”,	  Conference	  Report,	  1983	  	  
Official	  Information	  Act	  Requests	  Information	  obtained	  from	  Crown	  Law	  under	  the	  Official	  Information	  Act	  1982,	  received	  on	  22	  March	  2010	  Information	  obtained	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  under	  the	  Official	  Information	  Act	  1982,	  received	  on	  5	  May	  2010	  Information	  obtained	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  under	  the	  Official	  Information	  Act	  1982,	  received	  on	  30	  June	  2010:	  	  	  	   “Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict:	  New	  Zealand	  Policy”,	  19	  December	  2008	  	   “Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict:	  New	  Zealand	  Position”,	  24	  February	  2009	  “Relations	  with	  Israel	  and	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict:	  New	  Zealand	  Position	  Update”,	  3	  September	  2009	  	  
